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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Statement of the Problem 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the knowledge 
and understanding of elementary school principals in 
Massachusetts regarding the legal principles underlying 
the responsibilities of their position. 
2. Importance of the Study 
"The greatest single influence on the 
is the school principal, no matter what he 
school climate 
11 does.'.' This 
statement by Flanders points up a peculiar situation when 
contrasted with the assertion by Remmlein that principals 
" •••• should relieve themselves of the anomaly of being in 
v 
the ambiguous position they actually occupy." 
A position of such prime educational significance as 
the elementary school principalship has no express 
definition in Massachusetts and varies considerably 
ijNed A. Flanders, "The Administrator's Role in the 
Improvement of Instruction," The Elementary School Journal 
(October, 1956), 57:35. 
g}Madaline K. Remmlein, "Legal Principles for Principals," 
The National Elementary Principal (February, 1953), 
32:29-30. 
1 
in its scope and function from community to community. The 
Twenty-Seventh Yearbook of the National Association of 
v 
Elementary Principals reached the conclusion that " •••• his 
~he elementary school principaU status ranges from that 
of a head teacher, whose administrative and supervisory 
activities are limited, to that of a strategic professional 
leader." 
The recently completed study of the elementary school y 
principalship by the same organization did not indicate 
any significant change in this status. 
Although much has been written concerning what the 
principal ought 
may legally do • 
to do, little has been written of what he 
v O'Keefe states that the " •••• propriety 
of every rule, practice, and procedure of the school 
system depends, ultimately, on conformity with some 
principle or principles of law." 
Yet the principal, all too frequently, appears to be 
deficient in his understanding of the legal framework 
l/National Association of Elementary Principals, The 
Elementar School Princi alshi , Toda and Tomorrow, 
Twenty-Sevent Yearbook, 1 , National Education 
Association, Washington, D. C., p. 18. 
5/National Association of Elementary Principals, The 
Elementary School Principalship, Thirty-Seventh Yearbook, 
1958, National Education Association, Washington, D. c. 
1/William J. O'Keefe, Teachers and Their Legal Rights, 
The Author, Portia Law School, Boston, Massachusetts, 
1940' p. iii. 
') 
... 
upon which public education in general and his position 
in particular is based. This deficiency is noted by y 
Bolmeier in his statement: "There is mounting evidence to 
indicate that many school principals do not realize that 
the public school system is a creature of law, to be 
governed by law, and even to serve as an arm of the law." 
A similar concern for the importance of this knowledge 
of the legal structure of the public school system on the 
part of school personnel is voiced by Hamilton and y 
Reutter: 
"But anyone concerned in any way with the schools 
should be alert to the basic legal rights, duties, 
privileges, and responsibilities entailed in the public 
school enterprise. The stake in good public education 
of school administrators, teachers and other employees, 
parents, and citizens-at-large is so great and 
dependent on legal considerations that a general 
knowledge of this field is essential." 
A beginning principal, or a principal assuming a 
position in a new community, often has no reference to 
which he can turn for authoritative guidance. The rules 
and regulations of the local school committees appear 
seldom to furnish comprehensive assistance. The statutes 
1/E. C. Bolmeier, "The School Principal's Proper Concept 
of School Law," Bulletin of the National Association of 
Secondary School Principals, (March, 1958), 42:1-8. 
3./Robert R. Hamilton and E. Edmund Reutter, Jr., Legal 
Aspects of School Board Operation, Bureau of Publications, 
Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, 1958, 
p. v. 
3 
mention the principal rarely. The use of ruling case law 
is a considerable task. In addition to this lack of 
reference, there is a very real conflict as to what the 
role of the principal actually is in the thinking of 
school committee members, superintendents of schools, 
the general public, and even the principals themselves. 
In view of the singular importance of the position, 
its present lack of definition, and the absence of any 
ready reference for clarification, the investigator feels 
that a major task of real import needs to be accomplished. 
This task includes defining the principalship, establish-
ing clearly the inherent authorities and responsibilities 
of the position, and developing a guide of valid ruling 
principles clearly applicable to the functioning of 
elementary school principals in Massachusetts. Within 
such a framework, a principal could work effectively with 
that confidence that comes from knowing what his responsi-
bilities are and what he can do to meet those responsi-
bilities. 
Such a task is beyond the scope of a single study. 
But a first real step would be the derivation from 
authoritative sources of certain basic legal principles 
which govern a large part of the principal's work and an 
evaluation of the knowledge and understanding of these 
principles by Massachusetts elementary school principals. 
This the investigator proposes to do, Upon such knowledge 
could be built further steps aimed at the accomplishment 
of the larger task, that of a firm foundation of author-
itative guidance for the principal in his role as a 
professional leader in public school administration. 
3. Scope 
The process of legal research is concerned primarily 
with the legal aspects of public school administration in 
Massachusetts. The study of statutory law is confined 
to the Massachusetts statutes. The judicial decisions 
of Massachusetts are used as the basis of common law 
concepts with recourse to the decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court and courts of record in other 
states only when the points at issue have not been 
adjudicated in this state, are not clear-cut, or need 
comparison with other decisions for greater meaning. 
The rules and regulations of 89 city and town school 
committees are included in the analysis of rules and 
regulations of the local boards of school control. 
The 148 elementary school principals, whose test 
responses furnish the data for analysis, represent 34 
communities of Eastern Massachusetts. 
5 
4. Definition of Terms 
.v Boards of School Control "An administrative body 
entitled to exercise such powers and duties as are defined 
by statute or those which are necessarily implied thereby." y 
Elementary School "A school offering work in any 
combination of grades from one to eight." 
11 Principal "The administrative head and professional 
leader of a school division or unit, such as high school, 
junior high school, or elementary school." y 
.:.P.::u:.::bc.::l:..:i:.::c:......:S::.;c:..:h:::o::.;o:::..l:. "A s cho o 1 u sua 11 y o f e 1 em en tary or 
secondary grade, organized under a school district of the 
state, supported by tax revenues, administered by public 
officials, and open to all." 
l7Brannon v. Board of Education, 124 N. E. 234 (Ohio). 
ycarter v. Good, et al., Dictionary of Education, 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1946, p. 149. 
_y'Ibid., p. 307. 
_y'Ibid., p. 320. 
6 
CHAPTER II 
A REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE 
1, Research Studies of the Evaluation of 
the Knowledge of Elementary School 
Principals of Legal Principles 
A review of the literature showed no reported research 
of an objective nature concerned with an evaluation of 
the knowledge of elementary school principals of the legal 
principles underlying the responsibilities and authorities 
of their position either in Massachusetts or elsewhere in 
the United States. 
2, Research Studies in School Law of 
Special Concern to Elementary School 
Principals 
Two major studies have dealt with the problem of 
school law in a manner of significant interest so far as y 
this particular study is concerned, Turner was committed 
to the idea that particular stress should be placed upon 
the principles of law and that from these principles 
practical application could be made to the actual school 
situation. When those who make the decisions understand 
1/Rex A. Turner, The Principles of School Law with Appli-
cation to Alabama's Public School System, Unpublished 
Doctoral Dissertation, Alabama Polytechnic Institute, 1955. 
7 
the principles of law involved, they should be then able 
to chart intelligently their course of action. To this 
end, Turner attempted to develop a summary of the basic 
principles of school law, which would serve the school 
administrator or teacher in the same manner as a course 
in business law serves the business administrator. It 
was designed specifically to provide for school admin-
istrators and teachers those competencies in legal matters 
that are relevant to the administration and good order 
of the public school system, with special reference to 
Alabama. Turner felt that such a study would serve a 
similar purpose for school board members. 
To develop this summary of basic principles, Turner 
employed three research procedures: 
1. The reading of the constitutional and legislative 
enactments that pertained to the Alabama public 
school system. 
2. The briefing of Alabama Supreme Court cases and 
the opinions of the Alabama Attorney General 
involving schools. 
3. The briefing of the supreme court cases of other 
states where a particular point or principle of 
law involving school matters had not come before 
the Alabama Supreme Court. 
From the research procedures listed above,Turner 
8 
organized these principles of school law into six major 
areas: 
1. Police power 
2. Corporations 
3. Contracts 
4. Torts 
5. Loco parentis 
6, Due process, 
v Johnston endeavored to determine the legal status of 
the public school principal in the United States, The 
three purposes of his study were: 
1. To discover the constitutional and statutory 
provisions of state governments; the rulings of 
courts of law; and the rules and regulations of 
boards of school control which apply directly to 
the public school principal 
2, To ascertain in what manner these various factors 
enlarge or proscribe the province of the 
principal 
3. To summarize and report on the general principles 
of the legal status of the public school principal 
which could be deduced from the above fields of 
1/Joseph M. Johnston, The Legal Status of the Public 
School Principal in the United States, Unpublished 
Doctoral Dissertation, Uniiersity of North Carolina, 1953. 
9 
study. 
Johnston believed that such a study was dictated by 
the need for understanding of the legal scope on the part 
of school administrators of the nature of their official 
position. As Johnston expressed it: 
y 
"With all these ramifications of the law as a 
part of the school systems of the country, it is 
mandatory for those who would seek to work under a 
system of such complexity to have an understanding 
of the legal scope, not only of the entire system, 
but more particularly of their official position 
in it." 
In his research into previous studies on this subject, 
Johnston found that only meager research had been done in 
this area. In addition, he found that the professional 
literature was especially deficient in regard to the legal y 
aspects of the principal's work. 
"The literature of public school administration 
has been especially barren in respect to the legal 
status of the public school principal. Much has been 
written concerning what the principal ought to do; 
little has been written in connection with what he 
may legally do and what he must, by law, refrain 
from doing." 
Some of the conclusions reached by Johnston, expressed 
briefly were: 
1. A knowledge of statutory law, school board rules 
and regulations, and court cases affecting the 
1/0p. cit., p. 5. 
gjibid., p. 7. 
10 
principal are a necessary part of the equipment 
of any person who attempts to fill this office 
in any school system. 
2. If the powers, duties, and responsibilities of 
the principal were to be only those found in law, 
the office would be sadly lacking in many of the 
elements necessary to make it function as it must. 
3. Much of the present day status of the principal 
derives from history, and this is not always for 
the best. 
4. Legislatures are loath to change laws already 
written, and as a consequence those powers, duties, 
and responsibilities given by the statutes are not 
necessarily those which are dictated by present 
day conditions. 
5. Local school boards are somewhat more responsive 
to the ideas of authorities in the field of edu-
cation, and consequently, many more of them are 
incorporated in rules and regulations than in 
statutes. 
6. The recognition of the principal as the person in 
charge of all elements of the school should be 
given by the inclusion of a section in the 
statutes and the rules and regulations delegating 
to the principal all necessary power, subject 
11 
to higher authority, to administer, organize, 
and supervise his particular school. 
7. State statutes dealing with school law need 
extensive codification. It is now well nigh im-
possible to discover with any degree of complete-
ness the entire picture of the legal status of any 
one individual, 
8. Regulations of boards of school control are not 
universal enough. 
9. No cases directly affecting the school principal 
have reached the United States Supreme Court. y 
Suzzallo published an excellent historical research 
study early in this century dealing with the rise of local 
school supervision in Massachusetts. His purpose was to 
trace the development of the school committee through its 
four major characteristic stages during the early period. 
His description of the development of the school committee, 
of special significance to Massachusetts school personnel, 
showed clearly the nature of the forces involved in the 
creation of a board of local school control and the steps 
involved in the emergence of the school committee as it 
now exists. 
1/Henry Suzzallo, The Rise of Local School Supervision in 
Massachusetts, Teachers College, Columbia University, 
Contributions to Education, Number 3, 1906. 
12 
Kiernan used the historical approach to determine 
whether the "school committee possesses the sole and 
exclusive right to establish the budget and bind a 
coterminous municipality to underwrite sufficient funds y 
to guarantee its efficient operation~ He analyzed the 
positions of the two conflicting points of view,that of 
a strong, fiscally independent school board and that of 
municipal control of the financing of public education. 
He discussed in detail fifteen major decisions of the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts most relevant to 
the problem and six supplemental decisions of the same 
body. He reached the conclusion that the court has clearly 
held that the school board is a body with essentially 
complete fiscal independence from the municipal government. 
The study would serve as an excellent reference work for 
any student interested in this area of school law, 
A number of research studies have been made which 
to the school principal. 
aspect of school law of concern y 
Hamilton reviewed some 800 cases 
deal with one particular 
in an attempt to carry out these purposes: 
1(owen B. Kiernan, The Lefal Position of the Massachusetts 
School Committee in Relat on to Financing Education, Un-
published Doctoral Dissertation, Harvard University, 1950, 
2/0tto T. Hamilton, The Courts and the Curriculum, Teachers 
College, Columbia university, Contributions to Education, 
Number 250, 1927. 
13 
1. To discover those issues, pertinent to the curric-
ulum of the public common schools, that have been 
adjudicated by the higher judicial tribunals of 
the states and the nation 
2. To isolate and reveal some legal principles that 
had been decisive of cases in which the issues 
involved were related to the curriculum of the 
public schools, and which might serve as prac-
tical aids to those who may be confronted by 
legal questions pertaining to the curriculum 
3. To discover trends in the attitude of the judi-
cial tribunals towards issues pertinent to the 
curriculum. 
Two trends noted by Hamilton in 1927 would seem to 
have been justified by the history of the past 30 years 
since his study was published: 
1. The construing of broader and more definite powers 
to the local school officials in making all nec-
essary and reasonable rules and regulations for 
carrying out their duties. 
2. The lessening of the parent's absolute and arbi-
trary right to determine what studies his child 
shall pursue. 
..,_ y 
A statement by Hamilton that his study of the many 
court decisions gave him considerable confidence in the 
courts in their adjudication of school cases is echoed at 
this present date by this investigator. 
"It is believed by the author that nowhere else 
in this country can evidences of more careful, con-
siderate, and conscientious thinking upon curricular 
problems be found than in the opinions of the judges 
of the courts of the land. After a year of intensive 
study of the decisions relating to the curriculum of 
the public schools, the author has the feeling of 
great confidence in the courts in regard to the 
adjudication of curricular controversies." 
To this, the investigator of the present study would 
add that the courts, as their recorded decisions attest, 
today seem to be among the staunchest supporters of 
public education, its purposes, its officials, and its 
workers. y 
Uhlman attempted to discover the methods by which 
state legislatures had exercised control and direction 
of the public schools through legislation. From his 
review of the multitude of statutory enactments of state 
legislatures, he attempted to determine the pattern of 
control established especially through special legislation 
and to discover apparent trends in the area of special 
1Jop. cit., p. 156. 
2/Alexander s. Uhlman, Special Lefislation Affecti~ Public 
~chools, Teachers College, Columb a University, Cori:ribu-
tions to Education, Number 353, 1929. 
15 
legislation. Special legislation, as opposed to general 
laws, was a means of setting up special educational 
programs and policies for certain specified or classified 
towns. Uhlman noted that such special legislation was be-
coming less frequent and was becoming constitutionally 
forbidden in many states. He felt that such a trend was 
highly desirable in that special legislation produced a 
fragmentary collection of educational law which led 
inevitably to confusion and administrative difficulty. 
Little special legislation was reported as having been 
enacted in Massachusetts, which appeared to have estab-
lished a pattern of desirable general legislation from 
early times in educational history. 
A study which complemented the research reported y 
above was done by Matzen at Teachers College two years 
later, This study attempted to discover the ways and 
the extent to which the several states have made consti-
tutional provision for education along certain lines, 
especially with reference to the state board of education, 
the chief county school officer, land grants for common 
schools, state universities, state normal schools, and 
common school funds; to show the nature and trends of 
1fJohn M. Matzen, State Constitutional Provisions for 
Education, Teachers College, Columbia University, Contri-
butions to Education, Number 462, 1931. 
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these provisions; and to indicate the significance of those 
trends. From his examination of one hundred twenty-eight 
constitutions and the numerous amendments thereto, he 
noted several trends, the most significant of which was 
probably the trend away from the ex officio type board 
of education to one of elected or appointed members, 
usually laymen well known in the state for civic leader-
ship and public service. y 
Flanders attempted to discover the subject matter 
of instruction which was prescribed by legislative enact-
ment for the public elementary schools at the time of the 
study, 1923, and at two earlier periods, 1903 and 1913. 
By comparison, trends could be noted. He found notable 
increases in many subject areas, especially in the field 
of health and nationalism. He feared a continuance of 
the trend of increasing legislative prescription of the 
elementary curriculum, stating: 
" •••• our legislators are pursuing a course 
which, if persisted in, will eventually deprive the 
pupils of the advantage of professional leadership 
in this field. If we continue to increase the 
number of subjects required and to hedge them about 
with detailed specification, it is only a question 
of time when the legislature will have assumed entire 
responsibility for the course of study."?) 
1/Jesse K. Flanders, Legislative Control of the Elementary 
Curriculum, Teachers College, Columbia University, Contri-
te Education, Number 195, 1925. 
5/Ibid., p. 180. 
17 
His warning to educators of their lack of consider-
ation of legal prescription in curriculum construction is 
still very applicable: 
"Students of education commonly assume that the 
making of a curriculum is a professional undertaking; 
and that the limiting factors are the nature and the 
needs of the child. Books dealing with the principles 
of curriculum construction usually take no account of 
legal prescription; surveys in their recommendation 
for changes in the course of study seldom, if ever, 
provide for meeting such requirements. Nevertheless, 
in any actual situation, the curriculum must conform 
to the existing laws of the state and to any new laws 
which may from time to time be adopted •••• For educa-
tors to assume that they can solve their problems 
without reference to the action of legislators is 
obviously unwarranted."!/ 
?] 
Tidwell attempted to ascertain and compare the legal 
status of textbook selection and provision in the several 
states, being especially concerned with textbook uni-
formity laws and free texts laws. The study showed a 
wide variety of practices on these two points at the 
time of the study, 1928. Of interest was the fact that 
Massachusetts was included in highly desirable categories 
in the groupings on both major points. In fact, Tidwell 
stated that Masssachusetts was the first state to make 
free textbooks mandatory throughout the state in 1884. 
yrhid., p. 3. 
S/Clyde J. Tidwell, State Control of Textbooks, Teachers 
College, Columbia University, Contributions to Education, 
Number 299, 1928. 
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.!1 
Poe attempted to reveal and interpret legal liability 
for the injury of children in such a way that school admin-
istrators and teachers would have a better understanding 
of the extent of their obligations to their pupils. To do 
this, he compared the legal liability for the injury of 
children in out of school situations with the liability 
for the injury of pupils in public schools. His special 
concern was that the application of the knowledge of legal 
liability would, in addition to helping administrators 
avoid liability, act to the interest of the children by 
stimulating precautionary measures to aid in the reduc-
tion of the number of injuries to them. This deep 
concern with pupil safety was thus expressed: 
y 
"Educators have a moral responsibility to make 
the learning process safe for pupils. In most states, 
this moral responsibility is accompanied by a legal 
responsibility to do so. The difference between the 
two is that in the former the educator must answer 
to his conscience and public opinion; in the latter, 
a court may force him to pay damages." 
v Fuller also investigated the area of tort liability, 
being especially concerned with the historical development 
and then current status of the tort liability of school 
1/Arthur c. Poe, School Liability for Injuries to Pupils, 
Teachers College, Columbia University, Contributions to 
Education, Number 828, 1941. 
Yibid., p. 8. 
J/Edgar Fuller, Tort Liability of School Districts in the 
United States, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Harvard 
university, 1940. 
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districts. Primarily through statutory and case research, 
he ascertained the historical background of the develop-
ment of the common law theory of school district immunity 
from tort liability and noted the many statutory and 
judicial deviations from the common theory. He agreed 
with the many writers on the subject that statutory 
abrogation of the common law theory of non-liability of 
school districts should be enacted and that a greater 
20 
degree of uniformity should be effected among the several states 
in the legal theory of tort liability of school districts. 
]} 
Bender 1 through a comprehensive review of court cases 
involving the enforcement of school attendance laws, 
assembled data on the methods and degree of enforcement 
of school attendance laws, determined the legal be.ses 
for compulsion of attendance, and evaluated the adequacy 
of the methods of enforcement. As an outgrowth of his 
reading of many judicial decisions, Pender made the 
following observation: "Their decisions [!he court~ 
have greatll;strengthened free, universal, and popular 
education." This reaction of Bender showed the same 
strong approval of the courts' attitude toward public 
1/John F. Bender, The Functions of the Courts in Enforcing 
School Attendance Laws, Teachers College, Columbia Univer-
sity, Contributions to Education, Number 262, 1927 • 
.§_/Ibid., P• 180. 
11 
education as expressed by Hamilton in his study previously 
reported in this chapter. 
In his study of the development of the teacher tenure 
gj 
system, Meagher compared the beginnings of teacher tenure 
with the origin of the civil service for the workers of 
various governmental agencies. He noted that the first 
two instances of substantial movement toward tenure for tea-
chers took place in Massachusetts, The first was the Act 
of 1886, passed by the Massachusetts General Court, which 
permitted local school systems to employ teachers for a 
period longer than a yeer. This was followed in 1889 by 
the passing of a rule by the Boston School Committee, 
which provided for a probationary period of one year, 
followed by four years of annual election, and then a 
permanent appointment. 
'ij 
A survey reported by McCabe resulted in a comnilation 
of replies from the Attorney General of the several states 
to a questionnaire inquiring as to the status of school 
district liability for i~juries suffered by school nunils. 
McCabe found that the doctrine of non-liability was still 
1/0tto T. Hamilton, op. cit., p. 156. 
2/Thomas F. Meagher, Effect of Tenure Legislation in the 
Schools, Unpublished Mas ter 1 s Thesis, Boston University, 
1932. 
3/Robert V. McCabe, Survey and Analysis of State Lews to 
Determine Liebility of School Boards or School Funds for 
Student Injuries, Unpublished Service Paper, Boston 
University, 1948. 
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honored in the vast majority of states. He concluded that 
the status of the law on liability was confusing and in-
consistent and recommended that the common law immunity of 
school districts be abrogated by legislative action, that 
laws of the "save-harmless" types be enacted in the sev-
eral states, and that some attempt at uniformity be made 
among the several states on the matter of liability for 
pupil injuries, y 
Robinson has recently written three excellent book-
lets on the powers and duties of school committees. These 
booklets were sponsored by the Massachusetts Association 
of School Committees in an attempt to make available to 
the present and future members of local school committees 
some of the basic school law of Massachusetts of vital 
interest to the proper understanding of the functioning of 
school committees in this Commonwealth. The three areas 
encompassed are the financial powers of school committees, 
1/Joseph Robinson, Powers and Duties of School Committees, 
Part I, Financial Powers, Massachusetts Association of 
School Committees, New Bedford, 1957. 
Powers and Duties of School Committees, 
Part II, General Powers, Massachusetts Association of 
School Committees, New Bedford, 1957. 
Powers and Duties of School Committees, 
Part III, Structure and Operation, Massachusetts 
Association of School Committees, New Bedford, 1958, 
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the Leneral powers of school committees, and the structure 
and operation of school committees. The areas are dis-
cussed in view of both the statutes and the judicial 
decisions having bearing on the statutes. Intendec'. 
primarily for school committee members, these booklets 
should be a part of the library of every school adminis-
trator in Massachusetts. 
The Research Division of the National Education 
Association has published, from time to time, bulletins 
and articles dealing with school law. Two of the more 
recent and pertinent deal with sectarian instruction and 
1/ 
court cases involving teachers and pupils. The first-
summarized the legal status of the three majo10 phases of 
the sectarian issue: the elimination of church cont :rol 
over community schools, the introduction of religious 
doctrine into the educational program, and the efforts 
to obtain aid for sectarig,in schools from public 
The more recent bulletin grouped the 715 cases 
sources. 
involving 
teachers reported between 1942 and 1957 into the followinc 
categories: 
1. Contract and tenure 
1/National Education Association, Research Division, The 
State and Sectarian Education, Research Bulletin (Deceiii'Eier, 
1956), Volume 34, Number 4, Washington, D. c. 
2/National Education Association, Research Division, 
~esearch Bulletin, (April, 1958), Volume 36, Number 2, 
Washine;ton, D. C. p. 59. 
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2. Salary cases 
3. Liability for pupil injuries 
4. Loyalty cases 
5. Other types of cases. 
Contract and tenure cases represented about one-half of 
the total number. y 
In the second article of this bulletin of relevance 
here, a summary was made of the nature of the cases in 
which public school pupils were litigants. Six groups 
were noted: 
1. Pupil injury cases 
2. Admission and attendance 
3. Segregation 
4. Sectarian education 
5. Transportation cases 
6. Discipline cases. 
For the entl.re period surveyed, pupil injury cases were 
the most numerous. 
In summation, three major points stand out. First, 
there is a real paucity of good research in the general 
field of school law. Second, virtually no concern with 
school law as it affects the elementary school principals 
has been indicated. Third, in the face of the fact that 
l/Op. cit., P• 62. 
public education is primarily a state function and school 
law must be considered in terms of the individual state 
in which the teacher and administrator carry on their 
duties, no significant research in the field of school 
25 
law affecting the teacher or administrator in Massachusetts 
is reported, These three points, when considered in 
conjunction with the dates of many of the studies 
reported - more than twenty-five years for the most 
part - indicate that there is a tremendous need for much 
study in both the general area of school law, and the 
more specialized area of school law as it affects the 
functioning of teachers and administrators. 
3. Necessity for Research into Statutory and Case Law 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the knowl-
edge and understanding of elementary school principals 
in Massachusetts regarding the legal principles underlying 
the responsibilities of their position, 
However, as indicated in the previous sections, there 
is virtually no reported research dealing with the specific 
topic of this study. Neither are there any standard tests 
in the field of school law. No material has been pub-
lished which includes both a general overview of those 
legal aspects of public school administration relevant 
to the principalship and a specific delineation of those 
legal principles which apply in Massachusetts. There 
is no developed source of material from which an evalu-
ation instrument can be developed, 
Consequently, there needs to be developed an over-
view of those topics of school law of pertinence to 
elementary school principals, which would state the 
basic legal principles within these topics and which 
would be valid for the country as a whole, Integrated 
into this overview there must be statements as to the 
applicability of these principles in Massachusetts, 
noting the specific manner in which these principles 
have been applied and the instances of deviation in 
Massachusetts from the generally accepted principles. 
From such an overview, an evaluation instrument can be 
developed. 
The development of this overview requires reference 
to primary sources. Suc~yrofessional texts on school 
y y 
law as those by Hamilton and Edwards serve as 
general references. The two standard law encyclopediae, 
1/Robert R. Hamilton and Paul R. Mort, The Law and 
Public Education, The Foundation Press, Chicago, 
Illinois, 1941. 
ijNewton Edwards, The Courts and the Public Schools, 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois, 1955. 
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11 _g/ 
Americ:om Ju!'isprudence and Corous Juris Secuncum, make 
excellent startint; points. But the bulk of the !'esearch 
must be made in the series of legal reports in which are 
recorded the cases of the various courts of record in 
the United States, and the supreme judicial courts of the 
several states. The statutes of this commonwealth also 
furnish a significant body of material. 
The subsequent pages of this chapter present the 
results of this legal research in the foiTI of c e,eneral 
overview of the legal aspects of public school a.dminl. s-
tretion of concern to the principelshio and with special 
reference to r.•assach·J.setts. Such a presentstion is not 
duplicated in any other publication. This body of 
information forms the basis of the evaluation instrument. 
The use of primary soc1rces proves valusble in the 
development of the instrement because, throush the 
re&ding of the actual cases of record, a much clearer 
understanding is secured of the lege.l confl:i cts the.t 
have actually occ8.sioned litigation. The rending of the 
contendinc points of view and the judicial decision 
}Jii:iiierTc&nJurisoruoerce, Bancroft-V;ni_ tney '~om:n:ny, 
San J<rBncisco, California, The Lewyers Co-opere.tive 
Publishing Compeny, Rochester, New York, 1943. 
g/Corous Juris Secundum, American Law I'ook Company, 
Brooklyn, ~!ew Yorl;, 1956. 
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helps clarify the statutes involved, accentuates the 
points of view at issue, and makes possible the develop-
ment of an instrument composed of test situations closely 
approximating real situations that have already been 
adjudicated. 
4. The Goverr~ent and Education 
The Federal Government.-- The government of the 
United States is a government of delegated powers, It 
has no inherent powers but merely those powers expressly 
conferred upon it by the Constitution or those which are 
ll 
clearly implicit in the expressed powers. The Tenth 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution specifically 
reserves to the states all powers not expressly conferred 
2/ 
upon the Federal Government.- Thus, while the framers 
of the Constitution might well have delegated the area 
of public education to the Federal Government, they did 
not see fit to do so. The reasons for this are many. 
A vast system of public education did not then exist. 
The framers of the Constitution were, for the most part, 
products of religious or aristocratic schools. They were 
faced with more pressing problems than education. New 
1/United States v. Butler, 297 U. s. 1, 56 s. Ct. 312. 
g/United States Constitution, Amendment X. 
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and exigent motives for public education were yet to a-
rise from the changing political and social patterns. 
Yet, even during the period immediately preceding the 
Federal Constitution, the groundwork for a state 
operated system of free public education was being 
laid. The Land Ordinance of 1785 reserved one section 
of every township for the maintenance of public schools. 
Along with the incorporation of this provision, the 
Ordinance of 1787 stated the fundamental and much 
copied tenet that: "Religion, morality, and knowledge 
being necessary to good government and the happiness of 
mankind, schools and the means of education shall for-
gj 
ever be encouraged." 
Although education is a power reserved primarily 
to the states, the Federal Government is not completely 
excluded from any participation in public education. 
The power to expend money for public education can be 
found in the liberal interpretation of the general 
'jj 
welfare clause of the Constitution. While there has 
been no direct case involving education, there is 
little doubt that education would come within the 
l/Land Ordinance of 1785. 
gjNorthwest Ordinance of 1787. 
'j/United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8. 
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ll 
purview of that clause as interpreted by the court when 
it said that " •••• the power of Congress to authorize 
expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is 
not limited by the direct grants of legislative power 
.v found in the Constitution." In that same Butler case 
in which the court held the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
unconstitutional, the reasoning of the court implied that 
while the national government could not use the taxing 
power as an instrument to enforce the regulation of 
matters of state concern, it could enforce regulatory 
measures essential to accomplish the purpose of the 
expenditure where regulation was not the primary y 
purpose of the expenditure: 
"There is an obvious difference between a 
statute stating the conditions upon which moneys 
shall be expended and one effective only upon the 
assumption of a contractual obligation to submit 
to a regulation which otherwise could not be 
enforced, Many examples pointing to the dis-
tinction might be cited. We are referred to 
appropriations in aid of education, and it is 
said that no one has doubted the power of Congress 
to stipulate the sort of education for which money 
shall be expended." 
Too, in sustaining the Social Security Act, the court 
held that Congress could use the taxing power to induce 
cooperation between the state and federal governments in 
1/United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312. 
5/United States v. Butler, supra, 
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y 
meeting a nation-wide social need, In this category, 
education would seem to fall, 
A portion of the total revenue used for educational 
purposes is derived from the Federal Government. There 
is the income from early grants of lands and moneys to 
the several states and subsidies of several types. The 
Smith-Hughes Act of 1917 provided a subsidy for voca-
tional education in agriculture, home economics, and y 
industrial preparation, The George-Deen Act of 1937 
provided a similar subsidy for the distributive occu-
~ pations programs. Emergency funds were made available 
to public education during the depression years of the 
1930's, Federal aid for the school lunch program has 
been furnished to both public and parochial schools. 
Special aid has been given communities whose school 
systems have been overtaxed by an influx of population 
caused by the defense program. There are today many 
indications that the Federal Government will play an 
increasingly important part in the financing of public 
education. The proponents of such a policy urge that 
the vital importance of education necessitates the use 
1/Steward Machine Company v, Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 57 
S. Ct. 883. 
YThe Smith-Hughes Act, 1937. 
~The George-Deen Act, 1937. 
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of the wider tax structure available to the Federal Govern-
ment. 
The state government.-- In legal theory, education is 
an institution of the state and has been confirmed as such y 
in many decisions. The power to maintain a system of 
public schools is an inherent attribute of government just 
as is the power to tax or to administer justice. In its 
duty to promote the public welfare, the state finds its 
authority to tax for the maintenance of a public school y 
system, The power to compel education is a police power 
of a government, police power being defined as the inherent 
power of a government to carry out such functions as are 
necessary to the very survival of the state. Thus, the 
primary function of public education, so far as the law 
is concerned, is not to confer benefits upon individuals, 
but rather to assure the continuance of the existence of 
the state itself: 
y 
"The primary purpose of the maintenance of the 
common school system is the promotion of the general 
intelligence of the people constituting the body 
politic and thereby to increase the usefulness and 
efficiency of the citizens, upon which the govern-
ment of society depends. Free schooling furnished 
by the state ie not eo much a right granted to the 
pupils as a duty imposed upon them for the common 
l/City of Louisville v. Commonwealth, 121 s. w. 11 (Kent.); 
Thompson v. Board of Education, 90 A. (2d) 63 (N. J.); 
Morse v. Ashley, 193 Mass. 294. 
g/Bissell v, Davidson, 32 A. 348 (Conn.). 
YFogg v. Board of Education, 82 Atl, 173 (N. H,). 
good, If they do not voluntarily attend the schools 
provided for them, they may be compelled to do so, 
While most people regard the public schools as the 
means of great personal advantage to the pupils, 
the fact is too often overlooked that thQy are 
governmental means of protecting the state from 
the consequences of an ignorant and incompetent 
citizenship," 
In fact, the co~rts have recently gone so far as to 
state that " •••• today, education is perhaps the most 
.!1 important function,,,,of the state," This doctrine of 
education being primarily a state function and in ad-
dition being of prime importance has received sanction 
even from the United States Supreme Court. In the 
well-known Brown case on desegregation, that judicial 
body stated " •••• today, education is perhaps the most 
. y 
important function of state and local governments •••• " 
Almost universally throughout the states, the state 
constitution, as in Massachusetts, gives a general 
mandate to the state legislature to encourage and 
:v 
promote public education, 
"Wisdom and knowledge, as well as virtue, 
diffused generally among the body of the people, 
being necessary for the preservation of their rights 
and liberties; and as these depend on spreading the 
opportunities and advantages of education in the 
various parts of the country, and among the dif-
1/Board of Public Instruction v. State, 75 S. (2d) 832 (Fla.) 
g/Brown v, Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U. S. 294. 
]/Massachusetts Constitution, Chapter 5, Section 2. 
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ferent orders of the people, it shall be the duty 
of legislatures and magistrates, in all future 
periods of this commonwealth, to cherish the 
interests of literature and the sciences, and all 
seminaries of them; especially the university at 
Cambridge, public schools and grammar schools in 
the towns; to encourage private societies and 
public institutions, rewards and immunities, for 
the promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences, 
commerce, trades, manufactures, and a natural 
history of the country; to countenance and 
inculcate the principles of humanity and general 
benevolence, public and private charity, industry 
and frugality, honesty and punctuality in their 
dealings; sincerity, good humor, and all social 
affections, and generous sentiments, among the 
people." 
This constitutional mandate lays the basis for 
legislative control of the public educational system. 
In the exercise of this authority over education, the 
legislature has complete power unless restrained by the 
ll 
state constitution or the Federal Constitution. The 
courts are in agreement that the state constitutions 
are " •••• a limit upon, rather than a grant of power •••• " 
y 
to the legislatures and that the legislature need not look 
to the constitution for power but merely to see if the 
constitution restricts its authority in any given area. 
While the legislature may not delegate its legislative 
powers to any other agencies, it may create various admin-
istrative boards or agencies for the purpose of carrying 
1/Merrill Elementary School District v. Rapose, 271 P. (2d) 
522 (Cal.) 
g/Board of Public Instruction v. Wright, 76 s. E. (2d) 863 
"[Fla.). 
out the legislative policy, Thus, there have been created 
in Massachusetts, as in other states, two major types of 
agencies for the administration of the legislature's 
educational policies, namely, the local school committee 
and the state department of education, 
The school committee.-- In this commonwealth, responsi-
bility for the administration locally of state public educa-
tion is vested in the school committee. The school committee 
of Massachusetts corresponds to the more commonly used 
titles for boards of local school control of board of educa-
tion or school board, the designations used in most states. 
Each city and town must elect a school committee, A duly 
elected school committee is a quasi-corporation whose sole 
function is the administration of local public education 
and in whose hands lies all authority for carrying on the 
function of public education in its district, In its 
corporate capacity, a school committee is a state agency 
and is no part of town or city government, The Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts has said that " •••• still, 
in the end their ~he school committee] own decision when 
reached is the decision of the commonwealth, and is to y 
control." That same body in 1943 reiterated its opinion 
1/Morse v. Ashley, 193 Mass. 294. 
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as to the relation of the school committee to the local 
town and city government: 
y 
"The policy of the Commonwealth from early times 
has been to establish a board elected directly by the 
people separate from other governing boards of the 
several municipalities and to place control of the 
public schools within the jurisdiction of that body 
unhampered as to details of administration and not 
subject to review by any other board or tribunal as 
to acts performed in good faith." 
The school committee, having been created by the 
legislature for the sole purpose of administering the 
state public school system locally, has no inherent 
power. It has only those powers which are expressly 
delegated to it by statute or which can fairly be implied 
in the expressed powers. As a public corporation it has 
II ,Y 
•••• the most limited powers known to law •••• , and has y 
a public function only, that of education. However, 
in the exercise of the authority granted to it, the 
school committee has wide discretion. The courts are 
not concerned with the wisdom of the action of the 
school committee. Their sole concern is whether the 
action taken was within the authority of the school 
committee and whether it was reasonable. The Ohio Court 
l/Hayes v. Brockton, 313 Mass. 641. 
gjSchool District No. 17 v. Powell, 279 P. (2d) 492 (Oreg.). 
'j/Sawaya v. Tuscon High School District, 281 P. (2d) 
105 (Ariz.). 
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stated in an early decision; "Let the results be good or 
bad, there is no remedy (i.e. in the courts), so long as 
the board acts within the limits of its legal power and y 
authority." The Virginia Court sustained school au-
thorities in the enforcement of a rule, which the court 
questioned as to wisdom, holding that to do otherwise 
would be to substitute judicial opinion for the legis-
gj 
lative will. The powers considered to be within the 
authority of the school committee are those expressly 
granted by statute, those fairly and necessarily implied 
in the expressed powers, and those essential to the ac-
complishment of the purposes of the corporation, 
The members of the school committee, in their 
corporate capacity of carrying out the legislative will 
in the administration of the state public school system, 
11 
are state rather than local officers. As such they enjoy 
an immunity from liability for their own acts of non-
feasance in line of duty and for the acts of their y 
subordinates or employees. In Massachusetts especially, 
the local school committee has considerable autonomy 
1/Board of Education v. State, 88 N, E. 412 (Ohio). 
gjFlory v. Smith, 134 s. E. 360 (Va.). 
1/Cullum v. Board of Education, 104 A. (2d) 641 (N.J.). 
4/Moynihan v. Todd 188 Mass. 301; Howard v. Worcester 
l53 Mass. 426. 
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from the town or city government in the provision of 
funds for the operation of the schools. The local 
authorities must raise the amounts stipulated in the 
annual estimate of expenditures when properly prepared 
and voted by the school committee. In some states, the 
finance committee has the power to reduce appropriations 
y' 
requested by the board of education. However, in this y 
state, the finance committee is a recommendatory body. 
The duty to raise the funds stipulated by the school 
committee as necessary for the proper operation of the 
schools is expressly given to the towns and cities by 
statute, which provides both the obligation and the 
~ penalty for failure to fulfill that obligation: 
"Every city and town shall annually provide an 
amount of money sufficient for the support of the pub-
lic schools as required by this chapter. Upon peti-
tion to the superior court •••• , alleging that the 
amount in such city or town for the support of 
public schools as aforesaid has not been included 
in the annual budget appropriations for said year, 
said court may determine the amount of deficiency, 
if any, and may order such city and all its officers 
whose action is necessary to carry out such order, 
1/Board of Education of West Haven v. Carlo, 131 A. (2d) 
a7 (Conn.). 
'YYoung v. Westport, 302 Mass. 597. 
~General Laws Relating to Education (1956 Edition) 
Chapter 74, Section 31. 
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or such town and its treasurer, selectmen and 
assessors, to provide a sum of money equal to 
such deficiency, together with a sum equal to 
twenty-five per cent thereof." 
The discretion of the school committee as to what expen-
ditures may be rightfully included under the above statute 
has been challenged many times by municipal authorities. y 
This conflict has been well detailed by Kiernan in his 
study of the legal position of the school committee in 
relation to financing education. The single appropriation 
held to be within the jurisdiction of the local government y 
has been that of transportation. In other cases, the 
court has determined that all necessary appropriations are 
within the discretion of the school committee. These 
appropriations include: salaries of ~eachers, superintend-
ents, custodians, school physicians and nurses, attendance 
officers, personnel for continuation and vocational schools, 
texts and supplies, utilities and operational supplies, 
clerical assistance, diplomas, diploma ribbons, and y 
graduation speakers. This separation of public education 
from the local municipal governments is prevalent throughout 
i/Owen B. Kiernan, The Lefal Position of the Massachusetts 
School Committee in Relat on to Financing Education, Un-
published Doctoral Dissertation, Harvard University, 1950. 
gjEastern Massachusetts Street Railway v. Mayor of Fall 
River, 308 Mass. 232. 
2/Ring v. Woburn, 311 Mass. 679; Callahan v. Woburn, 306 
Mass. 265; Hayes v. Brockton, 313 Mass. 641; Watt v. 
Chelmsford, 323 Mass. 697. 
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the nation as it is in this Commonwealth. y 
thus stated the position: 
The Michigan 
court in 1957 
"The general policy of .the state has been to re-
tain control of its school system, to be administered 
throughout the state under state laws by local state 
agencies organized with plenary powers independent of 
the local government with which by location and 
geographical boundaries they are necessarily 
associated and to a greater or lesser extent au-
thorized to cooperate. Education belongs to the 
state." 
It is worthwhile to note that the present system is 
not necessarily absolute or permanent. Full authority 
for sweeping changes lies with the state legislatures. 
School districts are creatures of the state legislature 
and the legislature has the right to give or take away 
v powers. 
The powers and duties of the school committee,as they 
relate to teachers, principals, parents, pupils, and the 
curriculum, are discussed more fully in subsequent sec-
tions dealing with those areas. 
5. The Courts and Education 
Although the public school system is a creature of 
the state legislature, brought into being through legis-
lative enactments and governed by statutes, nevertheless 
i/Jones v. Grand Ledge Public Schools, 84 N. W. (2d) 
327, Mich. 
'ij'Christenson v. Felton, 295 S. W. (2d) 361 (Ark.). 
40 
the courts play a significant role in the determination of 
the course of public education. In an organized society 
such as ours, differences of opinions as to the rights 
and liabilities of its members inevitably arise and some 
agency must be provided to resolve these conflicts. That 
agency is the court. In its rulings interpreting the 
ramifications of laws stated in general terms, deciding 
where statutes are in conflict with constitutional limi-
tations or with the rights of individuals, or making 
decisions in areas not governed by specific statute, the 
judicial system wields tremendous influence upon the 
educational pattern. In fact common law, that law 
built upon judicial precedents, constitutes the greater 
bulk of school law. Bolmeier, in discussing the im-
portance of knowledge of these legal principles by school y 
principals describes it thus: 
"A judicial interpretation of a school law is the 
origin of a legal principle. Until it is overruled, 
it serves as a precedent for subsequent court decisions. 
The more court cases that are decided in accordance 
with the precedent, the more firmly the legal 
principle is established. Therefore, the accumu-
latj_on of court decisions regarding educational 
issues serves as a set of legal prj_ncj_ples to 
guide school principals and other personnel in the 
performance of their duties." 
ijE. C. Bolmeir, "The School Principal's Proper Concept of 
School Law", Bulletin of the Natj_onal Association of Second-
ary-School Principals, (March, 1958), 42: 1-8. 
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The area of the punishment of pupils by school 
personnel serves as an illustration of the need for 
knowledge of common law as well as statutory law. The 
Massachusetts statutes are silent on the subject of the 
punishment of pupils as are the statutes of many states. 
Yet based on the rulings in many cases, there is a 
written body of law defining the authority of the 
teacher to punish the pupil, the means that may be 
employed, and the limits to which he may go. Through 
a study of decisions bearing on the matter, specific 
principles and definitions may be drawn. 
"The law clothes the teacher, as it does the 
parent, in whose place he stands, with power to 
enforce discipline by the imposition of reasonable 
corporal punishment. He is not required to be 
infallible in his judgment. He is the judge to 
determine when and to what extent correction is 
necessary, and like all others clothed with a 
discretion, he cannot be made personally liable 
for an error in judgment when he acted in good 
faith and without malice.".!/ 
" •••• that he lthe teache;:]is liable in a 
criminal prosecutfOn for punishing a scholar only 
when the amount of punishment inflicted is more 
than adequate to subdue the scholar and secure 
obediance to the rules of the school."g;' 
"School principal, who was not in direct 
contact with pupil, had right to rely upon reports 
made to principal by teachers of pupil for 
i/Heritage v. Dodge, 9 A. 22 (N.H.). 
gjcommonwealth v. Randall, 4 Gray (Mass.) 36. 
determining what means of correction should be taken 
for infraction of discipline.".!/ 
These three cases, rulings by the highest courts of 
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and New York, taken in 
conjunction with other decisions on the same subject, 
provide a body of common law to which the school adminis-
trator may turn for reference in the absence of specific 
statutory law. 
Yet, the courts have been reluctant to review the 
actions of school authorities, doing so only when a 
specific legal necessity existed. When the courts have 
found it necessary to review the actions of school 
authorities, they have concerned themselves solely with 
the question of the authority of the school board to 
carry on such practices and never the wisdom of the 
practices. Justice Frankfurter of the United States 
Supreme Court voiced this concept in the Gobitis case: 
y 
"But the courtroom is not the arena for debating 
issues of educational policy •••• So to hold would in 
effect make us the school board for the country. 
That authority has not been given to this Court, nor 
should we assume it." 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Judicial Court, in two 
decisions, stated the thesis even more forcefully: 
i/People v. Mummert, 50 N.Y.S. (2d) 699, 183 Misc. 243. 
g}Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586. 
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"We must reiterate that a court is not a super 
board of directors with superior knowledge of the 
administration, finance, or science of pedagogies. 
It would be presumptuous to superimpose judicial 
control upon the exercise of discretion by trained 
educators. "Y 
"The courts are in no position to exercise con-
trol over schools and to determine the policy of 
school administration; the judges ordinarily are 
not equipped for this immense task. The divergent 
view of modern educational practices, the different 
systems advanced for the education of children •••• 
all these present serious questions which the school 
board can alone determine •••• All this, being purely 
administrative, must be left to persons of expe-
rience who have made a life study of it, and 
certainly is not to be subjected to the consider-
ations of jurists who have little or no training 
to appraise school systems or their necessities."Y 
Not only have the courts furnished a body of common 
law as a guide to school administration, but they have, 
by their rulings, established or over-ruled educational 
policies, often of a sweeping nature. In the period 
following World War I, eleven states enacted legislation 
restricting the teaching of foreign languages in elemen-
tary schools. This legislation, along with the restric-
tive policies of a large number of school boards, was 
completely reversed in one stroke by the United States 
Supreme Court as being in conflict with constitutional 
lfRegan v. Stoddard, 65 A. (2d) 240 (Penn.). 
g/Wilson v. School District of Philadelphia, 195 A. 90 
TPenn. ) • 
y 
limitations to legislative powers. So too, in the famous 
decision on the compulsory flag salute, the United States 
Supreme Court reversed the educational policies estab-
lished by certain state legislatures, enforced by many 
school boards, and sanctioned by the supreme judicial 
v 
states. courts of some 
However, while the courts, in occasional instances, 
have over-ruled educational policies promulgated by leg-
islatures and local school boards, yet, in the over-all 
view, public education has benefited from the staunch 
support of the nation's courts. In fact, it would 
appear that the jurists at times have shown greater 
faith in public education than have many professional 
educators. 
6. The Employment of Teachers and Principals 
The legal status of the principal.-- There are in 
Massachusetts two classes of professional employees of 
the school committee, teachers and superintendents. 
Public school principals are classified as teachers, 
and as such are employees of the school committee. 
This premise holds generally throughout the several 
1/Meyer v. State of Nebraska, 262 u. s. 390, 43 s. Ct. 625. 
g/West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178. 
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states, The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has 
twice defined the principal as a teacher: 
"Although G. L, c. 71, S, 4 requires the town 
of a certain size to maintain high schools to be 'kept 
by a principal and such assistants as may be needed' 
and in s. 5, in providing for reimbursement of ex-
pense by the commonwealth, speaks of payment 'for a 
principal and for each teacher', we do not interpret 
the law as creating a class of principals as distinct 
from teachers. Principals are teachers who are en-
trusted by the school committee with special duties 
of direction and rnanagement •••• "1/ 
"As principal of the high school he was only 
a superior sort of teacher."g/ 
With the single exception of the so-called principal's 
tenure section, all conditions and requirements regarding 
election to position, tenure in position, and dismissal y 
for teachers apply equally to principals, 
Teacher contracts.-- While a teacher serves in a 
public capacity, his position is generally considered 
to be that of an employee of the board. 
between him and the school board is that 
The relationship 
of contract only, 
As an employee of the board, he is subject to selection, 
dismissal, and control at the hands of the board, which 
1fBoody v. Barnstable, 276 Mass. 134. 
g/McCartin v. Lowell, 322 Mass. 624, 
'j/General Laws Relating to Education (1956 Edition) 
Chapter 71, Section 42A. 
YMootz v. Belyea, 60 N.D. 741, 236 N. W. 358, 75 A. L. R. 
1347; Spear v. Cummings, 23 Pick, (Mass.) 224, 
y 
46 
may make 
in these 
and enforce y any reasonable rules and regulations 
matters. 
The power to elect and contract with teachers rests 
exclusively with the school v committee. The superintendent 
shall recommend candidates to the school committee for y 
election. Since the acts of the school committee must 
be performed by the committee as a group, it follows that 
the power to employ teachers cannot be delegated to an 
!J/ individual member of the committee nor to the super-
2/ 
intendent of schools. Thus the awarding of a contract to 
a teacher by a superintendent delegated to perform that 
act by the joint school committee of a union superinten-
' dency was held invalid in the absence of the actual act §! 
of election by the school committee involved. 
Teachers to be eligible for employment in Massachusetts 
l/Freeman v. Bourne, 170 Mass. 289. 
2/General Laws Relating to Education (1956 Edition), 
~apter 71, Section 38. 
l/Ibid., Chapter 71, Section 59. 
4/Smith v. School District No. 57, 42A. 368 (Penn.); 
'S'chool District v. Bennett, 13 S. W. 132 (Ark.). 
2/Taggart v. School District No. 1, 188 P. 908 (Oreg.). 
§/Pulvino v. Yarmouth, 287 Mass. 21. 
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must be certified by the 
y 
State Board of Education, must 
the retirement y 
y 
to freedom from tuberculosis, y 
system, and must take the 
submit a report relative 
must join 
teacher's oath. 
While the school committee may not employ a person as 
a teacher unless he has met the minimum qualifications set 
~ by the state, the statutes do not restrict the committee 
~ from setting additional and higher qualifications. In-
quiries into virtually any aspect of a candidate's back-
ground are fit subjects for the 
with the exception of religious 
committee's investigation 
v 
and political beliefs. 
The discretion of the local committee is broad in the 
selection of teachers and principals and the courts have 
shown no inclination to interfere with the committee's 
discretion in this matter. In cases involving a local 
I/General Laws Relating to Education, (1956 Edition), 
Chapter 71, Section 38G. 
g/Ibid., Chapter 71, Section 55B. 
Yibid., Chapter 32. 
Yibid., Chapter 71, Section 30A. 
~Ibid., Chapter 71, Section 38G. 
~School District No. 10 v. Moury, 91 Mass. 94. 
IJGeneral Laws Relating to Education, (1956 Edition), 
Chapter 71, Section 39. 
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board's right to decline to elect candidates affiliated 
with a teacher's union, the courts stated that the board 
had the absolute right to decline to employ any candidate y 
for any reason whatever, or for no reason at all. It 
has been held also that a school committee acted within 
its field of discretion in the adoption of a policy 
against the employment of married female teachers. 
y 
Generally speaking, where the statute is silent as 
to the requirement of a written contract, an oral contract y 
is binding in the eyes of the court. The Massachusetts 
statute is silent on this requirement. The validity of 
a contract in the absence of a specific written contract 
appears further substantiated by the action of the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in holding that 
teachers serving at discretion were under contract which 
fixed their salary rights although there were no written 
contracts. 
y 
1/People ex.rel. Fursman v. Chicago, 116 N. E. 158 (Ill.); 
Seattle High School Chapter v. Sharples, 292 P. 994 (Wash.) 
72 A. L. R. 1275. 
gjHoughton v. Somerville, 28 N. E. (2d) 1001, (Mass.). 
~Pearson v. School District No. 8, 144 Wis. 620, 129 
N. W. 940, 
!lJCallahan v. Woburn, 306 Mass. 265, 
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Principles governing contracts generally apply to the 
contracts between the teacher and the school committee. 
Thus, such a contract is considered one for personal 
services and where entered into for a definite period is y 
an entire contract for that period. The rules and regu-
lations of the board of education are a part of the 
contract. The teacher is responsible for a knowledge 
of board rules. 
y 
Nothing will excuse the performance of a contract 
except the act of God or of a public enemy, or the 
interdiction of the law operating as the sole and direct 
cause of the failure. In the absence of any provisions 
in the contract to the contrary, a teacher is entitled 
to the agreed compensation without deduction for any 
period during the school term when the school is tem-
porarily closed for such reasons as 
Y y 
a fire or an epidemic. 
The school committee may elect a teacher upon a 
yearly basis and may, after one year of service, elect 
a teacher to serve at its discretion. However, the 
!/American Jurisprudence, Volume 47. 
g[Backie v. Cromwell Consolidated School District, 242 N. W. 
389 (Minn.). 
YPhelps v. School District, 134 N. E. 312 (Ill.), 21 
A. L. R. 737. 
YLibby v. Douglas, 175 Mass. 128. 
~0 
committee must elect a teacher to serve at its discretion 
after he has served three full years. A teacher or super-
intendent not serving at discretion shall be notified in 
writing on or before April fifteenth whenever such person 
is not to be employed for the following year. Unless 
such notice is given, the teacher or superintendent not 
serving at tenure is deemed to be appointed for the 
following year. .v 
According to the Donlon decision, the contract of 
employment of a teacher was held to be terminated by her 
death before the school year ended, although her death 
occurred during the summer vacation, leaving only a month y 
of the school year unpaid for. This decision has been 
challenged by legal authorities. The weight of authority 
would indicate that a teacher's full responsibility 
terminates with the end of the school year in June. Any 
pay that she may not yet have received is legally due her 
regardless of the mode of payment. 
1. Dismissal of Teachers 
In the absence of statutory provisions to the 
contrary, the power to employ teachers and other school 
1/General Laws Relating to Education, (1956 Edition) 
Chapter 71, Section 41. 
g!Donlon v. Boston, 223 Mass. 285. 
lloston Uni 'i ,, -, E1 ty 
.'Sobool of Educ&.ti_ar. 
'- L1 bracy; ---
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officials presupposes the power of dismissal, both of 
these powers generally being lodged in the local school y 
boards. The Massachusetts statute expressly places the 
power of dismissal with the local school committee, 
stipulating that the discharge of a teacher must be 
v 
made by a two thirds vote of the whole committee, 
Common law holds that statutory terms favorable to the 
teacher must be written into the terms of the contract 
and cannot be circumvented by any act of the school y 
board. However, the failure to renew a contract does 
not constitute dismissal of a teacher so as to come y 
within the purview of the courts. 
A teacher is bound to obey all reasonable rules and 
regulations of the school committee, both those estab-
Y lished prior to the making of the contract and those 
~ promulgated subsequent to the making of the contract. 
A teacher may be dismissed on the grounds of incompetency 
1/Freeman v. Bourne, 170 Mass, 289. 
£/General Laws Relating to Education, (1956 Edition), 
Chapter 71, Section 42, 
2/Public School District v. Holson, 252 P. 509 (Ariz.). 
YMarion v. Board of Education, 32 P. 643 (Cal.). 
YBoard of Education v. Swan, 260 P. (2d) 306 (Cal.). 
~Farrell v. Board of Education, 122 N. Y. S. 289. 
for being inefficient, incapable of controlling his pupils 
or unable to instruct his pupils properly. In the sign-
ing of a contract to render teaching services, the 
teacher necessarily implies that he has the necessary 
teaching skill requisite for the carrying out of the 
work. If, after a reasonable trial period, the teacher 
does not perform satisfactorily, then he has breached 
his contract, under which conditione the school board 
can abrogate his contract 
y 
with impunity. In line with 
this principle, teachers have been dismissed for not 
possessing the requisite qualities of temper and dis-
Y ~ 
cretion, and for being unable to maintain discipline. 
However a teacher cannot be dismissed for reason of 
general dissatisfaction on the part of pupils and 
y ~ 
parents, nor on the basis of occasional mistakes. In 
addition, the highest qualifications cannot be demanded 
of a teacher, but merely average ability and the usual 
1/Crawfordsville v. Hays, 42 Ind. 200. 
YRobinson v. School Directors, 96 Ill. App. 604. 
~Biggs v. School of Mt. Vernon, 55 Ind. App. 572, 
90 N. E. 105. 
YPaul v. School District No. 2, 28 vt. 575. 
~Holden v. Shrewsbury School District No. 1~ 38 Vt. 529. 
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.v 
application to the discharge of duties. In a case of 
dismissal for incompetence, the burden of the proof is y 
on the board of education. 
Tenure.-- Tenure is a status that teachers and other 
professional employees attain upon fulfilling the 
conditions imposed by the tenure statute. Tenure is a 
creation of the legislature and can be gained and lost 
only in the manner prescribed by the legislature. Tenure 
laws have been passed to protect the interests of the 
state and the school system by preventing the removal 
of capable and experienced teachers for personal or 
~ political reasons. Such laws were not passed for the 
purpose 
a class 
of granting specia~rivileges to teachers as 
or as individuals. The benefits that teachers 
receive through the passage of tenure laws are merely 
incidental to the main purpose of the legislation. 
The Massachusetts statute states: 
"Every school committee, in electing a teacher 
or superintendent, who has served in its public 
schools for the three previous consecutive school 
years •••• shall employ him to serve at discretion; 
but any school committee may elect a teacher who 
has served in its schools not less than one school 
1/Neviile v. School Directors of District No. 1, 36 Ill. 
£/Neville v. School Directors of District No. 1, supra. 
71. 
,Vstate ex rel. Anderson v. Brand 5 N. E. (2d) 531, (Ind.); 
Frye v. Leicester, 300 Mass. 537. 
Ystate ex rel. Clark v. Stout, 187 N. E. 267 (Ind. ) • 
~ year to serve at such discretion. 
The three previous consecutive years refer to years 
previous to the beginning of service under the new 
v 
election. Thus a teacher elected in the spring of his 
third year falls within the meaning of the term three 
previous consecutive years. Such a period of service 
includes within its meaning service of a regular part 
time nature, as the Massachusetts statute makes no 
distinction in the law between regular part time and 
~ full time teachers. However such service signifies 
a continuity of service and is not satisfied by inter-
mittent service as a substitute teacher, even though for y 
a substantial time in each of three years. Moreover, a 
teacher who has served continuously as a substitute 
teacher for two years and then resigns one month before 
the end of the third year 
period established by the 
interrupts the three year 
statute. ~ 
1/General Laws Relating to Education, (1956 Edition), 
Chapter 71, Section 41. 
g;Frye v. Leicester, 300 Mass. 537. 
~Frye v. Leicester, supra. 
YNestor v. Fall River, 318 Mass. 538. 
2/Nestor v. Fall River, supra. 
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A teacher who has attained tenure status is not em-
ployed on a year to year basis. The relationship between 
the teacher and the school committee in that case con-
stitutes continuous and indeterminate service subject to 
the statutory provisions and the exercise of discretion 
by the school committee within the prescribed limits. 
Even in the absence of a written contract, a tenure 
teacher once notified of the election to tenure, is 
under contract as set by the salary schedule of the 
v 
school committee. 
y 
Once a teacher or superintendent has attained the 
status of tenure, he may be dismissed only through 
following in full 
legislature. The 
the procedure established by the 
~ 
statute reads: 
"The school committee may dismiss any teacher 
•••• by a two thirds vote of the whole committee. 
In every such town a teacher or superintendent 
employed at discretion under the preceding sec-
tion shall not be dismissed except for inefficiency, 
incapacity, conduct unbecoming a teacher or 
superintendent, insubordination, or other good 
cause, nor unless at least thirty days, exclusive 
of customary vacation periods, prior to the meet-
ing at which the vote is to be taken, he shall 
have been notified of such intended vote; nor 
unless, if he so requests, he shall have been 
1/Paquette v. Fall Rive~ 278 Mass, 172. 
ycallahan v. Woburn, 306 Mass. 265. 
~General Laws Relating to Education, (1956 Edition) 
Chapter 71, Section 42. 
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notified of such intended vote; nor unless, if he 
so requests, he shall have been furnished by the 
committee with a written charge or charges of the 
cause or causes for which his dismissal is proposed; 
nor unless, if he so requests, he has been given a 
hearing before the school committee which may be 
either public or private at the discretion of the 
school committee, and at which he may be repre-
sented by counsel, present evidence and call 
witnesses to testify in his behalf and examine 
them; nor unless the charge or charges shall 
have been substantiated; nor unless, in the case 
of a teacher, the superintendent shall have given 
the committee his recommendation thereon." 
The stipulation that dismissal must be made by two 
thirds of the entire committee requires that all such 
members voting for dismissal muat have been present at 
the hearing of the teacher. The reading of a steno-
graphic report of such a hearing does not suffice to 
y' 
meet this requirement of the statute. The Thanksgiving 
Recess is not a vacation period within the meaning of 
v 
the thirty days notice required by statute. Although 
the school committee must receive a recommendation on 
dismissal from the superintendent, it is not essential y 
that the recommendation favor dismissal. The fact 
that, at a hearing by a school committee of charges 
preferred by it against a teacher serving at discretion, 
l/Perkins v. Quincy, 315 Mass. 47. 
g/Sheldon v. Hopedale, 276 Mass. 230. 
ysheldon v. Hopedale, supra.; Duffy v. Hopkinton, 236 
Mass. 5. 
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two of its three members testified as witnesses, did not 
disqualify them from resuming their function as school 
committee members and participating in the decision. 
y 
In such a situation, to disqualify the members from 
participating in the decision would be to make it im-
possible for the school committee to discharge its 
responsibility for the removal of a teacher who is in-
competent or whose retention would be detrimental to the 
best interests of the system. This responsibility rests 
solely with the school committee. Furthermore, a school 
committee hearing is merely an administrative hearing, in 
which the school committee is not bound by strict rules y 
of pleading and procedure. There is no other agency to 
carry out that responsibility. 
The term cause in the statute governing dismissal 
of teachers serving at discretion means a cause sufficient y 
in law. The hearing for the teacher is in the nature of 
a judicial investigation. Dismissal charges must be sub-
stantiated at the hearing by supporting evidence. y 
A recent case raised the question of the sufficiency 
1/Moran v. Littleton, 317 Mass. 591. 
2/Conley v. Board of Education of New Britain, 123 A. (2d) 
147 (Conn.). 
yaraves v. Wellesley, 299 Mass. 80. 
YFaxon v. Boston, 331 Mass. 531. 
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of a tenure teacher's refusal to answer questions about 
alleged Communistic associations by pleading the Fifth 
Amendment as grounds for dismissal. The Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court held that such action on the part 
of a teacher, in view of the attitude of the public toward 
Communism, would so impair his effectiveness as a teacher 
as to constitute sufficient grounds for dismissal. The 
right of a school committee to dismiss tenure women 
teachers upon marriage was sustained three times by the y 
highest court of Massachusetts. However, in 1953, the 
General Court of Massachusetts specifically amended the 
dismissal statute to provide that a change in the marital 
status of a female teacher should not be considered cause y 
for dismissal. 
Demotion of principals.-- As previously stated, a 
principal is a teacher with special duties of direction y 
and management. Thus, prior to 1945, a school committee 
could demote a principal to the position of a teacher at 
its discretion, without regard to the principal's tenure 
status. Such a demotion was, in the eyes of the law, 
merely a reassignment of teaching duties, and not a 
l/Sheldon v. Hopedale, 276 Mass. 230; Rinaldo v. Dreyer, 
~94 Mass. 167; Houghton v. Somerville, 306 Mass. 542. 
YGeneral Laws Relating to Education, (1956 Edition), 
Chapter 71, Section 42. 
YBoody v. Barnstable, 276 Mass. 134. 
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dismissal, i.e., a complete separation from the school 
system as contemplated in the dismissal statute. A simple 
majority vote of the committee was sufficient to reassign y 
the principal to teaching duties. A principal thus 
reassigned to teaching duties, when the position was no 
longer necessary due to a decreased enrollment, was not 
entitled to a restoration to a principalship when a 
vacancy occurred. Even if the committee has been in-
considerate and directed by controlling political 
consideration resulting from concerted action by an 
apparent group of the committee swapping favors or pay-
ing political debts in careless disregard of assurances 
give~ by them or their predecessors, the demoted principal 
had no recourse. Such demotion, however, could not be 
effected by the abolishment of a position as a subterfuge 
to demote a teacher when the school committee was acting 
in bad faith and was actuated by a difference of political 
v 
views with the teacher. 
Principals' tenure statute.-- In 1945 the legislature 
enacted a statute conferring tenure rights on principals y 
and supervisors. This statute essentially gives principals 
I/Downey v. Lowell, 305 Mass. 329; McCartin v. Lowell, 322 
Mass. 624. 
ysweeney v. Revere, 249 Mass. 525. 
yGeneral Laws Relating to Education, (1956 Edition), 
Chapter 71, Section 42A. 
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and supervisors the same rights to tenure status as a 
principal as a teacher has to his position, stating: 
"No principal or supervisor or professional 
employee performing the duties of a principal 
or supervisor, by whatever title his position 
may be known, who has served in that position 
for over three years shall •••• be demoted •••• "Y 
The procedures and causes for demotion are similar 
to those for dismissal of a teacher from his position. 
y 
Three cases involving interpretation of this statute 
have reached the Massachusetts Supreme Court. The court 
has held that a director who had served three full years 
at the direction of the school committee and ten days of 
the fourth year at the direction of the superintendent 
had not fulfilled the requirement of serving in that y 
position for more than three years. The superintendent 
had no authority to elect a teacher or principal, such 
authority resting solely with the school committee. 
In a second case, the court held that the period of 
service must be consecutive and in the same or a very 
similar position to meet the requirement of more than 
.Y 
three years of service. A person who had served less 
1/Ibid., Chapter 71, Section 42A. 
gjibid.' Chapter 71, Section 42. 
lfDemers v. Worcester, 329 Mass. 370. 
,V'Kelley v. Watertown, 330 Mass. 150. 
til 
than three full years as a submaster in the high school 
was not allowed to tack on several previous years of 
service as a submaster in a junior high school in the 
same system. This ruling held even where there was 
evidence that the position of high school submaster 
was abolished as a subterfuge and there was evidence y 
of bad faith on the part of the committee. 
Upon the closing of a grammar school by lawful 
vote of a school committee, one who has served as 
principal of that school for more than three years was 
not entitled to be appointed principal of a new and y 
much larger grammar school opened in the town. While 
such a principal may have had a technical right to a 
hearing before the committee, she had no right to be 
appointed to the principalship of the new school as 
that was not the previous position she had held. It 
was a much more important and responsible position and 
the duty of the school committee was clearly to select 
the person for that position whom they judged best fitted 
for it. 
It would seem reasonable to assume that the so-called 
principals' tenure statute does not create a new class of 
l/Kelley v. Watertown, supra. 
g/Jantzen v, Chelmsford, 332 Mass. 175. 
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professional employee in addition to the teacher and the 
superintendent. The statute was intended to establish 
merely procedural conditions for the protection of a 
principal against arbitrary or capricious demotion at 
the hands of the school committee. 
8. The Curriculum 
Power of the state to prescribe.-- Unquestionably, 
the state legislature has the power to select the system 
of instruction and the course of study to be pursued in y 
the public schools, and its mandate is final and binding y 
on all persons. The power to prescribe the curriculum is y 
not limited to the common branches, and hence, the leg-
islature may prescribe y 
economics and provide 
courses in agriculture and home 
for the establishment of a kin-
dergarten as a part of the public school system. Y 
The Massachusetts Legislature has provided that the 
1/Posey v. Board of Education, 1954 S. E, 393 (N.C.), 
70 A. L. R. 1306. 
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yschool Commissioners v. State, 28 N.E. 61 (Ind.), 
YAssociated Schools v. School District, 142 N.W. 325 (Minn.). 
YPosey v. Board of Education, supra. 
YPesey v. Board of Education, supra, 
public schools shall give instruction and training in: 
" •••• orthography, reading, writing, and English 
language and grammar, geography, arithmetic, draw-
ing, music, the history and constitution of the 
United States, the duties of citizenship, physiology 
and hygiene, instruction as to the effects of 
alcoholic drinks and of stimulants and narcotics on 
the human system, and as to tuberculosis and its 
prevention •••• to all pupils in all schools under 
public control. ••• "1/ 
"In all public elementary and high schools 
American history and civics, including the 
constitution of the United States, the declaration 
of independence and the bill of rights •••• shall 
be taught as required subjects for the purpose 
of promoting civic service and a greater knowledge 
thereof, and of fitting the pupils, morally and 
intellectually, for the duties of citizenship."gj 
The Massachusetts Legislature has further indicated 
that moral training should be the guiding philosophy of y 
instruction in this finely worded statute: 
" •••• and all instructors of youth shall exert 
their best endeavors to impress on the minds of 
children and youth committed to their care and 
instruction the principles of piety and justice 
and a sacred regard for truth, love of their 
country, humanity and universal benevolence, 
sobriety, industry and frugality, chastity, 
moderation and temperance, and those other 
virtues which are the ornament of human society 
and the basis upon which a republican constitution 
is founded; and they shall endeavor to lead their 
pupils, as their ages and capacities will admit, 
!/General Laws Relating to Education, (1956 Edition), 
Chapter 71, Section 1. 
g/Ibid., Chapter 71, Section 2. 
~Ibid., Chapter 71, Section 30. 
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into a clear understanding of the tendency of the 
above mentioned virtues to preserve and perfect a 
republican constitution and secure the blessings 
of liberty as well as to promote their future 
happiness, and also to point out to them the evil 
tendency of the opposite vices," 
Authority of the school committee.-- The prescription 
of courses of study is often delegated to the local 
authorities under the general limitations and rules 
laid down by the legislature. y This power of delegation 
is unquestioned. In the exercise of their discretion, 
school boards are not limited to the prescription of the 
so-called common branches or by the course of education y 
prescribed by the state board of education. Courts 
have held that the local school board could prescribe 
11 y .21 
courses in music, physical education, thrift, the §I 
study of state and federal constitutions, and 
1 Posey v. Board of Education, 154 S. E. 393 (N. C.), 
0 A. L. R. 1306. 
2/Associated Schools v. School District, 142 
rMinn.); State Tax Commissioners v, Board of 
73 P. ( 2d) 49, ( Kan. ) , 155 A. L. R. 1401. 
2/Epley v. Hall, 155 P. 1083 (Kan.). 
N. W. 325 
Education, 
4/Hullett v, Post Printing and Publishing Company, 192 P. 
b58 (Colo.); Alexander v. Phillips, 254 P. 1056 (Ariz.). 
5/Security National Bank v. Bagley, 210 N. W, 947 (Iowa), 
4'9 A. L. R. 705. 
§/Commonwealth v. Johnson, 309 Mass, 476. 
t)5 
.v dramatics. Sweeping discretionary matter in this 
prescription is given the local school committees of 
Massachusetts by the legislature through the statement: 
"Such other subjects as the school committee considers 
expedient may be taught in the public schools." 
y 
That the courts have liberally construed the 
right of local school authorities and have, in fact, 
encouraged the exercise of the right of the local board 
of school control to expand and change the curriculum 
is well expressed by decisions of the Iowa and Penn-
Y 
sylvania Courts. The Iowa Court said: 
"The establishment and the maintenance of an 
educational system through public schools is an 
indispensable obligation and function of the State 
of Iowa. It should be so maintained as to keep 
abreast of the times. This applies not only to 
the courses of study but also to the teaching 
force." 
The Pennsylvania decision expressed a similar 
.Y 
outlook succinctly. 
"It is the administrative function of 
school directors and superintendents to meet 
changing educational conditions through crea-
tion of new courses, reassignment of teachers, 
and rearrangement of the curriculum." 
1fWoodson v. Kingman County School District No. 28, 274 
P.728(Kan.). 
g/General Laws Relating to Education, (1956 Edition) 
Chapter 76, Section 1. 
3/Talbott v. Independent School District of Des Moines, 
~99 N. W. 556 (Iowa), 137 A. L. R. 234. 
_o/Jones v. Holes, 6 A. (2d) 102 (Penn.). 
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The school authorities have the unquestioned right 
to prescribe the mode of instruction to be used in any y v 
given subject. The courts of New Hampshire, Ohio, y !:!/ 
Georgia, and Kentucky have sustained the right of 
school authorities to compel the preparation of written 
assignments, the writing of compositions on assigned 
topics, and the entering into of debates. 
Court of Massachusetts expressed a similar 
The Supreme 
21 
attitude: 
"The real and vital question is not whether the 
plaintiff was guilty of misconduct in refusing to 
attend her class, but whether a parent has the 
right to say a certain method of teaching any 
given course of study shall be pursued. The 
question answers itself. Were it otherwise, 
should several parents hold diverse opinions, 
all must yield to one or confusion and failure 
inevitably follow, The determination of the 
procedure and the management and direction of 
pupils and studies in this Commonwealth rests 
in the wise discretion and sound judgment of 
teachers.and school committee, whose actions 
in these respects is not subject to the supervision 
of this court •••• " 
Where the state has the power to compel attendance at 
school on the basis that such attendance is essential to 
1/Kidder v. Chellis, 59 N. H. 473. 
ysewell v. Board of Education, 29 Ohio St. 89. 
J/Samuel Benedict Memorial School v. Bradford, 36 S. E. 
920 (Ga.). 
!:!/Cross v. Board of Trustees, 110 S. W. 346 (Ky.). 
2(Wulff v. Wakefield, 221 Mass. 427. 
{j 7 
the training for citizenship demanded for the protection 
of the state and its institutions, it follows that the 
state can compel all pupils to pursue those studies y 
necessary to good citizenship. However, in the absence 
of express statutory authority, there is doubt whether 
a local school board can compel a child to pursue a 
certain course of study against a parent's wishes. 
There is considerable authority to the effect that a 
parent may make a reasonable selection of studies for 
his child to follow, provided that this action does 
not interfere with the discipline or well-being of y 
the school and the rights of other pupils. The 
Nebraska court held that it was the right of a parent 
to have his sixth grade daughter excused from domestic 
~ 
science classes. A Colorado decision ruled that the 
school board could not compel all pupils to attend to 
the reading of the Bible on the grounds that such y 
instruction was not essential to good citizenship. In 
California, it was held that the school board could not 
compel a pupil to participate in social dancing as a part 
i/People v. Stanley, 255 P. (Colo.) 610. 
ystate v. School District No. l, 48 N. W. 393 (Neb.); 
Trustees of Schools v. People, 29 Amer. Reports 55 (Ill.). 
~Kelley v. Ferguson, 144 N. w. 1039 (Neb.). 
YPeople v. Stanley, 255 P. 610 (Colo.). 
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y 
of the required physical education program. In the 
decision, the court pointed out that neither the state 
nor any of its agents, in this case the district school 
board, had the authority to deprive parents of their 
natural and constitutional rights to govern the moral 
and ethical conduct of their children, Such compulsion 
would, in fact, be a violation of the right to religious 
freedom guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Consti-
tution. 
9. Religion and the Public Schools 
The area of religion and the public schools is one 
of conflict with many diverse judicial decisions. The 
holdings of the court vary from state to state on 
similar issues. Many of the decisions are majority 
decisions with strong dissenting opinions. Even the 
United States Supreme Court decisions in this area 
have shown sharp conflict among the members of that 
highest tribunal. One such case was the Everson case, 
y 
deciding the legality of the payment of public tax 
funds for the transportation of parochial school pupils. 
Another majority decision handed down with a vigorous 
1/Hardwlck v. Board of School Trustees, 205 P. 49 (Cal.). 
gjEverson v. Board of Education, 330 u. s. 1, 67 S. Ct, 962. 
fi 9 
dissenting opinion was the compulsory flag salute case y 
of West Virginia v. Barnette. 
The tradition of our country is interwoven with a 
religious spirit, a belief in tolerance, and a desire 
to keep separated the church and the state. The public 
policy towards religion has been one of extreme 
cooperation. Churches, in general, are free from 
taxation. The federal and state governments hire 
chaplains to minister to servicemen, open deliberations 
with prayers, and furnish police and fire protection to 
religious groups among many instances of cooperation. 
Our state constitutions testify to the belief of the 
founders of our country in a Supreme Being and the 
fact that this is a country based on a religious 
morality. 
Yet, despite this cooperation, there has also been 
the belief that a man's religion was a personal matter 
and that between the church and the state there should 
be "a 
y 
wall of separation". This wall of separation has 
been buttressed by the guarantee of religious freedom y 
in the First Amendment to the Constitution, and the 
!/Board of Education of West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 
U. S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178. 
g/Everson v. Board of Education, supra. 
:J/United States Constitution, Amendment I. 
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application of the Fourteenth Amendment to extend the 
guarantee of the First Amendment to the several states. 
y 
This denial of the authority of the state governments to 
appropriate and spend moneys raised by taxation in 
support of sectarian institutions or instructions is 
specifically prohibited by state constitutions. y The 
Massachusetts Constitution states: 
"All moneys raised by taxation •••• for the 
support of public schools •••• shall be expended 
in no other schools •••• and no grant, appropriation 
•••• shall be made •••• for the purpose of maintain-
ing or aiding any school •••• wherein denominational 
doctrine is inculcated •••• " 
Around these broad and well-established principles 
the points of issue have revolved. 
Bible reading and prayers.-- Approximately one third 
of the states mandate or permit the reading of the Bible 
in public schools, another one third of the states pro-
hibit such reading, and the statutes of the remaining 
states are silent on the matter. Massachusetts is one 
of the states in which reading from the Bible is pre-
scribed by statute: Y 
"A portion of the Bible shall be read daily in 
the public schools, without written note or oral 
l/United States Constitution, Amendment XIV. 
gjMassachusetts Constitution, Amendment XLVI, Section 2. 
yaeneral Laws Relating to Education, (1956 Edition) 
Chapter 71, Section 31. 
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comment; but a pupil whose parent or guardian informs 
the teacher in writing that he has conscientious 
scruples against it, shall not be required to read 
from any particular version, or to take any personal 
part in the reading." 
The authority of the school committee to make and 
enforce a rule that the school day should be begun by a 
reading from the Bible and prayer was upheld by the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in an early and y 
leading case. Thus Massachusetts follows the general 
interpretation that the simple reading of either the King 
James or the Douay versions of the Bible or the offering 
of a non-denominational prayer does not make a school a y 
place of worship or a sectarian school. There have been, 
j/ 
however, decisions to the contrary in other states. 
singing of hymns is contrary to the prohibition of 
sectarian instruction in a school supported by public y 
moneys. It is clear too, that in the absence of stat-
The 
utory provision, a school board may prohibit the reading 
of the Bible or the holding of morning devotional 
exercises. .21 
1/Spiller v. Woburn, 12 Allen (Mass.) 127. 
2/Hackett v. Brooksville Graded School District, 87 s. W. 
192 (Ky.); Wilkerson v. Rome, 110 S. E. 895 (Ga.). 
j/People v. Board of Education, 92 N. E. 251 (Ill.). 
!!/State v. Scheve, 91 N. W. 846 (Neb.) • 
.2/People v. Board of Education, supra. 
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The use of the Bible as a literature book is a 
point in complete conflict. Some judicial rulings have y 
upheld this practice while other rulings have held it 
gj 
to be illegal. However, even in jurisdictions where 
rulings against the use of the Bible have been held, the 
use of texts founded on the Bible and emphasizing its 
fundamental teachings or the reading of non-sectarian 
extracts such as the Ten Commandments is permitted. 
y 
The wearing of religious garb.-- Another point of 
irreconciliable conflict is the wearing of religious 
garb by a teacher in the public schools. The first 
leading case questioned the legality of the employment 
of persons belonging to a religious order to teach in 
the public schools, the wearing of religious garb and 
other symbols while teaching, and the giving of the 
salary received to a religious order. The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, by a majority decision, held such 
practices to be not violative of constitutional or y 
statutory prohibitions. Subsequently, however, the 
1/Hackett v. Brooksville Graded School District, supra; 
Conahoe v. Richards, 61 Am. Dec. 256 (Me. ) • 
gjstate ex rel. Weis v. District Board, 44 N. W. 967 (Wis.); 
State ex rel. Dearle v. Frazier, 173 P. 35 (wash.). 
'l/State ex rel. Weis v. District Board, supra. 
State ex rel. Dearle v. Frazier, supra. 
!±/Hysong v. Gallitzin School District, 30 A. 482 (Penn.). 
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Pennsylvania Legislature enacted a statute prohibiting 
this practice, which statute was held valid by the y 
Pennsylvania Supreme Judicial Court. In New York, a 
rule of a school board forbidding the employment of 
persons of a religious order and their wearing of 
religious garb in public school teaching was validated y 
by court decision. There are employed in some states 
today persons of religious orders, wearing their reli-
gious garb, and other symbols of their order, and the 
practice has been upheld by the highest court of the 
state. 
y 
Use of buildings owned by religious groups.-- There 
have been instances of public school pupils attending 
classes in a building or part of a building owned by a 
religious group. The controlling principle in such cases 
seems to be the element of control. In a very recent New 
Mexico case, the court held that the widespread practice 
in New Mexico of extremely close cooperation between the 
church school authorities and the public board of educ~ 
tion to the point that the church was virtually operating 
!/Commonwealth v. Herr, 78 A. 68 (Penn.). 
g/O'Connor v. Hendrick, 77 N. E. 612 (N.Y.). 
1/Gerhardt v. Reid, 267 N. w. 127 (N.D.); State ex rel. 
Johnson v. Boyd, 28 N. E. {2d) 256 (Ind.). 
a school system within the public school system was illegal. 
The court found that complete supervision and control in all 
school activities was not being exercised by the public 
school board, but was exercised in many respects by the 
church authorities. However, courts have commonly held 
that a school board may use part of a church or other 
sectarian building for public school purposes, providing 
that there is no sectarian instruction given and, in the 
case of a use of a portion of a parochial school, that 
v 
there be no intermingling of the two schools. But where 
a parochial school is taken over and incorporated into 
the public school system, sectarian instruction must be y 
discontinued. 
Transportation of parochial school pupils.-- A current 
bitter controversy exists on the matter of using public 
funds to transport pupils to 
a line of judicial decisions 
parochial schools. Despite y 
to the contrary, the United 
1/Zeller v. Hugg, 236 P. (2d) 949 (N. M.). 
5/Knowlton v. Baumhover, 166 N. W. 202 (Iowa); Dorner v. 
School District, 118 N. W. 353 (Wis.); State ex rel. 
Johnson v. Boyd, 28 N. E. {2d) 256 (Ind.). 
l/Harst v. Hoegen, 163 s. W. (2d) 609 (Mo.) 141 A. L. R. 
1136. 
ystate ex rel. Traub v. Brown, 172 A. 835 (Del.); Judd v. 
Board of Education, 15 N. E. {2d) 576 (N.Y.); Gurney v. 
Ferguson, 122 P. {2d) 1002 {Okla.); Mitchell v. Consolidated 
School District, 135 P. {2d) 79 (Wash.). 
11 
States Supreme Court, in a slender majority ruling, has 
held that the payment of tax funds for the transportation 
of parochial school pupils is not an aid to the church 
or to the school, but a public welfare benefit bestowed y 
upon the child, In this Everson case, the majority 
opinion felt that such payment for transportation in no 
way created a breach in the high wall between church and 
state. However, in the vigorous dissenting opinion of 
the minority written by Justice Jackson, the payment of 
such transportation from public funds was viewed as a 
clear case of aid to the school and the church as one. 
In Massachusetts, there has been no such controversy. 
The statute specifically states that pupils attending 
parochial schools are entitled to the same transportation 
v 
schools. That any rights as pupils attending public 
challenge to the validity of the Massachusetts statute 
would be rebuffed in Massachusetts seems assured in the 
apparent acceptance here in Massachusetts of the "child 
benefit" theory promulgated by the United States Supreme 
v Court. 
Other issues with religious connotation.-- The Supreme 
1/Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 67 S. Ct. 504. 
2/General Laws Relating to Education, (1956 Edition) 
Chapter 76, Section 1. 
VReports of the Attorney-General of Massachusetts, 1951. 
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Court of the United States has held that a state legislature 
does not have the authority to compel all pupils to be 
.!1 
educated in the public schools: 
"The fundamental theory of liberty, upon which 
all governments of the Union repose, excludes any 
general power of the state to standardize its 
children by forcing them to accept instruction 
from public teachers only. The child is not the 
mere creature of the state; those who nurture him 
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with 
the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for 
additional obligations." 
In Massachusetts, no public school committee or 
official may inquire concerning an applicant's religious y 
belief, creed, or practice or his political beliefs. In 
this state too, the use of a public school building for 
various recreational and educational purposes cannot be 
forbidden solely on the basis that such use is by a 
:v group with a religious affiliation. 
The cooperation of the public schools in the matter 
of a released time program for religious education has been 
validated by the United States in the Zorach case in so 
far as the cooperation is merely to the extent of adjust-
!Y' ing schedules. However, that same body ruled 
l/Plerce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 u. S. 510 45 S, Ct. 
571. 
'ij'General Laws Relating to Education, (1956 Edition) 
Chapter 71, Section 39. 
1/Ibid., Chapter 71, Section 71. 
!3/Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 346. 
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unconstitutional a released time program in which 
sectarian instruction was given in the public schools. 
y 
In this commonwealth, the released time is limited to y 
one hour each week. 
As discussed in other sections, it has been held 
that the state has the right to compel vaccination as a 
requirement for admission to the public schools in spite 
of religious scruples of the parent to the contrary. ~ 
But, it does not have the right to compel the flag salute 
and pledge of allegiance to the flag on the basis that 
such an exercise compelled of a person with religious 
scruples to the contrary would be violative of the First y 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution. 
10. Administration of Pupil Personnel 
School attendance.-- Under English common law, 
control of the education of the child rested with the 
parent. This principle was brought to the English 
Colonies and applied until the adoption of compulsory 
1/McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 u. S. 203. 
YGeneral Laws Relating to Education, (1956 Edition) 
Chapter 76, Section 1. 
~Commonwealth v. Green, 268 Mass. 585; zucht v. King, 260 
u. s. 174, 43 s. ct. 24. 
YBoard of Education of West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 
U. S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178. 
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attendance legislation by the several states. The courts 
have held that compulsory attendance laws are a valid 
exercise of police power because the welfare of the state 
11 is served by the creation of an enlightened citizenry. 
The primary purpose is that the child be educated and y 
not how he shall be educated. Attendance at public y 
schools cannot be compelled. In Massachusetts all 
children between the ages of seven and sixteen must y 
attend the public schools or be otherwise instructed 
in a manner approved in advance by the superintendent 
21 
or the school committee. Attendance is not required 
of a child whose physical or mental condition is such as 
to render attendance inexpedient or impractical nor 
of certain children granted employment certificates at 
the discretion of the superintendent. Failure to cause 
a child in one's care to attend school is punishable by §I 
fine as is the inducement of a minor to absent himself 
1/Stephens v. Bongart, 80, 189 A. 131 (N. J.). 
gjCommonwealth v. Roberts, 159 Mass. 372, 
3/Pierce v. Society of the Sisters 268 u. s. 510, 45 s. ct. 
'5'71. 
!:/General Laws Relating to Education, (1956 Edition) 
Chapter 76, Section 1. 
2/Commonwealth v. Renfrew, 332 Mass, 492. 
§/General Laws Relating to Education, (1956 Edition) 
Chapter 76, Section 2, 
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y 
unlawfully from school. The compulsory attendance law 
must be reasonably enforced. Illness is always a 
perfect defense. Unless transportation is furnished 
for a child living a considerable distance from the 
school, attendance cannot be compelled. Extremely 
hazardous conditions or other good cause may justify 
the failure of a parent to cause his child to attend 
school. 
Vaccination requirements.-- Compulsory vaccination 
has been upheld as a valid exercise of the police power y 
of a state by the United States Supreme Court. In 
Massachusetts an unvaccinated child may not be admitted 
to school except on presentation 7f a physician's y y 
certificate. Such certificate, stating that a child 
is not a fit subject for vaccination, must be renewed 
periodically at the request of the school authorities. 
!/Ibid., Chapter 76, Section 4. 
YJacobson v. Mass. 197 u. s. 11, 25 s. ct. 358; Zucht 
v. King, 260 U. S. 174, 43 S. Ct. 24. 
yaeneral Laws Relating to Education, (1956 Edition) 
Chapter 76, Section 15. 
Yibid., Chapter 111, Section 183. 
~Spofford v. Carleton, 238 Mass. 528. 
~ 
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The courts have held that religious scruples to the 
contrary did not absolve the parents of a child from y 
having the child vaccinated. The statutory obligation 
to cause children to attend school involves the obligation 
v 
to put them in condition to attend. The right to religious 
freedom is not an absolute right but the welfare of the 
group must take precedence over the liberty of an in-
Y dividual to exercise his religious beliefs. Court 
action may be brought against the school directors or 
the prin~al 
statute. 
compelling enforcement of the vaccination 
School age.-- The compulsory school attendance pro-
vision is merely a law to compel the attendance of 
children between seven and sixteen and does not set age 
~ limits for public schooling. The courts have held that 
the local school board may extend public schooling for 
ij 
of seven. In Massachusetts the children below the age 
i/State v. Drew, 192 A. 629 (N.H.). 
ycommonwealth v. Green, 268 Mass. 585. 
YRenfrew v. Commonwealth, 332 Mass. 492. 
4/State v. Beil, 60 N. E. 672 (Ind.); Commonwealth v. Rowe, 
b7 A. 56 (Penn.}. 
~General Laws Relating to Education, (1956 Edition) 
Chapter 76, Section 1. 
ijin re Kindergarten Schools, 32 P. 422 (Colo.); In re 
Newark School Board, 70 A. (N.J.) 881. 
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statute gives the local school committee the authority to 
establish junior college instruction, extending public y 
school age well beyond the compulsory age limit of sixteen. 
When the lower compulsory school age is established 
by law to be seven, parents cannot be compelled to cause 
their children under seven to attend school. Neither 
must a town provide schooling for children under seven, 
although in actual practice all towns do. Thus the 
provision of educational facilities for children under 
seven is entirely within the discretion of the school 
committee, which may establish requirements for admission 
as it sees fit, with the limitation that the regulation 
must apply equally to all children in the age classifica-
tion. A school committee may make and enforce a rule 
requiring that children to be eligible for grade one must 
enter the grade before a specified date in the school y 
year. The court reasoned that pupils entering a class 
at various times during the school year would be a 
disruptive influence on the class. 
Affect of residence on attendance.-- The questio~ 
as to what constitutes residence within the statutes has 
resulted in much litigation. Early decisions followed a 
1/General Laws Relating to Education, (1956 Edition) 
Chapter 71, Section 75. 
YAlvord v. Chester, 180 Mass. 20. 
theory of strict interpretation of 
school purposes, which favored. the 
legal residence for y 
taxpayers. More recent 
decisions construe residence more liberally than the legal 
v interpretation of domicil, Generally a child is entitled 
to attend the schools of the district in which he resides, 
providing the residence there in a home other than his 
legal residence is not merely for the purpose of attending 
school. In this state a child has a right to attend the 
schools of the district in which he resides subject to 
the reasonable rules and regulations of the school y 
committee. In the case of a child residing in the 
town for the special purpose of there attending school, y 
the town may recover tuition from the parent or from the 
21 
school committee of the town of legal residence. The 
town may also recover tuition from the state or the City of §1 
Boston for certain public charges attending school 
lfWheeler v. Burrow, 18 Ind. 14; Board of Education v. 
Foster 116 Kent. 484 3 Ann. Cas. 692; Mansfield Township 
Board of Education v. State Board of Education, 129 A. 
765 (N.J.); Inde v. Klinge, 30 Mo. App. 285; Smith v. 
Binford, 256 P. 366 {Idaho). 
5/People v. Hendrickson, 90 N. E. ll63 {N. Y.); Cline v. 
Knight, 193 P. {2d) 660 {Colo.); City of New Haven v. 
Town of Torrington, 43A. (2d) 455 (Conn.), 
2/General Laws Relating to Education, 
Chapter 76, Section 5 • 
(1956 Edition) 
.:±/Ibid., Chapter 76, Section 6. 
2/Ibid., Chapter 76, 'Section 12. 
.§/Ibid. I Chapter 76, Section 7. 
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y 
therein or from certain institutions for the school 
expense incurred by the attendance of inmates of that 
institution. 
Classification of pupils.-- Hamilton and Mort v 
state: 
"School authorities have the power to classify 
and grade pupils as, in the discretion of the author-
ities, will be for the best interests of the schools. 
Parents have no legal right to insist that their 
children shall be admitted to any particular class 
or group •••• The authority to grade and classify 
pupils is subject to the sole condition that the 
classification or grading be reasonable." 
The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that a pupil does 
not have the right to attend the school most conveniently 
located to his place of residence and that the school 
authorities could assign pupils to the various schools 
in the district as they saw fit to promote the best 
interests of the entire 11 system, The authority to 
classify pupils on the basis of scholarship rests also 
with the school committee. It may assign a pupil to the 
grade in the public school that his previous scholastic 
record warrants and the determination of what grade a 
pupil is prepared for is solely an educational matter 
1/General Laws Relating to Education, (1956 Edition) 
Chapter 76, Section 11. 
V'Robert R. Hamilton and Paul R. Mort, The Law and Public 
Education, The Foundation Press, Inc. Chicago, 1941 p, 465. 
3/State ex rel. Lewis v. Board of Education, 28 N. E. (2nd) 
496 (Ohio). 
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not for the courts to decide. This principle was 
affirmed in Massachusetts by a Supreme Court decision 
ruling that the school committee could exclude from a 
class and a school a pupil failing to meet the reasonable 
standards of achievement set by the committee. 
y 
Moreover, school committees may require the 
graduates of private and parochial schools to take an 
examination not required of public school graduates as 
a qualification for high school admission. 
y 
Transportation of pupils.-- The authority of the 
school committee to provide transportation for public y 
school pupils is well decided. The Massachusetts 
statute requires the school committee to provide 
transportation for pupils residing over two miles 
~ from the school. Cities and towns may appropriate 
moneys for provision of transportation for public 
school athletic teams, coaches, cheerleaders, and 
1/Board of Education v. Wickham, 88 N. E. 412 (Ohio). 
YBarnard v. Shelburne, 216 Mass. 19. 
ycreyhon v. Board of Education, 163 P. 145 (Kan.); 
Kayser v. Board of Education, 201 S. w. 531 (Mo.). 
Ycross v. Fisher, 177 S. w. 43 (Tenn.); Bufkin v. 
Mitchell, 63 S. 458 (Miss.); Pasadena City High School 
v. Upjohn, 276 P. 341 (Cal.). 
5/General Laws Relating to Education, (1956 Edition) 
Chapter 71, Section 68. 
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bands bearing the school name. Towns and cities may 
also provide for the transportation of pupils afflicted 
with cerebral palsy, mentally retarded pupils, and 
pupils with 
without the 
other physical y 
town. 
handicaps, within or 
The transportation of parochial school pupils at 
public expense is a burning issue in many states, but 
one which has been resolved in Massachusetts. The y 
statute states: 
"Pupils who, in the fulfillment of the 
compulsory attendance requirements of this section, 
attend private schools of elementary and high 
school grades so approved shall be entitled to the 
same rights and privileges as to transportation to 
and from school as are provided by law for pupils 
of public schools and shall not be denied such 
transportation because their attendance is in a 
school which is conducted under religious 
auspices or includes religious instruction in 
its curriculum." 
This apparent conflict with the Constitution of 
Massachusetts, which states that tax money can be spent 
only for public schools and cannot be used to aid or 
maintain a school under control of a religious denom-
Y ination, is resolved by the application of the ''child 
i/Ibid., Chapter 11, Section 47. 
'Yibid., Chapter 75, Section 46B. 
'j/Ibid., Chapter 76, Section 1. 
!±/Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 
Chapter 5, Article XLVI, Section 2. 
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benefit" theory discussed in the Attorney-General's 
. 11 
report for 1951. 
Exclusion of applicants for admission.-- The child 
does not have an absolute right to public schooling, but 
has the qualified right to avail himself of the privilege 
of public schooling extended by the state if he will 
meet the qualifications established by the state and 
the school committee. The principle that a school 
committee may exclude a child who does not meet the 
v 
established qualifications is long standing. The right 
of the school committee to exclude for non-vaccination 
has already been discussed. Similarly, a pupil may 
~ be excluded for immoral conduct performed away from 
school as may a child mentally or physically incapable 
of profiting from instruction or whose presence may 
interfere with the orderly carrying on of school 
activities. Recent Massachusetts legislation provides 
specifically for the education of ~ mentally retarded 
1/Attorney-General of Massachusetts Reports for 1951. 
yspear v. Cummings, 23 Pick, (Mass.) 224, 
~Sherman v. Charlestown, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 160. 
~atson v. Cambridge, 157 Mass. 561. 
~General Laws Relating to Education, (1956 Edition) 
Chapter 71, Section 46. 
y 
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and physically handicapped children. The requirement of 
physical examinations of pupils as qualification for 
entrance in spite of religious scruples to the contrary y 
has been upheld by the courts. However, the Massachusetts 
statute exempts pupils from certain physical examinations 
on religious 
communicable 
grounds, excepting 
diseases. ~ 
those connected with 
Enforcement of discipline.-- The right of a pupil to 
attend public schools is a qualified and not an absolute 
right. For a child to have the right to avail himself 
of the privilege of instruction in the public school, 
both he and his parent must meet the qualifications 
established by the state and by the local school 
committee. The Supreme Court of the United States, in 
reaching a decision on a Massachusetts case, has stated 
the principle succinctly: "The constitutional right of 
children to attend public schools is not absolute, but 
is subject to such reasonable conditions as the state y 
may impose." The right of the child to attend public 
school is subject also to such reasonable regulations as 
l/Ibid., Chapter 71, Section 46 A. 
ystreich v. Board of Education, 147 N. w. 799 (S.D.). 
~General Laws Relating to Education, (1956 Edition) 
Chapter 71, Section 57. 
YJohnson v. Deerfield, 306 U. S. 621, 59 S. Ct. 791. 
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to numbers and qualifications of pupils to be admitted to 
school and as to other school matters as the school 
v 
committee from time to time shall prescribe. The 
statutory obligation to cause children to attend school 
involves an obligation to the parents of putting them 
v 
into condition to attend. 
In dealing with all cases involving conflict between 
a pupil and a rule of the school committee, the courts 
have been loath to substitute their judgment for that of 
the school committee, It is well established that the 
court will question only if the rule was within the 
authority of the school committee, if the rule was 
reasonable, and if the rule was reasonably enforced, If 
the rule is for the promotion of the best interests of 
the school and meets these above qualifications, the y 
courts sustain the school committee. 
Statutory regulations.-- The authority to make rules 
and regulations for the control and management of the 
pupils may be found in the state legislature, the local 
school committee, the superintendent, the principals, 
and the teachers of the schools. 
1/Alvord v. Chester, 180 Mass. 20. 
Vcommonwealth v. Childs, 299 Mass. 367. 
yspiller v. Woburn, 12 Allen (Mass.) 127; Byrd v. Begley 
90S, W. (2d) 370 (Ky.). 
89 
Legislative enactments dealing with the control of 
pupils have been found mainly in the areas of health, the 
reading of the Bible, the flag salute, and the control of 
so-called secret societies. The validity of statutes 
which to some limited extent interfere with the personal 
rights of certain individuals is upheld on the theory that 
the right to attend an educational institution provided 
by the state is not a natural right but a public bene-
faction and those who seek to become beneficiaries of it 
must submit to such regulations and conditions as the law 
imposes as a prerequisite for participation. .v 
v The authority of statutes requiring vaccination and 
11 physical examinations has been substantiated in court. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Court has sustained the reading 
of the Bible as part of the opening exercises in the y 
public schools as has the Supreme Court of the United 
2/ States. Prior to 1942, statutes and school committee 
rules compelling the flag salute and the "Pledge of 
1/Satan Fraternity v. Board of Public Instruction for Dade 
County, 22 So. (2d) 892 (Fla.). 
g/Zucht v. King, 260 U. S. 174, 43 S. Ct. 24. 
1J'Streich v. Board of Education, 147 N. w. 779 (S.D.). 
!:/Spiller v. Woburn, 12 Allen (Mass.) 127. 
2}Doremus v. Board of Education of Hawthorne, 342 u. s. 429. 
90 
Allegiance to the Flag" on the part of all pupils, as an 
exercise for developing patriotic attitudes on the part 
.!1 
of the pupils, were upheld in many decisions. However, 
the United States Supreme Court reversed its own decision 
and the decisions of many state courts in the case of 
West Virginia v. Barnette, in which it was held that 
the compulsory flag salute was an infringement upon the 
right to religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. 
A statute banning the organization of fraternities, 
sororities, and other secret organizations in public 
schools and prohibiting pupils enrolled in school from y 
becoming members has been held valid, In that decision 
the court made the following statement on the question 
of the absolute right of individuals to liberty in a 
!J/ democracy: 
"In conclusion, it is pertinent to state that 
none of our liberties are absolute; all of them may 
be limited when the common good or common decency 
requires. Even freedom of religion, the most 
cherished of all our freedoms, has been limited. 
i/Nicholls v. Lynn, 297 Mass. 65; Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
309 Mass. 476; Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 
u. s. 586, 6os. ct. 1010. 
~oard of Education of West Virginia v. Barnette, 310 
u. s. 624, 63 s. ct. 1118. 
]/Satan Fraternity v. Board of Instruction for Dade 
County, 22 So. (2d) 892 (Fla.). 
!J./Satan Fraternity v, Board of Instruction for Dade 
County, supra. 
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Freedom after all is not something turned foot-
loose to run as it will like a thoroughbred in a 
blue grass meadow. Freedom in a democracy is a 
matter of character and tolerance. The ideal 
recipient of it is one who voluntarily refuses to 
sacrifice the common good to personal passion." 
Rules and regulations of the school board.-- Under 
the authority of general superintendence of the public 
schools delegated to the school board by legislative 
enactment, the school board has sweeping powers to make 
rules and regulations governing the actions of pupils. 
In Massachusetts, these sweeping powers given to the 
local school boards were defined by Chief Justice Rugg y 
in the Leonard v. Springfield decision: 
"A school committee may make all reasonable 
rules and regulations for the government, discipline, 
and management of the schools under their charge, 
and may determine the subjects to be taught and the 
nature of the schools to be maintained within 
'statutory bounds, and exercise discrimination in 
the election of teachers and in the general super-
vision of the school system with all the incidental 
powers essential to the discharge of their main 
functions." 
The classification and assignment of pupils are 
v functions inherent with the local school committee, which y 
will not be interfered with by the courts unless there 
is a clear abuse of authority in the promulgation of 
I/Leonard v. Springfield, 241 Mass. 325. 
?./Alvord v. Chester, 180 Mass. 20; Independent School 
District v. Salvatierra, 33 S. W. (2d) 790 (Tex.). 
J./Grove v. Peoria School Inspectors, 20 Ill. 532. 
y 
unreasonable rules. Unreasonable rules cannot be enforced. 
Under its power to prescribe rules for the management and 
government of the school, a committee may require a 
classification of pupils with respect to the branches of 
study they are pursuing and the standards of proficiency y 
to be attained, and may make rules governing the y 
methods of school work, The board may prescribe rules y 
for admission, for governing tests and examinations 
~ for promotion, and for the determination of double 
~ promotion. The school committee may rule that pupils 
v 
may not leave the school during the school day nor 
w participate in secret fraternities. A rule requiring 
that there be prompt attendance, diligence in study, and 
proper deportment lies within the power of the school 
1/Illinois School Trustees v. People, 29 Am. Rep. 55 (Ill.). 
g/Barnard v. Shelburne, 216 Mass. 19, 
yauernsey v. Pitkin, 76 Am. Rep. 171 (vt.). 
YAlvord v. Chester, 180 Mass. 20. 
~Sycamore Board of Education v. State, 88 N. E. 412 (Ohio). 
~Sycamore Board of Education v. State, supra. 
VRichardson v. Braham, 249 N. W. 557 (Neb.), 
WAntell v. Stokes, 287 Mass, 103, 
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y 
board. Other rules held reasonable by the courts include y 
a restriction against the wearing of heel plates, the 
requiring of a parent to sign and return to a teacher a y 
report card, and the restricting of lunches to those y 
brought from home or purchased at school. Additional 
rules that have been upheld by the courts are the 
~ 
requiring of the preparation of homework assignments and y 
the requiring of a pupil to go directly home after school. 
A further support to the wide power of the board with 
respect to making rules controlling the actions of the 
pupils is the presumption of the court existing in favor 
of the reasonableness and propriety of a rule adopted 
v by school authorities under statutory authority. It is 
perhaps well, in view of this very considerable power, to 
heed the admonishment of the Supreme Court of Virginia 
I/State v. Dixon County School District No. 1, 48 N. w. 
393 (Neb.). 
g;Bourne v. State, 52 N. w. 710 (Neb.). 
1/Stromberg v. French, 236 N. W. 477 (N.D.). 
~ishop v. Houston Independent School District, 29 
S. W. (2d) 312 (Tex.). 
~Bolding v. State, 4 S. W. 579 (Tex.). 
§/Jones v. Cody, 92 N. W. 495 (Mich.). 
1/Bishop v. Houston Independent School District, 29 
s. w. (2d) 312 (Tex.). 
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when it said: "However, while a rule may be legally 
reasonable, it should not be without elasticity. In the 
enforcement of every law there should be brought into 
play the element of common sense." 
Among rules that have been held unreasonable by the 
courts, and thus unenforceable, are rules requiring the y 
flag salute as previously mentioned, a rule depriving 
:v 
a pupil of a right to which the law entitles him, a 
rule tending to alienate the pupil from proper parental y 
authority, a rule excluding married girls from school, 
and a rule requiring a pupil to do what he cannot do, 
i.e., to §iY for damage carelessly 
property. 
done to school 
'21 
Authority of teachers over pupils.-- In the absence 
of specific rules provided by the statutes or by the 
school committee, a teacher, in the exercise of his power 
1/Flory v. Smith, 134 So. 360 (Va.). 
?/Board of Education of West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 
U. S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178. 
1/Valentine v. casey Independent School District, 183 
N. W. 4 34 (Iowa) • 
:!/Hardwick v. School District, 205 P. 49 (Cal.). 
'2/McLeod v. State, 122 So. 737 (Miss.). 
§/State v. Vanderbilt, 18 N. E. 266 (Iowa). 
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to control and maintain discipline in his class, may adopt y 
any reasonable rules to that end. Indeed, a teacher does 
not derive all his power over pupils from the statutes or 
from the school committee, but receives it directly from 
the parent. An authoritative statement on this authority y 
of the teacher is found in Ruling Case Law: 
"A teacher is responsible for the discipline 
of his school, and for the progress, conduct, and 
deportment of his pupils. It is his imperative 
duty to maintain good order and to require of his 
pupils a faithful performance of their duties. To 
enable him to discharge these duties effectually, he 
must necessarily have the power to enforce prompt 
obedience to his lawful commands, for which reason 
the law gives him the power, in proper cases, to in-
flict corporal punishment on refractory pupils, and 
this is true in private as well as public schools. 
The school master's authority is sanctioned, it 
seems, practically and judicially, on the same 
ground as the right of a parent to chastise his 
child. Indeed, it is said that for this purpose 
he represents the parent and has the parental 
authority delegated to him; that he stands in loco 
parentis. But this is true only in a limited sense. 
He has no general right to chastise for all offenses, 
as has the parent. His right is restricted to the 
limits of his jurisdiction and responsibility as a 
teacher. Also the power to inflict punishment thus 
delegated to and vested in the school teacher is not 
the full extent of the parent's right because the 
power of correction vested in parents is less 
liable to abuse, being continually restrained by 
natural affection, and the school teacher, of 
course has no such natural restraint, and there-
fore, must be limited to temperately exercising 
i/Fertich v. Michener, 11 N. E. 605 (Ind.). 
5/Ruling Case Law, Volume 24, p. 638. 
9G 
the power to inflict such punishment as is necessary 
to answer the purposes for which he is employed." 
The authority of a teacher over a pupil extends not 
only to the acts of the pupil committed during school 
hours or on the playground, but also to those acts 
committed after school hours and away from the school 
grounds insofar as they have a direct and material bear-
ing on the good order and best interests of the school or 
affect adversely the discipline of the school. Thus it 
has been held that a teacher or principal may punish a 
pupil for bullying young girls on the way home from 
school even where the boy in question had already reached 
his parental abode and the acts of bullying took place 
v in the yard of the boy. Sustained too has been the 
action of punishment by school authorities for the making 
of a speech before the student body which was highly y 
derogatory to the actions of school authorities, and 
the sending of pupils directly home who had stopped at y 
a store near the school after dismissal. The courts 
sustained the punishment of pupils for the publishing 
of a poem lampooning school rules in the local newspaper, 
1/0'Rourke v. Walker, 128 A. 25 (Conn.) 
g!Wooster v. Sunderland, 148 P. 959 (Cal.). 
YJones v. Cody, 92 N. W. 495 (Mich.). 
!i/Dresser v. School District No. 1, 116 N, W. 232 (Wis.). 
y 
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for making insulting remarks to the principal at his home, 
and for inciting other pupils to write articles for the 
local newspaper criticising the principal. 
y 
What statutes there are concerning the conduct of a 
pupil in school are very general in nature and give inade-
quate guidance. However, there has developed a sort of 
common law regarding 
first expressed in a 
the behavior of pupils, which was 
leading, early Wisconsin case: 
y 
"In the school, as in the family, there exists 
on the part of the pupils the obligation of obedience 
to lawful commands, subordination, civil deportment, 
respect for the rights of other pupils, and fidelity 
to duty. These obligations are inherent in any 
proper school system, and constitute, so to speak, 
the common law of the school. Every pupil is 
presumed to know this law, and is subject to it, 
whether it has or has not been re-enacted by the 
district board in the form of written rules and 
regulations. It would indeed seem impossible to 
frame rules which would cover all cases of insub-
ordination and all acts of vicious tendency which 
the teacher is liable to encounter daily and hourly." 
The powers of the teacher are unaffected by the fact 
that his commands are given to pupils in the form of y 
requests and extend the teaching and the preservation 
of order and discipline to matters affecting the morals, 
1/Lander v. Seaver, 76 Am. D. 156 (Vt.). 
YMorrison v. Lawrence, 181 Mass. 127. 
ystate v. Burton, 30 Am. Rep. 706 (Wis.). 
!±/State v. Scheve, 91 N. W. 846 (Iowa). 
9U 
y 
y 
safety, and health of his pupils. The use of detention 
after school is a practice well-established and even if a 
teacher is mistaken as to the justice or propriety of 
detaining a pupil after school, there is no element of 
false imprisonment in the absence of wanton, willful, or y 
malicious motives. 
However, a rule that is reasonable in itself, must 
be reasonably enforced having due regard for the health, 
comfort, age, and mental and physical condition of the 
pupils, and to the circumstances of each particular y 
situation. Furthermore, a teacher has no right to y 
inflict any cruel or unusual punishment, and must punish 
the child only for some specific offense which the child 
has committed and for which he knows he is being punished. 
The punishment must be commensurate with the offense and 
not excessive. There must be reasonable grounds for the 
punishment, and it must be administered without malice. 
1/Richardson v. Braham, 249 N. w. 557 (Neb.). 
ijFertich v. Michener, 11 N. E. 605 (Ind.). 
YFertich v. Michener, supra. 
YPhillips v. Johns, 12 Tenn. App. 354. 
~State v. Mizner, 32 Am. Rep. 128 (Iowa). 
~Marlar v. Bill, 178 S. W. (2d) 634 (Tenn.). 
~ 
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Corporal punishment,--
"As a general rule, a school teacher, insofar 
as it may reasonably be necessary to the maintenance 
of the discipline and efficiency of the school, 
and to compel compliance with reasonable rules and 
regulations, may inflict reasonable corporal punish-
ment upon a pupil for, insubordination, disobedience, 
or other misconduct." y 
While corporal punishment is _forbidden by statute in 
one state and is specifically sanctioned by the statutes 
of others, the Massachusetts statutes are silent on the 
subject. In the absence of rules and regulations of the 
school committee, a teacher or principal in Massachusetts 
may use corporal punishment within the limitations found 
in the common law of Massachusetts and the country. Where 
there are rules and regulations governing the practice of 
corporal punishment or its prohibition, a teacher is bound 
by those rules. The very early, but leading and much 
quoted case of Lander v. Seaver includes a comprehensive 
v discussion of the use of corporal punishment: 
roo 
"In determining upon what is a reasonable pun-
ishment, various considerations must be regarded, the 
nature of the offense, the apparent motive, and dis-
position of the offender, the influence of his example 
and conduct upon others, and the sex, age, size and 
strength of the pupil to be punished, Among reasonable 
persons much difference prevails as to the circumstances 
i/Corpus Juris quoted in Berry v. Arnold School District, 
1"37 S. W. ( 2d) 256 (Ala. ) • 
gjLander v, Seaver, 76 Am. D. 156 (vt.), 
which will justify the infliction of punishment, and 
the extent to which it may properly be administered. 
On account of this difference of opinion and the 
difficulty which exists in determining what is a 
reasonable punishment and the advantage which the 
master has by being on the spot to know all the 
circumstances, the manner, look, tone, gestures 
and language of the offender and thus to form a 
correct opinion as to the necessity and extent of 
the punishment, considerable allowance should be 
made to the teacher by way of protecting him in 
the exercise of his discretion. Especially should 
he have this indulgence when he appears to have 
acted from good motives and not from anger or 
malice. Hence the teacher is not to be held liable 
on the ground of excess of punishment unless the 
punishment is clearly excessive and would be held 
so in the general judgment to reasonable men. If 
the punishment be thus clearly excessive, then the 
master should be liable for such excess, though he 
acted from good motives in inflicting the punishment, 
and in his own judgment considered it necessary and 
not excessive. But if there is any reasonable doubt 
whether the punishment was excessive, the master 
should have the benefit of the doubt." 
The criterion of reasonableness always applies. Thus 
it is necessary always to consider the nature of the offense, 
and the age and mental condition and personal attributes of y 
the offending pupil. In an early Massachusetts case, the 
101 
court held a teacher guilty of excessive punishment when y 
the teacher struck a girl pupil several times with a ferrule. 
In handing down the decision, the court stated that " •••• he 
[the teacher] is liable in a criminal prosecution only when 
I/Sheehan v. Sturges, 2 A. 841 (Conn.). 
ycommonwealth v. Randall, 4 Gray (Mass.) 36. 
!Boston University 
llabool o:r Education 
.....___ Library 
the amount of punishment inflicted is more than adequate 
to subdue the scholar and secure obedience to the rules 
of the school." The prime function of the punishment is 
to show the child the error of his ways and to teach him 
to conform to generally accepted patterns of behavior, It 
can never be used as an instrument of revenge by the 
teacher. 
A school principal who is not in direct contact with 
a pupil has the right to rely on reports made to the 
principal by the teachers of the pupil for the purpose 
of determining what means of correction should be taken 
for the infraction of discipline; furthermore, in deter-
mining what punishment the pupil should receive, the 
principal has the right to consider the pupil's conduct y 
generally. 
In the imposition of reasonable punishment, a teacher 
is not required to be infallible in his judgment. He cannot 
be held liable for an error in judgment when he has acted in 
v good faith and without malice. 
A recent, complete statement of the legal principles 
guiding the reasoning of the courts in cases involving 
l/People v. Mummert, 50 N. Y. S. (2d) 699, 183 Misc. 243. 
5/Heritage v. Dodge, 9 A. 722 (N.H.). 
10:2 
corporal punishment was given by the Ohio Supreme Court: 
"First the teacher stands in loco parentis 
and acts in a quasi-judicial capacity and is not 
liable for an error in judgment in the matter of 
punishment. 
"Second, the teacher's responsibility attaches 
home to home. 
y' 
"Third, there is a presumption of the correctness 
of the teacher's actions. 
"Fourth, there is a presumption that the teacher 
acts in good faith. 
"Fifth, mere excessive or severe punishment on 
the part of the teacher does not constitute a crime 
unless it is of such a nature as to produce or threaten 
lasting or permanent injury, or unless the state has 
shown that it was administered with either express 
malice (i.e., spite, hatred or revenge) or implied 
malice (i.e., a wrongful act wantonly done without 
just cause or excuse), and beyond a reasonable doubt. 
"Sixth, the defendant teacher is entitled to 
all the benefits and safe*uards of the well known 
presumption of innocence.' 
Exclusion, expulsion, and suspension.-- In order to 
constitute lawful expulsion, there must be a deprivation 
of school privileges by those authorities legally empowered 
to make such expulsion. The power of expelling a pupil 
for misconduct lies exclusively in the hands of the school y 
committee. A teacher has the inherent power to suspend 
a pupil and make a report to the school board unless he 
has been deprived of this power by an affirmative action 
of the board, but the power of expulsion cannot be exercised 
11 by a teacher. A refusal to promote a child to a grade or 
1/State v. Lutz, 113 N. E. (2d) 757 (Ohio). 
'ijAntell v. Stokes, 287 Mass. 203. 
2/Davis v. Boston, 133 Mass. 103. 
a school for which he has 
of school subjects is not 
not attained required y 
an expulsion. 
standards 
Grounds for expulsion.-- A pupil may be expelled or 
suspended for violation of rules and regulations of the y 
school committee. He may be expelled or suspended for 
persistent disobedience, insubordination, or other mis-
conduct for which no formal rule has been promulgated, but 
which has an injurious affect on the discipline and manage-
Y 
ment of the school. The determination of what constitutes 
misconduct or disobedience lies within the powers of the y 
board. There is the limitation to be observed that the 
alleged misconduct have some injurious affect on the 
21 discipline and government of the school. 
A child may be made to suffer expulsion or suspension 
not only for his own acts but for the acts of his parent §I 
toward the teacher, or for the acts of his parent in 
1/Barnard v. Shelburne, 216 Mass. 19. 
2/Antell v. Stokes, 287 Mass. 203; Stromberg v. French, 
~6 N. W. 477 (N. D.). 
j/Antell v. Stokes, supra. 
!i/State v. Probst, 206 N. w. 642 (Minn.). 
5/Wright v. St. Louis Board of Education, 246 s. W. 43 
~.) 27 A. L. R. 1061. 
6/cartersville Board of Education v. Purse, 28 S. E. 
'8'96 (Ga.). 
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refusing to comply with the rules of the school or 
refusing to permit the child to comply with the rules 
v 
of the school. · However, a pupil cannot be expelled for 
the refusal of a father to permit his child to take part 
in a school activity when the father has the legal right to y 
withhold his consent. Neither can a child be expelled 
or suspended in an arbitrary manner without a statement y 
of reason or a hearing, nor can he be suspended or 
expelled for a refusal to comply with a rule or regulation 
that is not necessary for the government, the order, or the 
~ 
efficiency of the school. Nor in Massachusetts can a 
child be excluded from any public school of any town on y 
account of race, color, or religion. Nor can a child be 
expelled for a careless act, no matter how negligent, and 
the subsequent refusal of him and his parent to pay for the 
1/Bourne v. State, 52 N. w. 710 (Neb.). 
ystromberg v. French 236 N. W. 477 (N.D.). 
YHardwick v. Fruitridge School District, 205 P. 49 (Cal.). 
ycross v. Walton Graded Common School District, 89 
S. W. 506 (Ky.). 
~State v. Fond du Lac Board of Education, 23 N. W. 
102 (Wis.). 
§/General Laws Relating to Education, (1956 Edition) 
Chapter 76, Section 5. 
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11 damages. However, the willful destruction of school 
property is punishable by court action under a specific y 
statute. 
Among the grounds held as reasonable for the suspension 
or expulsion of pupils are continued absences without satis-
l/ factory excuses, the refusal to obey proper rules and 
.o/ 
regulations, the refusal to do reasonable school assign-
2/ 
ments, the refusal to present a certificate from a doctor 
as to the condition of a throat infection and refusing to 
submit to a physical examination by the school doctor for §I 
reason of religious scruples, making inflammatory speeches 
11 
against school authorities, and causing to have published 
in a newspaper articles ridiculing the school authorities. 
y 
Procedures for expulsion,-- The Massachusetts statutes 
make these specific statements regarding exclusion: 
I/Holman v. Avon Township School District No. 5, 43 N. W. 
996 (Mich.). 
g}General Laws Relating to Education, (1956 Edition) 
Chapter 266, Section 98. 
lJWulff v. Wakefield, 221 Mass. 427. 
!±/Antell v. Stokes, 287 Mass. 103. 
2/Sewell v. Defiance School Union, 29 Ohio St. 89. 
§/stone v. Probst, 206 N. W, 642 (Minn.). 
1/Wooster v. Sunderland, 148 P. 959 (Cal.). 
!2/Morrison v. Lawrence, 181 Mass. 127. 
lOti 
"The parent, guardian, or custodian of a child 
refused admission to or excluded from the public 
schools shall on application be furnished by the 
school committee with a written statement of the 
reasons therefor, and thereafter, if the refusal to 
admit or exclusion was unlawful such child may 
recover from the town in tort, and may examine any 
member of the committee or any other officer of the 
town, upon interrogatories." y 
" •••. A school committee shall not permanently 
exclude a pupil from the public schools for alleged 
misconduct without first giving him and his parent 
or guardian an opportunity to be heard." y 
Thus when the fault for which a child was suspended 
was a disputed fact and the school committee refused the 
father's application for a hearing and excluded child 
until he acknowledged his fault, the action for damages 
against the city could be maintained for unlawful exclusion 
and the finding in such action that the child was at fault y 
would not invalidate the action. Thus too, an indefinite 
suspension by a school principal, with the knowledge of 
but without formal action by the school committee, is held 
to be an expulsion which cannot be maintained in the y 
absence of a hearing. However, where a child has been 
excluded by a teacher from a public school acting without 
I/General Laws Relating to Education, (1956 Edition), 
Chapter 76, Section 16. 
5/Ibid., Chapter 76, Section 17. 
1/Bishop v. Rowley, 165 Mass. 460. 
!!}Jones v. Fitchburg, 221 Mass. 66. 
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authority from the school committee, an action against the 
city in court 
to the school 
cannot be maintained without first appealing y 
committee. 
The proceeding of a hearing before the school 
committee would be like the action of an administrative 
board making inquiry as to 
which they are required to 
the existing facts upon y 
act. At such a hearing, the 
refusal of the committee to hear all witnesses, if such 
refusal were made in good faith and to prevent the involve-
ment of pupils, would not make the town liable in action y 
for wrongful expulsion. 
11. Tort Liability 
Negligence in law.-- Negligence is the failure to 
act as a reasonably prudent and careful person would y 
under the circumstances involved. This definition of 
law is not found in any written statute, but has rather 
evolved in the common law from previous judicial decisions 
to a theory of precedent. In cases on this matter, the 
court inquires into the specific facts of the case, 
l/Davis v. Boston, 133 Mass. 103. 
yvermillion v. State, 110 N. W. 736 (Neb.). 
YMorrison v. Lawrence, 186 Mass. 456. 
YHarry A. Rosenfield, Liability for School Accidents, 
Harper and Brothers, New York, 1940, p. 3. 
lOU 
compares them with facts in a previously decided case, and 
thereby discovers the rules evolved in the preceding cases 
which serve as a judicial guide for this and subsequent 
decisions. 
For negligence to exist, there must be a duty toward 
a person, which duty is disregarded. The duty a teacher 
has towards his pupils arises from the fact that he stands 
y' 
in loco parentis in relation to the pupil. Because of 
this relationship, the duty which a teacher owes to a 
child under his care is that which a reasonably prudent 
and careful parent owes to his child. 
is no duty involved, no negligence can 
But where there 
v 
attach. 
The question becomes one, then, of the determination 
of whether a person has been reasonably prudent and careful 
under the circumstances existing at that particular time, 
that is, whether a reasonably prudent and careful person 
could have foreseen an accident under the particular 
existing circumstances, and that accident could have been 
any accident that might reasonably have been the outcome 
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of the set of circumstances, and not necessarily the specific 
21 
accident that did occur. Thus the standard of what 
1/State v. Burton, 30 Am. Rep. 706 (Wis.). 
~Friedman v. Board of Education, 186 N. E. 865 (N.Y.). 
]/Drurnmv. Miller, 47 S. Z. 421 (N. C.). 
constitutes reasonable prudence and care is the degree to 
which one is able to anticipate or foresee the action that 
children or other individuals might take under certain y 
circumstances. The basic issue is whether a reasonably 
prudent person could or would have foreseen the danger 
under the circumstances of the eituation • 
• Negligence is divided into three classifications, 
those of nonfeasance, misfeasance, and malfeasance. These 
classifications have been defined by the Supreme 
?] 
follows: 
Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts as 
"Nonfeasance is the omission of an act which a 
person ought to do; misfeasance is the improper doing 
of an act which a person might lawfully do; and mal-
feasance is the doing of an act which a person ought 
not to do at all." 
A knowledge of these terms is necessary, especially 
when dealing with the liability of a public official. 
Legal defenses.-- The mere fact that an accident has 
occurred and that a person charged with a duty has been 
negligent does not necessarily mean that there is a 
liability in damages. The negligence must be the direct 
Y' 
or proximate cause of the injury. And even where the 
1/Stovall v. Toppenish School District, 188 P. 12 (Wash.). 
g/Bell v. Josselyn, 3 Gray 309 (Mass.). 
'j/Angelis v. Foster, 75 P. (2d) 650 ~al.). 
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negligence is the proximate cause of the injury, certain 
defenses may avail. A person engaging in certain activities 
must assume that there is a possibility of risk as a 
natural outcome of the activity voluntarily carried on, 
such as participation in certain games. In a football 
game, the player assumes the risks associated with such 
y' 
a game of contact. 
Another defense to liability is contributory neg-
ligence. If the injured person fails to conduct himself 
as a reasonably prudent and cautious person would under 
the circumstances prevailing for his own protection, then 
his own negligence is a contributing factor in the ac-
cident and negates the negligence of the other person. 
Where the injured person fails to measure up to the 
standard of that expected of a reasonably cautious and 
v prudent person in the circumstances, or exposes himself y 
to apparent dangers, he negates any negligence on the 
part of others. 
However, in the determination of the standard of 
conduct to which a pupil must conform, the age of the 
pupil and the nature of the act must be considered. A 
1/Ingerson v. Shattuck School, 239 N. w. 677 {Minn.). 
g/Kelley v. School District No. 71, 173 P. 333 {Wash.). 
1/Basmajian v. Board of Education, 221 App. Div. 347, 207 
N. Y. Supp. 298. 
child is not expected to act with the prudence and 
caution of an adult. Thus a teacher or principal will 
be held to account for the reasonable prudence and care 
a principal or teacher should display because he is 
dealing with children in a school situation. This 
standard will be used by a group of laymen making their 
judgments by the precedents on liability often set in 
non-school cases. 
School board or school district liability.-- Although 
there are statutes in some states to the contrary and 
there is some judicial deviation in certain states from 
the general rule, the prevailing principle is that a 
school board or a school district is not liable for 
injuries suffered by pupils or other persons in any 
connection with the school. An early and leading y 
Massachusetts case stated: 
''No private action, unless authorized by express 
statute, can be maintained against a city for the 
neglect of a public duty imposed upon it by law for 
the benefit of the public, and from the performance 
of which the corporation receives no profit or 
advantage." 
This non-liability principle as regards the school 
committee and the school district in this state was 
reaffirmed as recently as 1955 by the Supreme Judicial 
1/Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344. 
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y 
Court of Massachusetts. The unwillingness of the courts 
to hold the school board and the school districts liable 
in damages for injuries suffered by pupils or other persons 
is based on long-standing legal precedents, which are 
frequently questioned by the courts but generally 
followed as principles of common law binding upon their 
decisions. The Supreme Court of Kansas stated the common 
view of the courts when it said: 
"If the doctrine of state immunity in tort 
survives by virtue of antiquity alone, it is an 
historical anachromisn •••• and works injustice to 
everybody concerned •• ,,the Legislature should 
abrogate it. But the Legislature must make the 
change in policy, not the courts." Y 
The doctrine of non-liability has been justified on 
various bases. The dominant basis for the doctrine is that, 
in the performance of a governmental function, the state or 
any of its agencies, in this case the school district, is 
immune from either its own liability or the liability of y 
its employees. This concept springs from the medieval 
theory of the divine right of kings and the consequent 
belief that a king can do no wrong. The doctrine is 
otherwise justified on the theories that all school 
I/Molinari v. Boston, 333 Mass. 394. 
gjMcGraw v. Rural School District No. 1, 243 P. 1038 (Kan.). 
]/Freel v. Crawfordsville, 41 N. E. 312 (Ind.). 
y 
moneys are in trust solely for educational purposes, that 
a school board in committing a tort is acting ultra vires, 
i.e., beyond its authority, having been authorized neither 
to commit a tort or to raise money for payment of a judg-
V 
ment against it, and that the rule of respondeat superior 
(let the maste~ay 
school boards. 
for the servant) does not apply to 
Some statutory and judicial deviations from the 
general doctrine of non-liability should be noted, 
although not applicable in Massachusetts. These cases 
involved serve as a guide to school practices that the 
courts have held imprudent and indicate a definite trend 
towards modification of the doctrine of non-liability, 
which appears destined to become nation-wide in time. 
California statutes allow practically a complete right 
of suit against the school district. "Safe-place" statutes 
providing that any public agency shall be liable in damages 
for injuries resulting from dangerous or defective 
condition of public property apply in Wisconsin, California, 
Washington, Minnesota, and Oregon, although in the latter 
l/Ernst v. City of West Covington, 76 S. W. 1089 (Ky.). 
2/Board of Education of Cincinnati 
o46 (Ohio). 
v. Volk, 74 N. E. 
1/Perkins v. Trask, 23 P. (2d) 982 (Mont.). 
11~ 
two states the law has been virtually nullified by y 
judicial interpretations. Connecticut and Minnesota 
have specifically repealed the doctrine of non-liability 
in relation to school transportation. North Carolina 
authorizes and directs school authorities to pay for 
injuries to pupils riding on school buses up to $600.00. 
Another form of statutory deviation is found in the so-
called "private bill", in which specific enactments of 
the legislature award a sum of money to a specified 
person for settlement of a particular claim. 
Judicial deviations from the doctrine of non-liability 
have also formed a varied and, at times, illogical pattern. 
The maintenance of a nuisance, legally speaking, applies to 
invasions of property rights rather than personal injuries. 
As such, it was invoked against school districts in an 
v 
early Michigan case. Some courts have held a school 
11 district liable for the maintenance of a nuisance while 
!±/ 
others have applied the doctrine of non-liability. Some 
courts have extended the maintenance of a nuisance even 
l/Bang v. Independent School District No. 27, 225 N. W. 
449 (Minn.); Antin v. School District, 280 P. 664 (Ore.). 
2/Ferris v. Board of Education of Detroit, 81 N. W. 98 
TMich.). 
1JBush v. City of Norwalk, 189 A. 608 (Conn.). 
!±/Antin v. School District, 280 P. 664 (Ore.). 
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to personal injuries suffered by pupils in an apparent 
y' 
doctrine. The attempt to circumvent the non-liability 
New York Court has made the greatest judicial deviation 
'by holding that the school board can be held liable for 
the negligent performance of nondelegable duties. These 
nondelegable duties, in the main, are the provision of y 
safe premises and equipment. 
In states where there are no permissive statutes on 
the subject, it appears that a school board cannot 
purchase liability insurance. Such a concept reasons 
that if a school board cannot be liable in tort and may 
not pay for damages, it may not use tax funds to purchase 
insurance to protect itself from a liability to which it 
is not subject. In those states where a school board may 
be held liable, permission is usually given by statute to 
purchase insurance. However, in Tennessee, where there 
is no statute making a school board liable in tort, the 
court has held that, if a school district was insured, 
the defense of governmental immunity was not available, 
21 
at least to the amount of the insurance. 
I/Bush v. City of Norwalk, 189 A. 608 {Conn.). 
2/Lessin v. Board of Education, New York City, 80 N. E. 
T6o (N.Y.). 
1/Rogers v. Butler, 92 S. W. {2d) 414 (Tenn.). 
llu--~ 
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Some courts make a distinction between the governmental 
and proprietary functions of the school board, holding a y 
board to be liable in the latter but not in the former. 
In most cases where it was charged that the school board 
was carrying on a proprietary function, school authorities 
had charged a fee for admission to a function on the 
school property. However the distinction is moot in 
many jurisdictions, and the most commonly held ruling is 
that even in the case of a person attending a basketball 
game at school upon payment of an admission fee the school 
board is carrying on a governmental function and no y 
liability can be held. Two recent cases, both involving 
an injury sustained by a spectator at a school football 
game, demonstrate the lack of judicial agreement. The 
Arizona Supreme Judicial Court, in 1955, held that 
liability attached because the school district was exer-
~ 
cising a proprietary function. Two years later, the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Michigan ruled that no 
liability attached because the school district was exe~ 
cising a governmental function and, in fact, had no such 
I/Lupke v. School District No. 1, Multnomah County, 275 
P. 686 (Ore.). 
S/Rhoades v. School District, 142 P. (2d) 89 (Mont.). 
1/Sawaya v, Tuscon High School District, 281 P. (2d) 
105 ~riz.). 
.!1 proprietary function. The Massachusetts decisions have 
followed the general rule of non-liability in spite of 
the contentions of the exercise of proprietary functions. v 
Until this time at least, the doctrine of non-liability }/ 
remains in force in Massachusetts. 
Liability of school board members.-- The weight of 
authority holds that a school board member cannot be held 
personally liable for injuries that occur in schools under 
his jurisdiction, A leading, early New York decision y 
held: 
"But it is not seen how a member of a corporate 
body, upon which body a duty rests, can be held 
individually liable for the neglect of its duty by 
that body. There is no duty upon him to act individ-
ually, His duty is as a corporator, and it is to 
act in the corporation in the way prescribed for its 
action, and by the use of its powers and meanings, 
And if there is neglect to exert its powers or all 
its means, it is the neglect of the body and not 
of the individuals composing it." 
Without some freedom from personal liability in the 
gratuitous performance of a duty for public benefit, it 
would be difficult indeed to obtain responsible people 
to fill these important positions. However, an individual 
1/Richards v. School District of City of Birmingham, 83 
N. W. (2d) 643 (Mich.). 
gjwarburton v. Quincy, 309 Mass. 111. 
}/Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344; sweeney v. Boston,309 Mass. 
106; Reitano v. Haverhill, 309 Mass. 118; Warburton v. 
Quincy, supra.; Molinari v. Boston, 333 Mass. 394. 
!±/Bassett v. Fish, 75 N. Y. 303. 
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member of the board, when acting in his individual 
capacity as a repairman in the school, can be held to 
liability if his action is negligently performed, not 
because he is a school board member, but y 
performed. This immunity from liability 
for the action 
does not apply 
where it can be shown that the board acted in bad v faith 
' y 
or with corrupt or improper motives. But board members 
cannot be held personally liable for injuries caused by 
the negligence of the employees of the school district 
because the employees of the school district are not 
personal employees of the school board members and there-
fore the theory of respondeat superior (let the master pay y 
for the servant) does not apply. 
119 
Personal liability of teachers and27rincipals.-- Rosen-
field makes this interesting statement: 
''It is a pity to see indigent parents bringing 
fruitless suits against boards of education, the 
city, and everyone of whom they can think, in an 
attempt to obtain some recompense for the expense 
and suffering they have undergone. The time will 
come, of course, when they will begin to think of 
suing the teacher." 
1/Bassett v. Fish, supra. 
3/Betts v. Jones, 181 S. E. 334 (N. C.). 
J/Medsker v. Etchison, 199 N. E. 429 (Ind.). 
!3/Herman v. Board of Education, 137 N. E. 24 (N.Y.). 
2/Harry N. Rosenfield, Liability for School Accidents, 
Harper and Brothers, New York, 1940. p. 44. 
In terms of negligence as earlier discussed in this 
section, a teacher may be personally held liable for acts 
of negligence performed while carrying on his duties as 
a teacher, The great weight of authority holds that a 
teacher is not a public officer and does not benefit 
from the immunity from liability enjoyed by public y 
officials. Neither does the immunity of the school 
district itself extend to the teacher as an employee of y 
the district. And liability attaches to an act of 
nonfeasance as well as acts of misfeasance and malfeasance, 
In a Maine case, the court stated the teacher's obligation 
thus: 
y 
"One accepting responsibility of guidance towards 
persons under his direction and control must exercise 
such care, not only as to what he himself actually 
does in observance of such duty, but as to what he 
fails to do and which he should have done in exercise 
of due care." 
The courts have held teachers to be negligent in the 
case of a boy on an unsupervised playground having his e~ 
by the throwing of goldenrod stalks. permanently damaged 
A teacher was held negligent when an injury resulted from 
i/Woodman v. Hemet High School District, 29 P. {2d) 
257 (Cal.). 
g/Montanick v. McMillin, 280 N. w. 608 (Iowa). 
1JBrooks v. Jacobs, 31 A. {2d) 414 (Me.). 
YHoose v. Drumm, 22 N, E. (2d) 233 (N. Y.). 
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the teacher's failure to prevent older pupils from riding 
y' 
bicycles among younger pupils. A principal was held 
negligent when lack of supervision on the playground 
before the start of school was responsible for the injury y 
to a pupil by a live wire. A teacher was held liable in 
damages for a permanent injury to the eye of a pupil 
caused when the teacher threw a pencil at the pupil not 
maliciously but for the purpose of attracting the pupil's y 
attention. 
However, the courts have not attempted to make the 
schools and the teachers the insurers of the pupil's 
:±! . 
safety. Ordinarily there is no liability for injuries 
suffered in connection with games on the playground. Too, 
a pupil engaging in a game of action and contact such as 
21 football assumes the possibility of injury. And finally 
the negligence of the teacher, for liability to attach, 
must be the proximate cause of the injury to the child. 
i/Buzzard v. East Lake School District, 93 P. {2d) 233 
(Cal. ) • 
g/Rice v. School District No. 302, 248 P. 388 {Wash.). 
1/Drumm v. Miller, 47 S. E. 421 (N. C.). 
~Underhill v. Alameda Elementary School District, 24 
P. ( 2d) 849 (Cal. ) • 
2/Hale v. Davies, 70S. E. {2d) 923 {Ga.). 
1')1 
-'-'"' 
Proximate cause was defined by the Washington court: 
y 
"That cause, which in a natural and continuous sequence 
unbroken by any new, independent cause produces the event, 
and without which that event would not have occurred." 
Thus, the defense of proximate cause was available 
in these following cases where negligence of the teacher 
was charged. An eleven year old boy, while cleaning a 
printing press at the direction of a teacher, had a 
finger crushed when another pupil turned a fly wheel y 
causing the gears to move. While the teacher of a 
class of defectives and incorrigibles was out of the 
room, a pupil was severely injured by a bottle thrown by y 
another pupil in the class. In each of the above cases, 
the intervening act by the other pupil was held to be the 
proximate cause of the injury. 
The Massachusetts ruling.-- In the Fulgoni decision 
reached in 1939, and apparently unmodified by arwlater 
decisions, teachers in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 
at least for the purpose of tort actions were classified 
as " •••• public servants with limited powers and duties." 
This classification of the school teacher as a public 
l/Eckerson v. Ford's Prairie School District No. 11, 
101 P. (2d) 345 (Wash.). 
5/Taylor v. Kelvin, l A. (2d) 433 (N. J.). 
yauyten v. Rhodes, 29 N. E. (2d) 444 (Ohio). 
!!)Fulgoni v. Johnston, 302 Mass. 421. 
y 
1 ') ') ........ 
official for the purpose of tort liability gives to him 
.v 
some degree of immunity from liability: 
"At least since the leading cases of Moynihan v. 
Todd, .188 Mass. 301, 74 N. E. 367, and Barry v, Smith, 
191 Mass. 78, 77 N. E. 367, it has been settled in 
this commonwealth that public officers of agencies 
engaged wholly in the performance of public duties 
are liable only for their own acts of misfeasance 
in connection with ministerial matters." 
In the introductory discussion on negligence, 
nonfeasance was defined as the omission of act which a 
person ought to do, while misfeasance is the improper 
doing of an act which a person might lawfully do, Thus 
we see that misfeasance is a positive action on the part 
of a person, as opposed to the mere failure to act which 
is nonfeasance, It follows then, that a teacher or 
principal in Massachusetts will not be liable for neg-
ligence which is merely the failure to act, but will be 
liable for some positive action improperly performed, 
This protection afforded Massachusetts school teachers 
and principals is at variance with the principles generally 
followed throughout the country which were well developed y 
by the Maine Supreme Court. In the Maine decision, which 
was based on a case similar to the Fulgoni case, the court 
i/Fulgoni v. Johnston, supra. 
y'Brooks v, Jacobs, 31 A. (2d) 414 (Me.). 
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discussed the Fulgoni decision in detail and pointed out 
specifically where it felt that it could not follow the 
Massachusetts ruling. Rhode Island has followed the 
Massachusetts theory, at least insofar as superintendents 
and principals are concerned. In 1949, the court ruled 
that "Those charged with the supervision, direction, and 
control of public education are 'public officers' or y 
officials exercising a governmental function." y 
That court further delineated its stand: 
12~ 
"We recognize the right to sue a public officer 
for a personal act of misfeasance committed peculiarly 
against another even though it occurred in the dis-
charge of his public function; and secondly, we do 
not necognize the existence of any right to sue such 
officer for his acts of nonfeasance or for his sub-
ordinate's acts of misfeasance in which he did not 
participate." 
It has been long recognized that a parent may not sue y 
a teacher for his refusal to instruct a pupil, Nor may 
a teacher be sued for false imprisonment of a child in 
the case of detention after school as a punishment. 
y 
But, while a teacher has generally the right to inflict 
corporal punishment on a pupil, he is liable in a 
l/Gray v. Wood, 64 A. (2d) 191 (R. I.). 
g/Gray v. Wood, supra. 
'lfspear v. Cummings, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 224. 
!±/Fertich v. Michener, 11 N. E. 605 (Ind.). 
criminal prosecution for punishing a scholar only where 
the amount of punishment inflicted is more than adequate 
to subdue the scholar, and secure obediance to the rules 
of the school. 
y 
12. Libel and Slander 
A libel has been defined in Massachusetts as a 
malicious publication, expressed either in printing or 
writing, or by signs or pictures, which tend either to 
blacken the memory of one who is dead, or the reputation 
of one who is alive, and expose him to public hatred, 
. y 
contempt or ridicule. Slander has been defined as the 
speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to 
prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, 
~ business, or means of livelihood. The difference 
between the two terms is essentially that libel is written 
and slander is spoken. 
While there have been relatively few cases of libel 
and slander regarding teachers and administrators, certain 
points should be noted. Statements made against a teacher 
that would tend to show the teacher to be unfit and 
1/Commonwealth v. Randall, 4 Gray (Mass.) 36. 
g!Lyman v. New England Newspaper Publishing Company, 
286 Mass. 258. 
~American Jurisprudence, Volume 33. 
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discredit his standing in the profession have been held 
:v 
to be slanderous, Of course in any suit for libel or 
slander, truth is a complete defense, Another defense 
that is available to school administrators is that of a 
privileged communication, The Idaho Court stated it 
thus: 
y 
"Because of the great public interest involved, 
it is generally recognized that statements in regard 
to school matters are qualifiedly privileged if 
made by persons having a common duty or interest in 
the premises and acting in good faith." 
Two cases decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Court, 
while not involving school personnel, define more fully 
the responsibilities and limits which apply to privileged ]/ 
communications. In Doane v, Grew, the court explained 
the responsibilities of the employer from whom information 
regarding an employee or former employee had been requested: 
"When inquiry is made of a person as to the 
character and capabilities of a former servant, the 
person to whom the inquiry is addressed would not 
do his whole duty if he should confine his answers 
to facts which he knows to be facts of his own 
knowledge. Nor would he do his whole duty if he 
should confine himself to giving information which 
he has fully investigated, Indeed he would fail 
in doing his full duty if he should omit to impart 
1/Spears v. McCoy, 159 S. W, 610 (Ky.). 
E/American Jurisprudence, Volume 33. 
]/Doane v. Grew, 220 Mass. 171. 
any material information which has come to him, even 
if he has not attempted to investigate it at all." 
In the process of fulfilling the above responsibility, 
the employer receives the benefit of certain protection • 
.!1 As stated in Childs v. Erhard, certain immunity applies: 
"If a master is asked concerning the character 
and capability of a former employee, he does not 
exceed the privilege and is not guilty of malice if 
some of his statements are untrue. There must be 
bad faith, such as knowledge that the facts stated 
was untrue, or making use of the occasion to gratify 
ill will or a desire to injure. The author must be 
prompted by some motive other than the mere desire 
to fulfill the duty called by the occasion, and if 
he uses the words in good faith for this purpose, 
he is protected." 
These above Massachusetts rulings, when considered 
with holdings in other jurisdictions, make it clear that 
a principal can relay to the proper authorities information 
concerning a pupil or teacher under his jurisdiction with 
impunity even though the information might of itself be 
v libelous or slanderous. Naturally this impunity applies 
only where the principal is not motivated by malice. It 
is equally clear that where a principal were asked to 
send a letter of reference to school authorities in other 
school systems such a communication would be held as y 
privileged. 
1/Childs v. Erhard, 226 Mass. 454. 
gjFenley v. Steele, 60S. W. 108 (Mo.). 
2/Barry v. McCollum, 70 A. 1035 (Conn.). 
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH PROCEDURES EMPLOYED 
l. Logical Analysis of the Problem 
The study consisted of three major phases: (l) the 
preparation of an instrument to evaluate the knowledge 
and understanding of elementary school principals in 
Massachusetts regarding the legal principles underlying 
the responsibilities and authorities of their position; 
(2) the application of the evaluation instrument to a 
sampling of Massachusetts elementary school principals; 
and (3) the analysis of the data obtained. 
Phase one.-- The first phase consisted of the build-
ing of an evaluation instrument for determining the extent 
of the knowledge of elementary school principals of 
certain legal principles pertinent to the legal aspects of 
public school administration. This phase was divided into 
five parts: (l) a study of legal references, professional 
texts, previous research, and periodic literature to 
develop a body of legal principles pertinent to public 
school administration; (2) an analysis of the rules and 
regulations of school committees in Massachusetts to 
determine what assistance to principals was available 
from that source; (3) the development of a comprehensive 
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list of questions illustrating certain of these legal prin-
ciples, together with the investigator's proposed answers 
and supporting grounds; (4) the submission of this compre-
hensive list of questions and answers to a jury of experts 
for validati~;and (5) the development of the evaluation 
instrument from this list of validated questions and 
answers. 
Phase two.-- The purpose of the second phase was two-
fold; (1) to apply the evaluation instrument to a sampling 
of elementary school principals in Massachusetts, and 
(2) to provide a limited amount of in-service training for 
these principals in the area of their legal responsibilities 
and authorities. 
Phase three.-- The third phase was an analysis of 
the obtained data to determine to what extent elementary 
school principals in Massachusetts were aware of the legal 
principles underlying the responsibilities and authorities 
of their position, the areas of school law in which there 
was the greatest and least awareness, and the differences 
in the extent of this knowledge as influenced by college 
training, administrative experience, sex, the size of the 
school, the size of the community, and the type of prin-
cipalship. 
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2. Other Research Procedures 
Phase one.-- The development of an instrument for 
the evaluation of the knowledge and understanding of ele-
mentary school principals in Massachusetts regarding the 
legal principles underlying the responsibilities and 
authorities of their position involved several sub-problems. 
Sub-problem one.-- A study of legal references, pro-
fessional texts, periodic literature, and reported research 
was made to determine the nature and extent of educational 
research in this field and to develop a summary of the 
legal principles underlying the work of the elementary 
school principal. The relative paucity of texts and 
periodic literature dealing with the topic and the limited 
amount of research reported in the field of school law, 
more especially within the area defined in this study, 
dictated that the bulk of the study be done in the various 
law encyclopediae and law reports. From this study, a 
summary of school law most pertinent to the elementary 
school principal was developed. This summary was divided 
into the following major headings: 
(1) The Government and Education 
(2) The Courts and Education 
(3) The Employment of Teachers and Principals 
(4) The Dismissal of Teachers 
(5) The Curriculum 
(6) Religion and Public Education 
(7) Administration of Pupil Personnel 
(8) Tort Liability 
(9) Libel and Slander 
Sub-problem two.-- In the absence of statutes, the 
rules and regulations of the local school committee serve 
as a guide to the actions of the teacher and principal 
in the school district, These rules and regulations are 
considered to be written into all contracts of employment 
and must be observed by every employee of the board • 
.v 
O'Keefe states: 
"Upon appointment a teacher is subject not only 
to the educational laws of the state, but also to 
the reasonable rules and regulations of the school 
committee. All teachers are expected to be aware 
of the practices, customs, and usages commonly 
observed in the public school systems, whether 
these practices, customs, and usages have found 
their way into the written rules of the school 
department or not." 
Thus, the rules and regulations of the local school 
committee should be well known by a principal, because, 
in signing his contract to serve as an employee of the 
board, he agrees, in the eyes of the law, to obey these 
rules and regulations, In addition, these rules and 
regulations serve to indicate the accepted practices of 
1/William J. O'Keefe, Teachers and Their Legal Ri~hts, 
The Author, Portia Law School, Boston Massachuset s, 
1940, p. 18. 
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the school system and the status accorded the principal 
in that community. 
The importance of these rules and regulations to 
the principal in the performance of his work and their 
possible influence on his degree of knowledge of the 
legal aspects of school administration made the 
determination of the answers to the following questions 
a necessary preliminary step: 
1. In how many communities in Massachusetts are 
such rules and regulations published in some 
form? 
2. How many references are made to the position 
of the elementary school principal? 
3. What is the nature of the rules and regulations 
which have influence on the functioning of the 
principal? 
4. To what extent do these rules and regulations 
serve as a reference to a principal, which 
would furnish full information as to the legal 
responsibilities of his position? 
The finding of universal, comprehensive rules and 
regulations which delineated the legal responsibilities 
of the principal would have affected drastically the 
subsequent developments of this study. To make this 
.!1 determination, the investigator sent a request to all 
superintendents in Massachusetts for the rules and 
regulations of the school committee. After a lapse of y 
several weeks, a second letter was sent to those 
superintendents from whom no reply had been received. 
The investigator was strongly encouraged by the large 
percentage of responses received from the superintendents. 
Further encouragement was received from the inclusion of 
several comments indicating the belief of the superintend-
ents that such a study was necessary, that the area of 
study was a fertile and important field, and that they 
were willing to cooperate as they might. Such comments 
were included as: 
"May I say that I certainly believe the area 
which you are studying is an important one, and I 
certainly believe that the end result of your 
investigation should prove something of value 
to the profession." 2/ 
"I feel you have chosen a subject, the find-
ings of which will prove of great value to 
superintendents." !JI 
1/Copy in Appendix A. 
5/Copy in Appendix A. 
2/Letter from Donald Dow, Superintendent of Schools, 
Hopedale, Massachusetts, August, 1957. 
!J/Letter from Jerome Lynch, Superintendent of Schools, 
Burlington, Massachusetts, August, 1957. 
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The Annual Report of the Department of Education ll 
lists 351 cities and towns in Massachusetts. In response 
to the investigator's request for rules and regulations 
or for a statement of community status as regards the 
existence of school committee rules and regulations in 
some printed form, the investigator received replies 
from 211 superintendents representing 319 of the 351 
cities and towns in Massachusetts. Thus the percentage 
of communities represented in the response was 90.88% 
of the total number of communities in the state. 
Table 1 shows the classification of the returns 
made by the superintendents in response to the request 
for rules and regulations. 
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Table 1. Classification of Returns from Communities to 
Requests for School Committee Rules and Regulations 
Classification Communities 
Frequency Per Cent 
tl J ( 2) t3 )_ 
1. No rules and regulations 
published •. ................. 170 48.43 
2. Rules and regulations 
received . ........•.......... 89 25.36 
3. Rules and regulations not 
available for mailing ....•.• 60 17.09 
4. No reply . ................... 32 9.12 
Total ............•....... 351 100.00 
l/Annual Report of the Department of Education, Part II, 
1956, Boston, Massachusetts. 
Of the 319 respondent towns and cities, 170 of these 
were indicated by their superintendents as publishing no 
such rules and regulations, representing 53.29% of the 
total. A list of these communities and the communities 
in the other classifications is found in Appendix A. The 
courts have consistently held that teachers and principals 
are bound by the rules of the school committee and are 
presumed to know them. Yet, here in this commonwealth, 
in a majority of the communities, a teacher or principal 
has no readily available means by which he can gain this 
knowledge. The only means of securing such information 
is to search the minutes of the meetings of the school 
committee to ascertain those rules and regulations the 
committee has voted from time to time. It is also 
unfortunate that the school committee members themselves 
do not have available such a code of rules and regulations 
as a guide to their deliberations on cases which arise 
from time to time. It is hopeful to note that the 
respondents indicated that, in 38 of the 170 cities and 
towns without published rules and regulations, such a 
publication was in the process of development. 
One hundred forty-nine of the respondent cities an 
towns, or 46.71%, indicated that such a publication of 
the school committee rules and regulations was available 
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in the school system, Eighty-nine of these were forwarded 
to the investigator, while 60 of these were listed as 
not being available in sufficient quantity for mailing. 
Thus, the investigator has included rules and regulations 
from 89 of the 149 cities and towns indicating such a 
publication, 59.73%, in his analysis. Of note is the 
fact that superintendents representing 48 of the cities 
and towns indicated that a process of revision was being 
carried on, with the great majority of this number found 
in the group of cities and towns indicating that copies 
were not available in sufficient quantity for mailing. 
Analysis of the rules and regulations.-- The copies 
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of the rules and regulations representing 89 of the cities 
and towns were read in their entirety by the investigator. 
In a few cases, the published rules and regulations applied 
in two or more of the towns of a superintendency union. 
All references which directly stated a rule or regulation 
affecting the principal were noted. Certain references 
to the principal, while not listed in the section under 
the heading of Principals, were also noted, For example, 
under the heading of Principals might be found no 
reference to corporal punishment of pupils, but in the 
sections under the headings of Pupils or Teachers might 
be found a statement to the effect that teachers must 
secure the approval of the principal before administering 
corporal punishment. 
From these 89 copies of rules and regulations, some 
142 rules and regulations of direct influence on the 
principal were noted. Many were stated frequently 
while a large number occurred but once. Where the intent 
of the rule was clearly apparent, every effort was made 
to include it in a general category. However, many of 
the rules and regulations defied such categorization 
without a complete loss of identity. A gross total of 
1342 rules and regulations were noted and organized into 
the 142 rules and regulations which finally remained as 
distinct rules and regulations. These were organized 
further into ten classifications: 
1. General administration 
2. Administration and supervision of teachers 
3. Administration of pupil personnel 
4. Plant management 
5. Books and supplies 
6. Instruction and curriculum 
7. Extra-curricular program and special services 
8. Home-school relationships 
9. Central office relationships 
10. Personal requirements for the principal. 
These classifications admit a large amount of 
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overlapping, Many rules and regulations could be placed 
in two or more classifications, But, such difficulties 
in classification are inherent because of the very nature 
of the rules and regulations themselves and because the 
school committees, in enacting such rules and regulations, 
had no such classifications in mind. In fact, it would 
seem that many of these rules and regulations reflect the 
school committee's reaction to a specific local incident, 
the need for which has long since been forgotten. 
Listed below and on the following pages are the ten 
major classifications and the rules and regulations 
included under each, The rules and regulations are 
listed in descending order of the frequency in which 
they were found. The number of instances of occurrence 
are given in the parentheses. In all cases the reference 
is understood to be to the principal, 
A. General Administration 
1. (60) Shall hold fire drills and/or air raid 
drills periodically. 
2. (52) Shall be generally responsible for the 
administration of school. 
3. (51) Shall be responsible for playground 
supervision at recess periods. 
4. (31) Must enforce regulations of committee 
and superintendent. 
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5. (19) Shall/may hold staff meetings. 
6. (15) Must prohibit unauthorized exhibitions, 
agents, excursions, advertising, or 
entertainment. 
7. (13) Shall notify superintendents and/or 
parents in case of accidents. 
8. ( 9) Shall make accounting of all school funds. 
9. ( 9) May, at discretion, with cause, close 
classrooms for a session or dismiss early. 
10. ( 5) Shall supervise the keeping of records. 
11. ( 4) Shall be responsible for the issuance of 
report cards. 
12. ( 4) Shall approve all visitors to the building. 
13. ( 3) Shall not provide lists of pupils to 
unauthorized persons. 
14. ( 2) Shall be responsible for the mail and 
correspondence of the school. 
15. ( 2) Must approve any person brought in to 
supplement instruction or speak to pupils. 
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16. ( 1) May omit outdoor recesses on inclement days. 
17. ( 1) Shall see that all safety precautions are 
observed. 
18. ( 1) Shall supervise clerical service. 
19. ( 1) Shall make out insurance reports on 
accidents. 
20, ( 1) Shall appoint a sufficient number of 
safety patrol officers. 
21. ( 1) Shall direct the riding of bicycles to 
school. 
22. ( 1) Shall not permit any prizes or insignia 
to be awarded to pupils except as 
prescribed by the school committee. 
23. ( 1) Shall keep the records of the school. 
B. Administration and Supervision of Teaching Personnel 
1. (28) Shall supervise the keeping of attendance 
registers. 
2. (19) Shall report teacher absences and/or 
tardinesses periodically. 
3. (19) Shall regulate arrival and departure of 
teachers. 
4. (13) Shall require teachers to post daily 
program. 
5. (10) Shall advise and direct teachers in an 
emergency. 
6. ( 7) Shall secure substitute teachers. 
7. ( 7) Shall require teacher to keep seating plan. 
8. ( 6) Shall provide each teacher with a copy of 
the regulations. 
9. ( 5) Shall require teacher to keep plan book. 
1~0 
10. ( 3) Shall assign teachers. 
11. ( 3) Shall have authority over "specials" in 
building. 
12. ( 3) Shall assign teachers supervision of early 
arrivals. 
13. ( 2) Shall make nomination of teachers for 
ensuing year. 
14. ( 2) Shall screen candidates for teaching 
positions. 
15. ( 1) Shall correct all teachers' records, 
reports, and registers before sending 
to superintendent. 
16. ( 1) Shall not permit teachers to receive gifts 
from pupils. 
17. ( 1) Shall supervise keeping of mark books. 
18. ( 1) Shall acquaint substitute teachers with 
the routine of the class. 
C. Administration of Pupil Personnel 
1. (56) May suspend pupils for truancy and/or 
misconduct. 
2. (43) Shall report truancy to designated 
authority. 
3. (43) Shall be responsible for discipline. 
4. (24) Shall assign pupils to grade and class. 
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5. (23) Shall exclude and/or readmit pupils with 
contagious disease. 
6. (22) Shall supervise pupil attendance. 
7. (20) Shall regulate admission of pupils to 
school. 
8. (17) Shall be solely or co-responsible with 
superintendent for promotion of pupils. 
9. (15) Principal only may permit pupil to leave 
school during school hours. 
10. (15) Shall be sole administrator of corporal 
punishment. 
11. (15) Shall regulate detention of pupils. 
12. (12) Shall approve corporal punishment by 
teacher. 
13. ( 9) Shall permit teachers to send pupils on 
errands. 
14. ( 9) Shall permit early entrance of pupils in 
inclement weather. 
15. ( 7) Shall approve messages, telephone calls, 
or visitors for pupils. 
16. ( 7) Shall witness corporal punishment by a 
teacher. 
17. ( 2) Shall refer maladjusted pupils to 
Director of Guidance. 
18. ( 2) Shall notify the parent and/or superintend-
ent when necessary to send pupil home. 
19. ( 2) Shall not permit police or other to 
interrogate pupils without legally 
authorized person present. 
20. ( 2) Shall be responsible for passing and 
traffic in halls. 
21. ( l) Shall keep a record of corporal punishment 
by teachers. 
22. ( l) Shall send home pupils not properly attired. 
23. ( l) Shall arrange for the dismissal of pupils 
arriving on "no school" days. 
24. ( l) Shall approve all excuses for absences. 
25. ( l) Shall be within principal's discretion 
to permit non-bus pupils to eat lunch 
at school. 
26. ( 1) Shall permit police to interrogate pupils. 
27. ( l) Shall have oversight of bus pupils before 
and after school. 
28. ( l) Shall be within principal's discretion to 
permit police questioning of pupils. 
29. ( l) Principal only may excuse pupil for 
instruction elsewhere. 
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D. Plant Management 
l. (52) Shall supervise custodian. 
2. (41) Shall generally be responsible for 
building, grounds and furnishings. 
3. (26) Shall report needed repairs to proper 
authority. 
4. (14) Shall not permit doors used by pupils 
to be locked on the inside. 
5. ( 7) Shall inspect building periodically. 
6. ( 6) Shall regulate use and/or collect 
tolls for use of school telephone. 
7. ( 4) Shall see that flag is flown. 
8. ( 3) Shall approve use of buildings by 
organizations. 
9. ( 2) Shall keep a record of gifts to school 
and report same to superintendent 
annually. 
10. ( l) Shall direct the cleaning of inkwells. 
ll, ( l) Shall see that the doors are kept locked 
at all times. 
12. ( l) Shall leave office in good order at end 
of school day as good housekeeping 
example for building. 
13. ( l) Shall check heat and ventilation 
in rooms, 
1 , ' ~~ 
14. ( 1) Shall establish regulations for distri-
bution of keys. 
15. ( 1) Shall regulate use of playground after 
school hours. 
E. Books and Supplies 
1. (42) Shall requisition needed texts and supplies. 
2. (34) Shall supervise use and care of texts, 
supplies and equipment. 
3. (21) Shall keep inventory of books and/or 
supplies. 
4. (14) Shall see that all books are stamped or 
labeled. 
5. ( 5) Shall sign receipts for all supplies 
received. 
6. ( 1) Shall forward teachers' requisitions to 
superintendent. 
F. Instruction and Curriculum 
1. (34) Shall be responsible for supervision of 
teachers in work of instruction. 
2. ( 7) Shall regulate homework assignments. 
3. ( 4) Shall be principal's duty to see that 
course of study is adhered to. 
4. ( 3) Shall organize and direct curriculum 
within city-wide policies. 
5. ( 2) Shall/may conduct examinations in all 
grades at discretion. 
6. ( l) Shall be responsible for standard testing. 
7. ( 1) Shall organize classes to provide for 
individual differences, 
8, ( 1) Shall administer and score standard tests. 
9. ( 1) Shall see that daily Bible reading is 
done. 
10. ( 1) Shall cause written exams in all subjects 
to be given as often as necessary. 
11. ( 1) Shall provide teachers with course of 
study. 
G. Extra-Curricular Program and Special Services 
1. (10) Shall be responsible for extra 
curricular activities and social affairs. 
2, ( 9) Shall have control and direction of lunch-
room, 
3. ( 6) Shall cooperate with school doctor and 
nurse. 
4. ( 5) Shall be responsible for health and 
welfare of teachers and pupils. 
5. ( 4) Shall be responsible for first aid 
treatment. 
6. ( 2) Shall approve class field trips. 
7. ( 1) Shall be manager of school athletic teams. 
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8, ( 1) Shall plan appropriate exercises for 
patriotic days. 
9. ( 1) Shall agree with nurse on hour for weekly 
medical inspection, 
10, ( 1) Shall supervise the observance of the 
rules of the board of health. 
11, ( 1) Shall plan and have charge of assembly 
programs. 
12, ( 1) Shall circulate weekly visual aids 
requisition form. 
13. ( 1) Shall approve use of school name by 
athletic teams, 
14, ( 1) Shall accompany field trips if possible. 
15. ( 1) Shall oversee health of pupils. 
16. ( 1) Shall be responsible for all matters 
relating to transportation, 
17. ( 1) Shall be responsible for health and 
safety rules and regulations. 
18, ( 1) Shall find some means of transportation 
home for ill pupils, 
19. ( 1) Shall refer pupils and school personnel 
for examination by school doctor. 
H. Home-School Relationship 
1. ( 4) Shall be responsible for maintaining 
good public relations with community. 
1~7 
2. ( l) Shall furnish a list of tutors to parents. 
3. ( l) Shall patiently hear and investigate 
complaints of parents. 
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4. ( l) Shall insist that parent-teacher conferences 
be held before or after school hours. 
5. ( l) Shall make such home visits as necessary. 
I. Relationships with Central Office 
l. (44) Shall make such reports to the superintend-
ent as requested. 
2. (33) Shall keep superintendent informed of 
school matters and/or submit an annual 
report. 
3. (16) Shall attend administrative staff meetings. 
4. ( 9) Shall give superintendent an estimate of 
work of teachers and/or custodian. 
5. ( 3) Shall file a copy of teacher's daily 
program with superintendent. 
6. ( 2) Shall notify superintendent of admission 
and dismissal of pupils. 
7. ( l) Shall make a written report to superintend-
ent of all substitute teachers in building. 
8. ( l) Shall be duty to note all violations of 
committee rules and report the same in 
writing to the superintendent at once. 
J. Personal Requirements for Principal 
1. (33) Principal is subject to all teacher 
regulations. 
2. (12) Shall be in the building for specified 
hours. 
3. ( 7) Shall notify superintendent of intended 
absence from building. 
4. ( 6) Shall be on duty before and/or after 
opening and closing of school year. 
5. ( 6) Shall be responsible for a high level 
of educational leadership. 
6. ( 4) Shall delegate a teacher to act in his 
stead during absence from building. 
7. ( 1) Shall not make unauthorized purchases. 
8. ( 1) Shall attend state principals' meetings. 
Of the copies of rules and regulations analyzed, 
the number of rules and regulations referring to the 
principal ranged from a low of zero references to a 
high of 40 references. The median number of references 
for the 89 cities and towns was 15.19. Eleven of the 
89 communities had more than 24 references to the 
principal while 15 had four or fewer references. It 
is worth noting that those cities and towns in which 
there were nine or fewer references to the principal 
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did not, as a rule, have so few references because they 
had used one or two general statements giving the principal 
a broad range of duties and responsibilities, thereby 
obviating the need for a statement of many specific duties 
and responsibilities, Frequently, where there were but 
one or two references to the principal, that reference 
was a specific one. For example, the single reference one 
town made to the principal was that he should agree with 
the nurse on the hours of the weekly medical inspection. 
In another town, the sole stipulation required the 
principal to be the sole administrator of corporal 
punishment. 
Table 2 shows the total number and percentage of the 
rules and regulations found in each classification, Of 
note is the relatively little reference to curriculum 
and instruction and the area of home-school relations. 
The amount of attention given these classifications seem y 
to follow that found by Johnston when he analyzed the 
rules and regulations of certain city boards of education, 
He found considerable difference between the emphasis 
given certain areas in the professional texts on the 
principalship with the emphasis found in the rules and 
1/Joseph M. Johnston, The Legal Status of the Public 
School Principal in the United States, Unpublished 
Doctoral Dissertation, University of North Carolina, 
Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1953. 
150 
1 
Table 2. Frequency of Mention of Major Classifications of 
Rules and Regulations in 89 Massachusetts School 
Committee Rules and Regulations 
Frequency of Mention 
Major Classifications Frequency 'Per Cent 
{ ll {21 l3J 
1. Administration of 
pupil personnel •............ 354 26.38 
2. General administration •.••.. 287 21.39 
3. Plant management .•.•..•.•... 161 12.00 
4. Administration and super-
vision of teachers .....•.... 131 9.76 
5. Books and supplies ...... .... 117 8.72 
6. Relationship with central 
office ........... ........... 109 8.12 
7. Personal requirements for 
principal . ....•......•...... 70 5.22 
8. Instruction and cur-
riculum .. ...............•... 56 4.17 
9. Extra-curricular and special 
services .................... 49 3.65 
o. Home-school relationship •••• 8 0.60 
Total . .................... 1342 100.01% 
.!1 
regulations. 
"In two areas of educational interest, the 
school board rules and regulations are almost silent. 
There is very little mention of the principal's part 
in the interpretation of the school program to the 
community or to the preparation of an in-service 
program for teachers. Some school boards mention 
these, but the number is not anywhere near as great 
1/Joseph M. Johnston, ibid,, p. 136. 
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as current interest in these areas might lead one 
to believe they would be." 
The position of elementary school principal as 
revealed through this study of the rules and regulations 
bears little relationship to the position as described in 
the current professional textbooks on elementary school 
administration. While it is to be expected that there 
should be considerable lag between theory and practice, 
the rules and regulations, in general, show no apparent 
concern for current theory. It is to be hoped, however, 
that the elementary school principal, in most communities, 
brings a professional knowledge and a breadth in outlook 
that makes the position of elementary school principal 
one more nearly approximating the best modern concepts 
of an educational administrator than the position attains 
by virtue of the school committee rules and regulations. 
It appears safe to state, on the basis of the 
analysis of the school committee regulations that: 
1. There is an immediate need for the development 
of a current publication of the rules and 
regulations of every school committee in the 
state, where such publication is not in existence. 
2. All copies of school committee rules and 
regulations should include a section in which 
the authorities, responsibilities, and duties 
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of the principal are clearly defined. 
3. In the development of a code of rules and 
regulations, the principalship should be 
considered from the point of view of a 
definition of the position. Proceeding 
from the definition, an organized, coherent 
section would include all pertinent informa-
tion on the principalship in this one section, 
replacing the present collections of fragmentary 
rules passed at varying periods in response to 
specific situations. 
4. The Massachusetts Elementary School Principals' 
Association should develop a typical set of 
broad statements and definitions of the 
authorities and responsibilities of the ele-
mentary school principal to be recommended as 
a basic outline, which could be augmented by 
the specific rules and regulations necessary 
for the individual community. 
Sub-problem three.-- From the summary of legal 
principles developed in sub-problem one, questions were 
formulated, generally in the form of a hypothetical case, 
which illustrated certain of the legal principles. These 
questions were written in the form of a true-false 
statement. The proposed answer to each question was 
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given along with the supporting principles and grounds 
for the answer. The original list of forty-three 
questions and answers is found in Appendix B. 
Sub-problem four.-- To validate these questions and 
answers for use in building an evaluation instrument, 
they were submitted to a jury of experts in the field of 
school law in Massachusetts. The jury consisted of the 
three men who were at that time teaching courses in 
school law at the college or university level and the 
Deputy Commissioner of Education for the State of 
Massachusetts, who has the area of school law as one 
of his major concerns. These four men comprising the 
jury of experts were: 
Raymond A. Fitzgerald, Deputy Commissioner of Educa-
tion, State Department of Education, Boston, Massa-
chusetts. 
Wayne Holmes, Professor of Education, Westfield 
Teachers College, Westfield, Massachusetts. 
William J. O'Keefe, Professor of Law, School of 
Law, Boston College, Boston, Massachusetts. 
Albert Purvis, Dean, School of Education, University 
of Massachusetts, Amherst, Massachusetts. 
These jury members were asked to read all questions 
and answers, approve them or disapprove them, and make 
any comments or suggestions. All questions that were 
challenged by any jury member were eliminated from further 
use. As a result of the criticisms of the various jury 
members, the original list of forty-three,questions was 
reduced to twenty-five questions. The criteria for re-
jection was the lack of approval of the question and its 
answer and supporting reasons on the part of any of the 
four jury members. Thus the final twenty-five remaining 
items were unanimously approved by the four members of 
the jury. 
Sub-problem five.-- From the twenty-five questions 
with answers and supporting principles and cases, an 
evaluation form was constructed. This form consisted 
of twenty-five true-false statements plus a choice of 
five possible supporting statements. A copy of the final 
instrument is found in Appendix C. On the basis of the 
facts presented, an answer of true or false was indicated 
by the circling of TRUE or FALSE. Provision was made for 
a third choice by the inclusion of a DON'T KNOW item, 
which could be circled by the respondent when he 
recognized that he was quite unsure of the proper response. 
After the major statement had been acted upon by the 
circling of TRUE or FALSE, the respondent was asked to 
circle the letter preceding from one to three statements 
of the five statements presented as reasons supporting 
the response to the major statement. The use of such a 
device was included to reduce the factor of guessing 
that is present in the standard alternative-response type 
1S5 
of test item. Such a modified alternative-response 
question with supporting statements was presented by 
.v 
Michaels and Karnes. This type of modified alternative-
'Y. 
response item was used by Erickson in his study attempt-
ing to measure the relative effectiveness of two methods 
of teaching. Not only did the use of supporting statements 
aid in reducing the factor of guessing, but it made possi-
ble an analysis of the responses at a higher level than 
would be the case with the use of the regular alternative-
response question only. An analysis of the types of sup-
porting statements correctly indicated showed clearly 
whether the levels of knowledge attained were based on 
general information, familiarity with the statutes, or 
recognition of the cases that have established legal 
precedence. 
Phase two.-- The method of application of the 
evaluation instrument involved certain perplexing con-
siderations. The need for obtaining an adequate sampling 
on which to base the conclusions precluded, from a prac-
tical standpoint, the administration of the test 
individually by the investigator. The desirability of 
I/William J. Michaels and M. Ray Karnes, Measuring Educa-
tional Achievement, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 
1950, p. 205. 
g/Carleton Erickson, The Effectiveness of Joint Pupil-
Teacher Motion Picture Production as a Method of Teaching 
General Science, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Boston 
University, 1955. 
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control of the conditions under which the test was to 
be taken ruled out the distribution of tests by mail. 
The desirability of discussing the topic with the prin-
cipals at the most favorable time, immediately after the 
taking of the test had stimulated their interest, also 
eliminated the possibility of distributing the tests by 
mailing. 
The method of application finally evolved was to 
have the investigator administer the test to various 
groups of principals and follow the administration of 
the test immediately with a discussion of the pertinent 
information. Such a method enabled the testing of an 
adequate sampling of Massachusetts principals, retained 
complete control of the test to the investigator, and 
provided an in-service training meeting for the elementary 
school principals involved. 
The investigator arranged the several communities of 
Eastern Massachusetts into twelve groups, geographically 
clustered about one key community. The superintendent 
of schools in each key community was asked if he would 
approve the participation of his elementary school 
principals in such a project and consent to the 
invitation of the principals of the surrounding communities 
to participate along with his principals in the meeting 
in the key town. Upon the receipt of the agreement of 
1S7 
the superintendents of the key towns to participate and 
the establishment of a date for the meeting, letters 
were sent to the superintendents of schools in the 
surrounding towns inviting their principals to parti-
cipate. Nine such meetings were held, involving prin-
cipals from thirty-four communities, 
Phase three,-- The third phase was concerned with 
the organization and analysis of the data obtained 
through the completion of Phase Two. The extent of the 
knowledge of the principals regarding the responsibilities 
and authorities underlying their position, the areas of 
strengths and weaknesses, and the relative knowledge of 
the principals as differentiated on the basis of 
experience, college preparation, size of school, sex, 
type of principalship, and size of community were 
analyzed. Summaries and tables are reported in 
Chapter IV. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS OF DATA 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the knowl-
edge and understanding of elementary school principals in 
Massachusetts regarding the legal principles underlying 
the responsibilities of their position. To accomplish 
this purpose, a test of certain legal aspects of public 
school administration was constructed and applied to a 
sampling of Massachusetts elementary school principals. 
The collected data have been analyzed to indicate: 
1. The characteristics of the sample group 
2. The performance of the sample group on the 
test as a whole and on the individual items 
3. The influence of certain criteria on test 
performance. 
1. Population Data 
Size of sample.-- The test was administered by the 
investigator to groups of elementary school principals 
in nine communities in Eastern Massachusetts. The groups 
were composed of principals from those communities and 
surrounding communities, which, for the greater part, 
were located in the Metropolitan Boston area. A total 
159 
of 158 persons were tested, representing 34 public school 
systems. Ten of the tests were discarded. Of those dis-
carded, three had been completed by superintendents, one 
by an elementary supervisor, one by a junior high school 
principal, one by a classroom teacher, and the remaining 
four had not been completed. 
lbO 
Characteristics of sample.-- The sample was analyzed 
into various criterion groups for the purpose of determin-
ing what factors influenced the performance on the test 
of legal knowledge and to estimate the representativeness 
of the sample. The six criterion groupings used were: 
(l) years in the principalship; (2) college preparation; 
(3) size of school; (4) sex; (5) type of principalship; 
and (6) population of community of employment. 
Table 3 shows the number of years of experience. 
Table 3. Years in Principalship 
Group Number Per Cent 
t l J (cJ _131 
l to 3 years . ........•....••..... 40 27.03 
4 to 10 years . ................... 56 37.84 
11 or more years . ................. 52 35.14 
Total ........................... 148 100.01 
reported by the principals. 
The percentages of principals in each of the three 
classifications of experience in the principalship were 
quite comparable with those reported in the Twenty-
Y 
Seventh Yearbook. In that study of a representative 
sampling of 1826 elementary school principals, percentages 
for similar classifications were given as 26, 35, and 39 
respectively. The median number of years of experience 
of the principals included in this present study was 8.2 
as compared to an average of 9.1 years reported for the 
principals in the most recent national study. 
y 
College preparation of principals.-- The second 
criterion for characterizing the sample of principals was 
that of training, in terms of the type of academic 
degrees held. 
The principals were divided into five groups as 
shown in Table 4. However, the number of principals 
with a doctor's degree was so small that, for purposes 
of analysis of the performance of the groups, their 
scores were included with the group holding the Certifi-
cate of Advanced Graduate Specialization. 
I/National Association of Elementary Principals, The 
Elementary School Principalship, Today and Tomorrow, 
Twenty-Seventh Yearbook, 1948, National Education 
Association, Washington, D. c., pp. 21-22. 
YNational Association of Elementary Principals, The 
Elementary School Principalship, Thirty-Seventh Yearbook 
161 
1958, National Education Association, Washington, D. c. p. 113. 
Table 4, College Preparation of Principals 
Group Number Per Cent 
ll J (c) \ j) 
No degree . ............... , ......... 9 6,08 
Bachelor's degree . ................. 21 14.19 
Master's degree .......•...........• 94 63.51 
c. A. G. s ......................... 22 14.87 
Doctor's degree . ........•....•..... 2 1.35 
To ta 1 ...•..•..•................ 148 100.00 
The principals included in this present study 
appeared to be quite comparable with the principals 
included in the recent national study in terms of highest 
academic degrees held. The Thirty-Seventh Yearbook 
reported the following percentages respectively for the 
classifications shown in Table 4: 
76 per cent, 3 per cent and 3 per 
2 per cent, 
cent. 
y 16 per cent, 
Pupil population of schools administered,-- As shown 
in Table 5, the principals were classified into three 
groups on the basis of the number of pupils in the school 
or schools they administered. 
The pupil populations of the schools administered by 
1/National Association of Elementary Principals, op. cit., 
p. 151. 
Table 5. Pupil Population in School or Schools Administered 
Group Number Per Cent 
( 1) (2) UJ 
Less than 350 pupils ............... 44 29.73 
350 to 499 pupils .................. 49 33.11 
500 or more pupils ................. 55 37.16 
To ta 1 ••.•••••••.•••••••••••••.•. 148 100.00 
the participating principals ranged from a low of 83 to a 
high of 1200. Those administered by supervising principals 
ranged from 200 to 1200 while those administered by teaching 
principals ranged from 83 to 600. The median pupil popula-
tion administered by the participating principals was 450. 
Proportion of men and women.-- The proportion of men 
and women in the principalship in the present study was 
almost identical to that reported in the Thirty-Seventh 
Yearbook. .!1 
The national study reported proportions of 59 per cent 
and 41 per cent for men and women principals.respectively, 
identical to the corresponding per cents of 59 and 41 in 
the present study. However, in the relatively few teaching 
yNational Association of Elementary Principals, op. cit., 
p. 111. 
lf}3 
Table 6. Proportion of Men and Women in the Principalship 
Group Number Per Cent 
llJ ( 2) ( 3) 
Men • .............................. 87 58.78 
Women ............................. 61 41.22 
To tal • ..•..................... 148 100.00 
principalships, the women far outnumbered the men. 
Proportion of teaching and supervising principals.-- A 
fifth criterion for the classification of the principals 
into groups was the nature of the principalship, i •. e., 
teaching principalships or supervising principalships. 
In the case of principals who taught classes regularly 
during the school day, the principals were asked to check 
teaching principal as their classification if more than 
50 per cent of the school day was devoted to teaching. 
As shown in Table 7, an extremely large proportion 
of the principals included in this study were supervising 
principals. The fact that the principals included in this 
study were employed in the urban area of Eastern Massa-
chusetts doubtless contributed much to this situation. A 
second contributing factor was the scheduling of three 
of the meetings during the school day, thereby virtually 
164 
Table 7. Proportion of Teaching and Supervising Principals 
Group Number Per Cent 
( 1) P='J ( 3 J 
Teaching principals ..••....•••.• 17 11.49 
Supervising principals ...•...... 131 88.51 
Total ........................ 148 100.00 
precluding the attendance of teaching principals at such 
meetings. 
Population of community of employment.-- The final 
classification of principals was made on the basis of the 
size of community in which the principal was employed, as 
shown in Table 8. 
Table 8. Population of Employing Communities of Principals 
Population of Number of Per Cent 
Community Principals of Total 
( 1) ( 2) ( 3) 
0 .,~ 24 16.22 
- 9' 999 . ............ 
10,000 
-
24,999 ............. 44 29.73 
25,000 - 49,999 ............. 38 25.68 
50,000 - 100 J 000 . ............ 42 28.38 
Total ..................... 148 100.01 
~assachusetts State Department of Education, Annual 
Report, Part II, Boston, Massachusetts, 1957. 
Hi5 
Consideration was given to the inclusion of the 
principa.ls of Boston in the study, which would have had 
the effect of creating an additional large city clessifica-
tion of principals. However, one very large city would 
have furnished a disproportionately lart;e number of the 
sample. Moreover, there has been certain special lee;isla-
tion passed relative to the schools of Poston which would 
have influenced the correctness of tLe responses to certain 
of the test items. For these reasons, the City of Boston 
was eliminated from further consideration for purposes of 
this study. 
2. Analysis of Test Performance 
Perfoi'I!lsnc e on true-false statements.-- The performance 
of the 148 principals on the 25 true-false-don't know 
statements were analyzed, as shown in Table 9. 
Approxima.tely 56 per cent of the total possible rie;ht 
answers were correctly indicated on the tests. Over 29 per 
cent of the resoonses were incorrect and nearly 15 per cent 
of the responses were Don't Know. An average test score 
had 14 correct answers, seven incorrect answers, and four 
Don't Knows. By applying the correction of rights minus 
wrongs, commonly used with an alternative-response test, 
the average score was seven right of a possible 25. 
Hi6 
~able 9. Number and Per Cent of Correct Answers, Incorrect 
Answers, and Don't Know Responses 
Correct Incorrect Don't Know 
Item Fre- Per Fre- Per Fre- Per 
quency Cent quency Cent quencJ Cent 
ll) (2) ( 3) ( 4) ( 5) ( 6l ( 7) 
1 ... 71 47.97 71 47.97 6 4.05 
2 ••• 96 64.87 35 23.65 17 ll.49 
3 ... 57 38.51 70 47.30 21 14.19 
4 ••• 77 52.03 53 35.81 18 12.16 
5 ... ll8 79.73 15 10.14 15 10.14 
6 ... 67 45.27 67 45.27 14 9.46 
7 . .. ll4 77.03 16 10.81 18 12.16 
8 ... 119 80.41 14 9.46 15 10.14 
9 •.. 107 72.30 ll 7.43 30 20.27 
10 ••• 69 46.62 64 43.24 15 10.14 
11 . .. 74 50.00 43 29.05 31 20.95 
12 ... 37 25.00 108 72.97 3 2.03 
13 •.. 95 64.19 35 23.65 18 12.16 
14 ... 123 83.ll 20 13.51 5 3.38 
15 ... 81 54.73 49 33.ll 18 12.16 
16 ... ll6 78.38 17 11.49 15 10.14 
17 •.• 99 66.89 29 19.59 20 13.51 
18 ..• 96 64.87 35 23.65 17 11.49 
19 ... 105 70.95 21 14.19 22 14.87 
20 ••• 44 29.73 27 18.24 77 52.03 
21 ••. 53 35.81 54 36.49 41 27.70 
22 ••• 43 29.05 74 50.00 31 20.95 
23 .•• 107 72.30 25 16.89 16 10.81 
24 ..• 47 31.76 74 50.00 27 18.24 
25 •.. 62 41.89 50 33.78 36 24.32 
Total 2077 56.14 1077 29.ll 546 14.76 
lfJ7 
Performance in terms of a corrected score.-- In an 
attempt to minimize the influence of guessing, a corrected 
score was derived for each test. A credit of plus two was 
given for each correct true-false statement and a credit 
of minus two was given for each incorrect true-false 
statement. A credit of plus one was given for each 
correct supporting statement and a credit of minus one 
was given for each incorrect supporting statement. Cer-
tain measures of the performance of the total group in 
terms of the corrected scores were derived, as shown in 
Table 10. 
Table 10. Certain Measures of Total Group 
Performance in Terms of the Cor-
rected Scores 
Measure 
ll J 
Mean • •••••.••..••••••••.•• 
Standard deviation •••••••• 
Range • ••.••••.•••••••••••• 
Result 
T2 l 
16.44 
14.42 
83.00 
The corrected scores ranged from a low of minus 30 to 
a high of 52. The highest possible score attainable was 98, 
which would have resulted from answering correctly all 25 
true-false statements and indicating all 48 correct support-
ing statements. The mean for the group of 16.44, in view 
ltiH 
of the maximum possible score, corroborated the tentative 
conclusion drawn from the consideration of the results on 
the true-false statements, namely, that an obvious def-
iciency of knowledge of these legal principles was demon-
strated. Thirteen of the scores were less than zero, 
indicating a greater number of incorrect responses than 
correct responses. The results on both the true-false 
statements and the corrected scores indicated that the 
area of the legal aspects of public school administration 
was one of a lack of knowledge and understanding on the 
part of the elementary school principals. In view of the 
fact that the principles on which the test questions were 
based constituted a significant part of the legal founda-
tions of public school administration in Massachusetts, the 
demonstrated low degree of knowledge in this area was 
difficult to justify. 
Analysis of response to each test item.-- In an 
attempt to gain an insight into the specific principles 
best known and least known to the principals and make 
possible a clearer understanding of the significance 
of the responses on each test question, the items were 
considered individually as to the performance of the 
principals on the true-false statements and on the 
supporting statements selected by the participants. 
lti9 
Ee.ch i tern has been listed below by number, followed by an 
extremely brief statement of the principle involved in 
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the item. The complete test has been placed in Appendix c. 
The number and percentage of these responses have been 
listed, along with a brief description of the legal basis 
underlying this principle in Massachusetts school law. 
Finally, certain inferences have been drawn from the 
frequency and pattern of the responses made to the test 
item. 
Item l. A teacher has the legal 
right to administer corporal 
punishment. 
Cor. Incor. D.K. 
N 7l 71 6 
% 47.97 47.97 4.05 
The statutes are silent on the question. Case 
law has confirmed the right of a teacher to administer 
reasonable corporal punishment. A school committee 
rule is binding on the teacher. 
Less than half the total number of principals selected 
the correct response. Generally speaking, the response on 
this item showed a lack of real knowledge of this prin-
ciple. The deficiency was accentuated oy an inspection 
of the supporting statements circled by the 71 principals 
who answered correctly the main question. The sole 
correct supporting statement indicated that the Massa-
chusetts statutes were silent on the subject of corporal 
punishment. Nine principals circled this supporting 
statement and no other, although several used it in 
combination with an incorrect supporting statement, 
Forty-seven of the principals making the correct response 
to the major question indicated their belief that a 
Massachusetts statute permitted reasonable corporal 
punishment in school. Obviously, the great majority of 
those principals who responded correctly to the major 
question were uncertain as to the legal basis for their 
answer. Doubtless, one contributing factor to this 
uncertainty was the variety of school committee rules 
governing the actions of principals and teachers in the 
matter of corporal punishment. Ten principals of the 
group responding correctly to the major question indicated 
that only the principal had the right to administer 
corporal punishment. Such a belief might well have 
resulted from the existence of such a school committee 
rule in the school system in which those ten principals 
were employed. 
Item 2. A school committee may 
dismiss a teacher in the face of 
an adverse recommendation from 
the superintendent. 
N 
% 
Cor, 
96 
64.87 
Incor. D.K. 
35 17 
23.65 11.49 
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The statutes require that the superintendent must 
give his recommendation to the committee regarding 
the proposed dismissal of a tenure teacher. However, 
once the committee has received the professional 
advice of the superintendent, the decision lies with 
the committee; As the courts have phrased it, the 
superintendent is not the master, but the servant of 
the committee, 
Almost 65 per cent of the principals indicated the 
correct response to the main question. By subtracting 
the number of incorrect responses from the correct 
responses, it was found that approximately 41 per cent 
of the principals probably knew the principle here 
involved, Further indications of a lack of widespread 
and sure knowledge of this principle was found in the 
fact that of the 96 principals correctly responding to 
the major statement, 68 of them circled the supporting 
statement which placed the question of a recommendation 
from the superintendent within the discretion of the 
committee, Only 10 principals designated the supporting 
statement which correctly stated the requirement by 
statute of a recommendation from the superintendent. 
Item 3. 
fects of 
be given 
Instruction in the ef-
alcoholic drinks must 
in all public schools, N 
% 
Cor. 
57 
38.51 
Incor. D.K. 
70 21 
47.30 14.19 
The right to prescribe the curriculum lies with 
the state legislature. The statute specifically 
states that instruction as to the effects of alcoholic 
drinks shall be given in all schools under public 
control. This prescription is the most universally 
found of all state curriculum prescriptions. 
Over 61 per cent of the principals were unaware that 
a statute mandates instruction in the effects of alcoholic 
drinks in all regular public schools, an obvious indica-
tion of the failure of many public schools to comply with 
1,.... ') ..... 
this legislative prescription of curriculum. This failure 
to observe the law doubtless was responsible for the low 
percentage of correct responses, because the responses 
of the principals tended to reflect actual practice. How-
ever, of the 57 principals responding correctly, 46 stated 
that there was a statutory requirement. But a majority of 
the principals responding correctly failed to indicate also 
that the statute was mandatory upon the local committee and 
several listed their belief that such instruction was 
required only at the secondary level. 
Item 4. Parochial school pupils 
are entitled to transportation 
rights equal to those of public 
school pupils. 
Cor. Lncor. D.K. 
N 77 53 18 
% 52.03 35.81 12.16 
The statutes specifically mandate transportation 
rights to parochial school pupils equal to those 
enjoyed by public school pupils. Such use of public 
tax money does not violate the "wall between the 
church and state' because, as held by the United 
States Supreme Court, the benefit is received by 
the child and not the institution. 
A bare majority of the principals indicated the 
correct response to this item. Nearly 48 per cent were 
unaware of this statutory requirement, which has been in 
effect in Massachusetts for some 20 years. Of the 77 
principals responding correctly, seven indicated a 
knowledge of all three premises basic to a full under-
standing of this principle; namely, that there is a 
17J 
statutory requirement, that the Supreme Court of this 
state has upheld the constitutionality of the statute, 
and that the United States Supreme Court has validated 
such legislation. Thirty-three of those responding 
correctly noted the statute. Seven chose supporting 
statements completely at variance with the correct 
answer to the true-false statement. The responses on 
this item showed a general lack of basic knowledge as to 
the principles involved in the transportation of parochial 
school pupils at public expense. 
Item 5. The reasonable control 
of wearing apparel for school 
falls within the implied powers 
of the school committee. 
Cor. Incor. D.K. 
N 118 15 15 
~ 
,o 79.73 10.14 10.14 
The power to make reasonable rules regarding the 
apparel pupils shall wear to school falls within the 
implied powers of the school committee. In certain 
states, this power is specifically granted to the 
local board of school control by statute, 
The third highest total of correct responses was made 
by the principals on this item. Eighty per cent of the 
principals were aware that school authorities had some 
element of control over the apparel which pupils wore to 
school. Eighty-nine of the principals, moreover, correctly 
supported their response with the placement of the authority 
within the implied powers of the school committee, One 
possible reason for the relative success on this item may 
174 
have been the fact that shortly before the time of the 
testing, there had been considerable publicity in the 
newspapers about certain school committees passing more 
stringent rules governing the mode of dress of pupils. 
Thirty-nine of the principals incorrectly stated that 
statutes specifically governed the question of school 
wearing apparel. Although such a statute was in force 
in certain states, no such statute has been passed in 
Massachusetts. 
Item 6. A school committee may 
establish reasonable qualifica-
tions for admission to the 
public schools. 
Cor. Incor. D. K. 
N 67 67 14 
% 45. 2'( 45.27 9.46 
The right of pupils to attend public school is 
a qualified right. Particularly, below the compul-
sory school attendance age of seven, the committee 
may establish such reasonable qualifications for 
admission as it may deem necessary to prevent dis-
ruptive elements from intruding on the class. The 
benefit of the entire group take precedence over 
the welfare of a single individual. 
Less than half of the principals were correct in 
recognizing that, within statutory limitations, the school 
committee may establish certain reasonable requirements 
for admission to the public schools. Only 34 of the 
principals responding correctly stated that the right to 
attend school is a qualified right. Twenty-five of this 
same group placed within the school committee full 
discretion as to what children may attend public school. 
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Surprisingly enough, 33 of the principals responding 
incorrectly stated that the right to attend school is 
a qualified right, but 37 of the same group stated that 
the compulsory school age starts at six years, doubtless 
the cause of so large a number selecting the incorrect 
response to the true-false statement. The percentage of 
correct answers on this item, together with the pattern 
of supporting statements selected, showed a lack of 
definite knowledge about the compulsory school age and 
the rights of the school committee in respect to the 
admission of pupils. 
Item 7. The school may not in-
vade the right of the parent to 
govern the moral and ethical 
conduct of his children. 
Cor. Incor. D.K. 
N 114 16 18 
% 77.03 10.81 12.16 
Parents are entitled to certain liberties in the 
upbringing of their children, and among these is the 
right to govern the moral and ethical conduct of their 
children. Where parents have objected on religious 
grounds to the participation of their children in 
social dancing as part of the required physical edu-
cation program, the court has sustained the parent. 
Generally speaking, the principals demonstrated a 
knowledge of their limitations in compelling the actions 
of pupils which were contrary to religious beliefs. 
Eighty-nine of the principals responding correctly to 
this item specified their belief that an agency of the 
state has no authority to deprive parents of their right 
to govern the moral and ethical conduct of their children. 
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However, 12 of the principals responding correctly 
apparently justified their response by their indicated 
belief that physical education was not a required subject 
in the curriculum, whereas the statute prescribes 
physical education as required instruction in all regular 
public schools. 
Item 8. The right to determine 
school procedures rests with 
school authorities. N 
Cor. 
119 
Incor. D.K. 
14 15 
% 80.41 9.46 10.14 
A parent does not have the right to say that a 
given method of teaching shall be followed. Were 
such the case, divergent opinions would inevitably 
lead to confusion and failure. The determination 
of procedures and the management and direction of 
pupils and studies rest in the judgment and discretion 
of teachers and the school committee. 
Slightly over 80 per cent of the principals indicated 
the correct response to this item, the second highest 
percentage of correct responses on the entire test. 
Seventy-five of the principals making the correct response 
further specified that the determination of procedures 
rests with the teachers and the committee and 67 recognized 
that the factor of the pupil erring in the correcting had 
no bearing on the rights involved. However, a total of 
20 incorrect supporting statements raised some question 
as to whether all principals responding correctly 
understood the full implication involved in the test 
situation described in Item 8. 
Cor. Incor. D.K. 
N 107 11 30 
Item 9. The state has the power 
to compel that all children be 
educated, but not the power to 
compel that such education be in 
a public school. 
% 72.30 7.43 20.27 
By virtue of its police power, a state may 
compel that all children who are capable be educated. 
But a parent retains the right to select the type of 
education for his child. An attempt by a state legis-
lature to compel the attendance of all children at 
public schools has been held unconstitutional by the 
United States Supreme Court. 
Over 72 per cent of the principals responded correctly 
to the true-false statement. Only seven per cent of the 
responses were incorrect, the smallest number of incorrect 
answers on any item in the test. In view of the fact there 
were so few incorrect responses, it was surprising that 
over 20 per cent of the principals indicated a Don't Know 
response. While 84 of the principals responding correctly 
chose the general supporting statement that parents have 
certain rights in the direction of the education of their 
children, only little more than a third evinced knowledge 
that such legislation had actually been attempted and 
invalidated by the United States Supreme Court. Fifteen 
of the principals responding correctly also stated that 
the state has no right to supervise private schools, 
which assumption on their part was entirely incorrect. 
l ,...p I u 
Item 10. Vaccination is a re-
quirement for admission to pub-
lic school. 
Cor. Incor. D.K. 
N 69 64 15 
% 46.62 43.24 10.14 
The statutes of this state specifically require 
vaccination as a requirement for admission to 
public schools, granting an exemption only on the 
statement from a physician that such vaccination 
would endanger the child's health. The fact that 
religious grounds against compliance with such 
statutes cannot be maintained has been decided by 
both the Supreme Court of Massachusetts and the 
Supreme Court of the United States. 
A startlingly low percentage of principals showed 
knowledge of the statutory requirement of vaccination 
for admission to public school. Less than half of the 
principals indicated the correct response. Although 
vaccination has ceased being a controversial issue for 
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the most part, nevertheless, the principals were responsible 
for the enforcement of this important and specific statute. 
The lack of clarity of knowledge of the statute and its 
provisions was further indicated by the fact that 41 
principals stated that the statute specifically permits 
exemption from vaccination on religious grounds and 38 
principals stated that the State Department of Education 
furnishes a form for such exemption. Such statements 
reflected a confusion between the exemption permitted by 
statute from physical examinations and the exemption from 
vaccination. The percentage of correct responses and 
the pattern of responses on the supporting statements 
raised serious doubts as to the effectiveness of the 
enforcement of this statute. 
Item 11. Refusal to answer 
questions put by a Congression-
al Committee regarding alleged 
Communist Party connections is 
Cor. Incor. D.K. 
a justifiable cause of dismissal 
of a tenure teacher. 
N 
% 
74 
50.00 
43 31 
29.05 20.95 
A teacher has a constitutional right to avail 
himself of the Fifth Amendment, but he does not have 
a constitutional right to teach. A school committee 
has the right to conclude that substantial doubts on 
the part of pupils and parents of a teacher's alleged 
connection with the Communist Party would reduce the 
teacher's effectiveness and so constitute grounds for 
dismissal. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts has 
so decided. 
On this still current and important controversial 
issue, the principals showed a lack of clear-cut under-
standing of the legal principles involved. While such a 
problem would not normally arise in the routine adminis-
tration of the elementary schools, still the principals 
should have had an understanding of major issues concern-
ing public education and more specifically of the type of 
grounds which have justified dismissal from a teaching 
position. The fact that a decision had been quite 
recently been made by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts 
on such a case and had received wide publicity apparently 
1 :~'I uu 
had not clarified the issue in the minds of many principals. 
Item 12. The school committee 
shall make any changes in text 
books used in the public schools. 
Cor. Incor. D.K. 
N 37 108 3 
% 25.00 72.97 2.03 
The statutes specifically place the adoption 
of new textbooks in the hands of the school com-
mittee and further stipulate that such adoption 
shall be by a two thirds vote of the whole com-
mittee. 
This item, dealing with a specific statutory re-
quirement, brought forth the largest number of incorrect 
responses of any of the 25 test items. Of the 37 prin-
cipals responding correctly to the true-false statement, 
'only 15 stated that the statute specified the method of 
selection of texts. Of these same 37 principals, seven 
placed the selection of textbooks within the discretion 
of the superintendent and 10 incorrectly gave the school 
committee the right to delegate the selection of texts. 
The latter response was also the one most commonly chosen 
by the principals who responded incorrectly to the 
true-false statement. These answers doubtless reflected 
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the widespread practice of the establishment of committees 
of professional school employees to consider and 
recommend changes in basic texts for use in the schools. 
Apparently the principals were unaware of the fact that 
the recommendations of these textbook committees were 
referred to the school committee for its formal action. 
Perhaps too, certain school committees have left the 
selection of textbooks to their professional employees, 
thereby failing to exercise a power of the school 
committee which is theirs alone to exercise. 
Item 13. The local school com-
mittee is an agency of the 
state legislature. N 
% 
Cor. 
95 
64.19 
Incor. 
35 
23.65 
D.K. 
18 
12.16 
The state legislature has created and has control 
of the public schools of the state. It has created 
the school committee for the express purpose of 
administering the public schools locally. The 
school committee, acting in its corporate capacity, 
is a state agency and no part of local government. 
On this basic concept of the legal structure of the 
public school system and its governing board of local 
control, some 36 per cent of the principals were unaware 
of the proper relationship of the school committee and 
the local city or town government. Such a relatively 
poor understanding of this concept by the professional 
employees of the school committee probably reflected the 
even greater lack of understanding on this concept by the 
general public. The fact that school districts are 
coterminous with the local political subdivision and that 
school committee members are locally elected doubtless 
contributed to this lack of understanding. Twenty-eight 
of the 95 principals responding correctly to the true-
false statement attempted to support their reasoning with 
a court decision which had no relationship with the point 
at issue. Twelve of the principals responding correctly 
used as a supporting statement the fact that school 
committee members are elected locally, a supporting state-
ment that was used also by 12 principals who responded 
incorrectly. 
Item 14. The school committee 
is fiscally independent of the 
town government so far as the 
matter of general support is 
concerned. 
Cor. Incor. D.K. 
N 123 20 5 
% 83.11 13.51 3.38 
The statutes stipulate that every town must 
provide adequate financial support for the public 
schools as estimated by the school committee in its 
annual budget. Except for new construction, extra-
ordinary repairs, and the provision of transportation, 
a long list of court decisions attest to the fiscal 
independence of the school committee. The finance 
committee is a recommendatory body only. 
Over 83 per cent of the principals responded correctly 
on this item, constituting the highest degree of correct 
response for any item on the test. Furthermore, 116 prin-
cipals signified that the statute specifically imposes upon 
the towns and cities the duties of raising funds for the 
support of the public schools as stipulated by the school 
committee. It appeared surprising that such a relatively 
high degree of success would have occurred on an item 
dealing with affairs somewhat removed from the everyday 
routine of school administration at the elementary school 
level. But the rather large number of cases that have 
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been adjudicated on this point, the fact that such cases 
have been well-publicized, and the fact that the principals 
have had a pecuniary interest in the issue apparently has 
clarified the understanding of the principals on this 
legal principle. 
Item 15. The charges against a 
tenure teacher must be substan-
tiated at the hearing proceding 
the dismissal vote. 
N 
% 
Cor. 
81 
54.73 
Incor. D.K. 
49 18 
33.11 12.16 
The statute, as amended in 1934, stipulates 
that the charges against a tenure teacher must be 
substantiated. Judicial decision has further in-
terpreted the statute to require that this substan-
tiation be made by evidence produced at the hearing 
preceding the intended dismissal vote. The burden 
of the proof rests with the school committee. 
Over 45 per cent of the principals showed a lack of 
awareness of the full protection extended by law to the 
tenure teacher, principal, and superintendent. Only 63 
of the principals noted the statutory requirement of 
substantiation of charges and but 47 placed the burden 
of proof with the school committee. It was surprising 
that less than 55 per cent of the principals, a percentage 
but slightly higher than chance, showed knowledge of this 
stipulation of the statute, in view of the fact that the 
statute is so specific on this point and that this statute 
is the cornerstone of the protection of professional 
employees of the school committee of their positions. 
Item 16. Principalship tenure 
achieved in one principalship 
does not give a person a vested 
right to the principalship of a 
new or different principalship. 
N 
% 
Cor. 
116 
78.38 
Incor. D.K. 
17 15 
11.49 10.14 
Principalship tenure is achieved by the serving 
of more than three years in a principalship at the 
election of a school committee. Such tenure does 
not, in the event of the replacement of the build-
ing with a new, larger school, give that principal 
a vested right to the principalship of the new 
school. The court has held that the new principal-
ship is not the one previously held and that it is 
the duty of the school committee to select the best 
qualified person for the new principalship. 
A relatively high percentage of principals, exceeded 
only on three other items, indicated the correct response 
to the true-false statement. Over 78 per cent of the 
principals noted the distipction between the tenure pro-
tection to the already held position and a vested right 
to other principalships. Eighty-four of the principals 
responding correctly to the item noted that it was the 
duty of the school committee to select the best qualified 
person for the position and 73 signified that the prin-
cipalship of the new school was not the principalship 
formerly held by the tenure principal. Eleven of the 
principals responding correctly identified the leading 
case on this point although five principals selected a 
counterfeit case as a supporting statement. 
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Item 17. The flag salute, com-
pelled in the face of religious 
scruples to the contrary, is an 
infringement of religious 
freedom. 
Cor. Incor. D. K. 
N 99 29 20 
% 66.89 19.59 13.51 
The statute compels a teacher to cause the 
pupils under his charge to salute the flag and 
repeat the oath of allegiance at least once each 
week. However, the United States Supreme Court 
has ruled that such a ceremony can have religious 
significance, and that the compulsion of pupil par-
ticipation in the face of religious objections is 
an infringement of the religious freedom guaranteed 
in the First Amendment. 
186 
Almost 67 per cent of the principals responded cor-
rectly to this item. However, the pattern of the supporting 
statements designated by the principals making the correct 
response to the true-false statement cast some doubt on 
the degree of surety of their knowledge of the principle 
involved. A total of 87 supporting statements were indi-
cated of which but 20 were correct. Sixty-six of the 
supporting statements chosen referred to judicial decisions 
which could not properly be used in any way to support the 
correct answer. Twenty-two principals indicated that the 
Supreme Court of the United States had held that there was 
no religious significance involved in the flag salute, 
whereas the final decision by that body on the question 
held that the salute could not be compelled against 
religious scruples to the contrary. Even though 99 prin-
cipals responded correctly, a better response than that 
given on a majority of the items, it was hard to justify 
187 
that at least one third of the principals were unaware of the 
legal principles involved. No principal, who might be called 
upon to make an administrative decision in his school in 
the event that a pupil might decline to participate in the 
flag salute on religious grounds, was adequately prepared 
for his position if he were unaware of the specific prin-
ciples involved in this matter. 
Item 18. A person attains tenure 
status as a principal after hav-
ing served more than three years 
in the position at the election 
of the school committee. 
N 
% 
Cor. 
96 
64.87 
Incor. D.K. 
35 17 
23.65 11.49 
In 1945 principals were given essentially the 
same tenure protection to their position as principals 
as that enjoyed by teachers to their position. The 
demotion of a tenure principal requires procedures 
similar to those required for the dismissal of a 
tenure teacher. However, prior to the attainment 
of such tenure status, a vote to return a principal 
to the classroom is merely a reassignment of duties 
and requires only a majority vote of the committee. 
Almost 65 per cent of the principals showed some 
knowledge of the requirements necessary for the attainment 
of tenure status as a principal. Perhaps more noteworthy 
was the fact that some 35 per cent of the principals 
indicated that they were unaware of the provisions of 
the statute which gave to them this important protection 
to their position. Of the 96 principals responding 
correctly to the true-false statement, 49 correctly noted 
that a change to a classroom teaching position before the 
achievement of tenure status was merely a reassignment 
of duties. Forty-two evinced a knowledge that the statute 
required the serving of more than three years in the prin-
cipalship to attain tenure status as a principal, and 
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50 indicated that a demotion is not the same as a dismissal. 
Item 19. Continual acts of mis-
chief and playfulness may con-
stitute sufficient grounds for 
the expulsion of a pupil from 
the public schools. 
Cor. Incor. D.K. 
N 105 21 22 
% 70.95 14.19 14.87 
The school committee has the authority, to be 
exercised in good faith, to expel a pupil from the 
public schools, when his behavior interferes with 
the discipline and management of the schools. 
Continual acts of mischief and playfulness, although 
not mutinous or gross, which interfere with that 
rliscipline and management are sufficient grounds for 
expulsion. 
A relatively large percentage of the principals, 
nearly 71 per cen~ responded correctly to this item. 
However, an examination of the supporting statements cast 
some doubt on the validity of the amount of knowledge 
indicated by such a percentage. Of the principals 
responding correctly to the true-false statement, 27 placed 
the power of expulsion within the discretion of the prin-
cipal. Fourteen used as a supporting statement a reference 
to a counterfeit case. Perhaps the significant point was 
not that over 70 per cent of the principals successfully 
responded to the item, but that a total of 31 principals 
placed the power of expulsion within the discretion of 
the principal. It appeared that the knowledge of such 
a specific and basic concept was a part of the essential 
knowledge that should be a requisite in the training of 
any aspirant to the principalship. 
Item 20. A school committeeman 
may serve both as a witness and 
in a judicial capacity at a hear-
ing on an intended dismissal of 
a tenure teacher. 
N 
% 
Cor. 
44 
29.73 
lncor. D.K. 
27 77 
18.24 52.03 
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A school committee hearing preceding an intended 
dismissal vote is an administrative hearing at which 
strict rules of evidence do not apply. A member of 
the committee may testify as a witness against the 
teacher and then participate in the vote for dismissal. 
To rule otherwise would be to eliminate the testimony 
of those who might be in the best position to know 
the facts. 
The next to lowest number of correct responses occurred 
on this item. The largest number of Don't Know responses 
was given on this item, over 52 per cent. It was apparent 
that a large number of the principals felt that a legal 
technicality of trial procedure was involved and was conse-
quently in an area outside their sphere of knowledge. Of 
the 27 principals responding incorrectly, 21 indicated 
their belief that in no kind of administrative hearing 
could a person serve as both witness and judge. The 
response to this item, when taken into account with 
others involving the power of the school committee, 
indicated that apparently little real information as 
to the powers of the school committee has been included 
in the training of elementary school principals. 
Item 21, A child may be exempted 
from the physical examination re-
quired by the statute at the re-
quest of his parent on religious 
grounds. 
Cor. Incor. D.K. 
N 53 54 41 
% 35.81 36.49 27.70 
The statutes require that every child in the 
public schools shall be examined to ascertain 
defects in vision and hearing and certain other 
defects. The statute specifically permits exemp-
tion from such examination at the written request 
of the parent on religious grounds, but such exemp-
tion does not apply in the case of communicable 
diseases. · 
On this item, dealing with a specific statutory re-
quirement, with which every principal should be familiar, 
less than 36 per cent of the principals responded cor-
rectly. Whereas an almost identical percentage of prin-
cipals selected the incorrect response on an alternative-
response test item, it was clearly apparent that there 
was little real knowledge of the legal concepts included 
within this question. Twenty-eight principals stated 
that the statute specifically permitted such exemption, 
but 36 principals stated that the necessity for efficient 
vision and hearing in school achievement was such that no 
exemptions could be permitted. Eleven of the 53 principals 
responding correctly to the true-false statement designated 
a counterfeit case as a supporting statement to the 
selection of their correct response, The fact that almost 
28 per cent of the principals indicated that they were 
unaware of the correct response was indicative of a high 
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degree of unfamiliarity with the principles involved in 
this item. 
Item 22, No pupil shall be per-
manently excluded from the pub-
lic schools for misconduct with-
out a hearing before the school 
committee. 
Cor, Incor. D.K. 
N 43 74 31 
% 29.05 50.00 20.95 
The statutes place the power of expulsion from 
the public schools solely within the discretion of 
the school committee, stipulating that any permanent 
exclusion requires a hearing before the committee. 
While such a hearing need not be conducted with all 
the formalities of a court of law, the committee 
must exhibit a judicious attitude and make their 
decision on the basis of the facts presented at the 
hearing. 
Twenty-nine per cent of the principals responded 
correctly to the true-false statement, the second lowest 
percentage of correct responses on the entire test. Of 
the 43 principals responding correctly to the true-false 
statement, 31 principals noted the statutory requirement 
of a hearing before the committee. A contributing factor 
to the low number of correct responses was undoubtedly the 
failure of the principals to recognize that a refusal to 
grant a hearing without a prior acknowledgement of guilt 
was tantamount to a permanent exclusion without the hear-
ing as required by statute. Yet, a total of 46 principals 
stated that the power to expel for misconduct lay within 
the discretion of the principal. A second possible reason 
for the low number of correct responses was the probable 
confusion of the power of suspension, which does lie 
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within the discretion of the principal, with the power of 
permanent exclusion, which lies exclusively with the school 
committee. 
Item 23. The reading of a 
portion of the Bible in the 
public schools is a statutory 
requirement. 
N 
% 
Cor. 
107 
72.30 
Incor. D.K. 
25 16 
16.89 10.81 
The statutes specify that a portion of the Bible 
shall be read daily in the public schools, without 
written note or oral comment. A pupil, at the written 
request of his parent, shall not be required to read 
from any particular version, or to take any personal 
part in the reading. 
More than 72 per cent of the principals indicated the 
proper response to the true-false statement, which ques-
tioned their cognizance of the statutory requirement of a 
daily reading of the Bible in the public schools. Ninety-
two of the 107 principals making this correct response noted 
that the statutes specify the frequency of Bible readings. 
The same supporting statement was selected by 9 of the 
principals responding incorrectly to the true-false state-
ment, an obvious indication that they felt the frequency 
of reading was stipulated as something other than daily. 
The fact that 41 of the principals did not respond 
correctly to the true-false statement raised the question 
of the extent of compliance with the statute that is 
practiced in the schools administered by those principals. 
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Item 24. A teacher in Massachu-
setts is not liable in tort for 
negligence occasioned by non-
feasance. 
N 
% 
Cor. 
47 
31.76 
Incor. D.K. 
74 27 
50.00 18.24 
For purposes of tort liability only, a teacher has 
been held to be a public official. This judicial hold-
ing has rendered teachers not liable for damages 
suffered by a pupil when the teacher's negligence was a 
failure to act. 
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The confusion and variety of statutes and rulings, which 
dominate the area of tort liability of school districts and 
school employees throughout the country, was reflected by 
the principals in the low number of correct responses made 
on this item dealing with that topic. The further fact that 
Massachusetts has deviated judicially from the most commonly 
accepted holdings doubtless added to the uncertainty as to 
the correct response. The lack of any real general knowl-
edge on this topic was further indicated by the fact that 
the most frequently chosen supporting statement was that 
which reported a counterfeit court case. 
Item 25. The parent, as well as 
the child, is bound by the 
reasonable rules of the school. N 
% 
Cor. 
62 
41.89 
Incor. D.K. 
50 36 
33.78 24.32 
If a parent wishes to avail himself of the benefits 
of a free public education for his child, he must comply 
with the reasonable rules of the school. The courts 
have held that a rule requiring that parents sign and 
return report cards is a reasonable rule. The refusal 
of a parent to comply with such a rule has been held 
to be sufficient grounds for expulsion of the child. 
Less than 42 per cent of the principals indicated the 
correct response to the true-false statement in which the 
above principle of law was included. Thirty-six of the 
principals stipulated that a committee has a right to 
deprive a pupil of his right to attend school only for his 
own misconduct, whereas 44 of the principals correctly 
stated that a parent is bound by the rules of the school. 
The fact that this question was the final item on the 
test probably contributed to the relatively large number 
of principals selecting the Don't Know response, although 
the number of Don't Know responses was considerab:!.y leas 
on this item than on items appearing much earlier in the 
test. 
Summary statement.-- An analysis of the respcnses 
of the 148 principals on the 25 test items, both on the 
true-false statements and the supporting statements for 
each question, revealed a low degree of knowledge and 
understanding of the legal principles underlying certain 
aspects of the administration of the elementary schools. 
This low degree of knowledge applied both to basic general 
principles underlying the legal structure of the public 
school system and to a knowledge of specific statutory 
and common law concepts. 
The lack of background in the elements of the common 
law applying to the legal aspects of public school 
194 
administration was perhaps to be expected. A total of 528 
supporting statements which included the names of court 
cases were designated by the principals, The total number 
of responses in which the supporting statement was correct 
was 204. The total number of responses which included 
the names of court cases and were incorrect was 324. 
Without any detailed analysis, this preponderance of 
incorrect supporting statements including case names 
over correct supporting statements including case names 
clearly showed the expected lack of case knowledge. 
However, the relatively low percentage of correct 
responses on the many items which referred to specific 
statutes was unexpected and difficult to justify. This 
demonstrated lack of knowledge of many of the statutory 
requirements that relate directly to the practical aspects 
of elementary school administration led to the obvious 
inference that certain statutory requirements have not 
been met. 
3. Variance Analysis 
In an attempt to determine what factors exerted an 
influence on the performance of the principals, the 
results were analyzed for variance in terms of six 
criteria: (1) years of experience as a principal; 
(2) college preparation; (3) population of school 
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administered; (4) sex; (5) type of principalship; and 
(6) population of community of employment. Within each 
of these criterion groups, the principals were placed in 
certain classifications for the purpose of determining 
whether any significant differences appeared between 
or among the performance of the principals so classified. 
Influence of amount of experience on test performance.-
To determine what influence the number of years of exper-
ience as a principal exerted on performance on the test 
of legal principles of school administration, the total 
group of 148 principals was separated into three groups, 
one group with one to three years of experience, one 
group with four to ten years of experience, and a third 
group with over ten years of experience. The performance 
of those three groups was determined, as reported in 
Table 11. 
The performance of the principals based on amount of 
experience did not show a progression from those of least 
experience to those of great experience, as might have been 
expected. While the performance of the most experienced 
principals exceeded that of both groups of less exper-
ienced principals, the performance of the least exper-
ienced group exceeded the performance of the middle 
group by a slight amount. This was true of both the 
Table 11. Performance of Principals Classified by Amount 
of Experience 
Group N Mean Range Mean Cor- Range 
Rights rected 
Scores 
\ 1) I\ "1 UJ (LI) L5J (b) 
1 to 3 years ... 40 13.83 4 to 21 15.45 15 to 
4 to 10 years •. 56 13.66 8 to 19 14.46 1-30 to 
11 or more years 52 14.60 4 to 21 19.33 i-23 to 
50 
38 
52 
Total . ....... 148 14.03 4 to 21 16.44 30 to 52 
performance on the correct number of true-false statements 
and the corrected scores. The middle group, as far as 
experience was concerned, also included the lowest scores 
at both ends of the range. To determine if the difference 
in performance among the three groups was statistically 
significant, the variance of the data was analyzed, as 
reported in Table 12. The obtained F values for the 
analyses of variance of the data for all six criterion 
groups have been placed in Table 12. The 12 individual 
analyses of variance from which the reported F values 
were obtained have been placed in Appendix D. 
As shown in Table 12, the computed value of F, for 
the differences in performance based on experience, did 
not reach a significant level. Because no significant 
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Table 12. Results of the F test of Variance of Test 
Performance as Influenced by Six Criteria 
Groups F Value for F Value for 
True.:.False Corrected 
Statements Scores 
ll J ( 2) ( 3) 
Experience as a principal .•• 1.15* 1.66* 
College preparation of 
principals .................. 1.27* 0.69* 
Population of school 
administered ....•..........• 0.60* 0.21* 
Sex . ........................ 5.43** 4.82** 
Type of principalship .•.•..• 0.46* 3.11* 
Population of community of 
employment . ........•........ 1.27* 2.22* 
* Not significant 
** Significant at the five per cent level 
differences existed in the total performance of the three 
criterion groups, it was unnecessary to analyze the 
variance between the individual groups. The results 
of this analysis indicated that the amount of experience 
in the principalship did not significantly influence test 
performance. 
Influence of college preparation of the principals on 
test performance.-- The participating principals were 
divided into five criterion groups based on the highest 
degree of level attained: those of no degree, the 
bachelor's degree, the master's degree, the certificate of 
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advanced graduate specialization, and the doctor's degree, 
The performance of the groups was determined, as shown in 
Table 13. 
Table 13, Performance of Principals Classified by College 
Preparation 
Group N Mean Range Mean cor- Range 
Rights rected 
Scores 
ll) l2 l3 J l4 J l5 J \ 0 J 
No degree ...• 9 13.44 9 to 18 13.89 -8 to 
Bachelor's 
degree ....... 21 14.29 4 to 19 16.19 -23 to 
Master's 
degree .•....• 94 13.76 4 to 21 15.78 -30 to 
c. A. G. s ... 22 15.13 10 to 21 20.16 -27 to 
Doctor's 
degree ..•..•• 2 * * * 
Total 148 14.03 4 to 21 16.44 -30 to 
* Data included in the C. A. G. S. classification 
Only two principals reported the holding of a 
doctor's degree. Consequently, the results of those 
two principals were included with the results of the 
principals in the group holding the certificate of 
advanced graduate specialization, thereby creating a 
single advanced degree group beyond the master's degree 
level. The normal expectation of a progressively higher 
35 
43 
49 
52 
* 
52 
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performance with succeeding degree levels did not materialize. 
The performance of the group holding the bachelor's degree 
was superior to that of the group holding the master's 
degree, both in terms of the mean of the total number of 
correct responses on the true-false statements and of the 
mean of the corrected scores. The advanced degree group 
achieved the highest mean on both scores while the non-
degree group made the lowest achievement on both scores. 
To determine whether these differences in performance 
were statistically significant, the F test of variance was 
applied, the obtained values for which were reported in 
Table 12. The obtained values did not reach a level of 
statistical significance for either the total number of 
correct answers on the true-false statements or for the 
corrected scores. Because there were no statistically 
significant differences found for the total performance of 
the four groups, it was unnecessary to analyze the variance 
between the individual groups. The findings indicated that 
the college preparation of the principals did not exert a 
statistically significant influence on the performance of 
the principal on the test. 
Influence of size of school administered on test 
performance.-- In an effort to determine whether the size 
of the school or schools administered by the principals, 
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in terms of pupil population, exerted any influence on test 
performance, the total group was divided into three criterion 
groups, one of principals of schools of fewer than 350 
pupils, one of principals of schools of 350 to 499 pupils, 
and one of principals of schools of 500 or more pupils, 
The data of the test performances of these three groups 
were analyzed, as reported in Table 14, 
Table 14. Performance of Principals as Classified by the 
Pupil Population of the Schools Administered 
Group N Mean Range !llean Cor- Range 
Rights rected 
Scores 
(lJ _1_~) (3 J l4J (51 Lt:l J 
0 - 349 •• 44 13.59 9 to 21 16.30 -15 to 49 
350 - 499 •• 49 14.14 4 to 21 16.78 -30 to 52 
500 - 1200 •. 55 14.29 8 to 19 16.25 1-10 to 44 
Total. .••. 148 14.03 4 to 21 16,44 !-30 to 52 
The mean of the number of correct responses on the 
true-false statements varied directly with the increase 
in pupil population of the schools administered by the 
participating principals. However, the differences among 
the means appeared to be very small. A similar condition 
did not apply for the means of the corrected scores, where 
the highest mean was achieved by the principals in the 
middle group, and the lowest mean was achieved by the prin-
cipals in the largest group. Again however, the differences 
among the means appeared to be relatively small. 
To determine if the differences in the performances of 
the three groups were statistically significant, the F test 
of variance was applied. The resulting F values for the 
differences in performance on both the number of correct 
responses on the true-false statements and the corrected 
scores, as reported in Table 12, indicated that the 
differences did not reach a level of statistical signif-
icance. The findings of these analyses showed that the 
size of the schools administered by the participating 
principals did not exert a significant influence on test 
performance. 
Influence of sex on test performance.-- To determine 
what influence sex exerted on test performance, the total 
group of 148 principals was separated into two groups, one 
for the men principals and one for women principals. The 
performance of these two criterion groups was determined, 
as reported in Table 15. 
The mean of the scores of the men principals, both 
in terms of the number of correct responses on the true-
false statements and in terms of the corrected scores, 
exceeded the means of the scores of the women principals. 
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Table 15. Performance of Men Principals and Women Principals 
Group N Mean Range Mean Cor- Range 
Rights rected 
Scores 
ll J l c J l3 J ( 4 J l5 J \OJ 
Men • ..•..•. 87 14.55 8 to 21 18.66 -15 to 52 
Women • ••.•• 61 13.30 4 to 19 13.28 -30 to 44 
Total. ... 148 14.03 4 to 21 16.44 -30 to 52 
On both scores also, the ranges showed that at both the 
upper and lower extremities, the performance of the men 
principals was higher than that of the women principals, 
The F test of variance was applied to the data to 
determine if the superiority demonstrated by the men prin-
cipals was statistically significant, the results of which 
were reported in Table 12. The performance of the men 
principals exceed the performance of the women principals 
at the five per cent level of statistical significance on 
both the number of correct responses on the true-false 
statements and on the corrected scores, with F values of 
5.43 and 4.82 respectively. The findings of these 
analyses indicated that sex exerted a significant influence 
on test performance in favor of men principals. 
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Influence of type of principalship on test perform-
~.-- The 148 principals were classified into two 
criterion groups established on the type of principalship, 
i.e., a supervising principalship and a teaching principal-
ship, to determine if the type of principalship exerted 
any significant influence on test performance. The perform-
ance of the two groups was determined, as reported in 
Table 16. 
Table 16. Performance of Supervising Principals and Teaching 
Principals 
Group N Mean Range Mean Cor- Range 
Rights rected 
Scores 
ll J l " J l3 J ( 4 J ( 5 J ( b J 
Supervising 
principals ••. 131 14.10 4 to 21 17.19 -30 to 52 
Teaching 
principals ..• 17 13.53 9 to 21 10.65 -15 to 49 
Total. ..••• 148 14.03 4 to 21 16.44 -30 to 52 
The mean of the supervising principals exceeded the 
mean of the teaching principals in both terms of total 
correct responses on the true-false statements and of the 
corrected scores. The range of the teaching principals 
included the highest score on the total correct responses 
204 
to the true-false statements, but did not reach the lowest 
extreme found in the range of the supervising principals. 
On the corrected scores, the range of the teaching prin-
cipals did not reach either extremity found in the corrected 
scores of the supervising principals. 
To determine if the differences by which the means of 
the supervising principals exceeded the means of the teach-
ing principals were statistically significant, the F test 
of variance was applied, the results of which were reported 
in Table 12. While the F value for the difference of the 
corrected scores was considerably larger than that found 
for the difference of the number right on the true-false 
statements, neither F value reached the level of signif-
icance. On the basis of these analyses, it was determined 
that the nature of the principalship did not exert any 
significant influence on test performance. 
Influence of population of community of employment on 
test performance.-- The 148 principals were classified into 
four groups, established on the basis of the population of 
the community in which they served as principals, to 
determine what influence such a factor exerted on test 
performance. The four groups thus formed consisted of 
principals employed in communities in the following 
population classifications: less than 10,000 population; 
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between 10,000 and 24,999 population; between 25,000 and 
49,999 population; and between 50,000 and 100,000 
population. The performance of the four groups so clas-
sified was determined, as reported in Table 17. 
Table 17. Performance of Principals as Classified by 
Population of Community of Employment 
Group N Mean Range Mean Cor- Range 
Rights rected 
Scores 
(1) 1(2) ( -o, ) ( 4) ( 5) (6) 
Under 10,000 ••..• 24 14.83 7 to 21 19.37 1 to 49 
10,000 - 24,999. 44 14.45 10 to 21 19.57 -8 to 50 
25,000 - 49,999. 38 13.61 4 to 18 15.42 -10 to 42 
50,000 - 100,000, 42 13.52 4 to 21 12.20 -30 to 52 
To ta 1 .....•.... 148 14.03 4 to 21 16.44 -30 to 52 
The performance of the principals who were employed 
in communities in the two smallest classifications 
attained a higher level of performance on the test than 
did the principals employed in the communities in the two 
largest classifications. This superiority applied both 
to the number of correct responses on the true-false state-
ments and to the corrected scores. On the true-false 
statements, the mean of the number correct varied in-
versely as the size of the community of employment. 
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To determine if the performance of the principal in 
the smaller communities exceeded the performance of the 
principals in the larger communities to a degree that was 
statistically significant, the variance of the groups was 
analyzed. The results were reported in Table 12. The 
obteined F values did not reach a level of statistical 
significance for the total group for either the scores 
on the true-false statements or the corrected scores. 
Because no significant differences existed in the total 
performance of the four groups, it was unnecessary to 
analyze the variance between the individual groups. 
The findings indicated that the size of the community in 
which the principal was employed did not sie;nific&ntly 
affect test performance. 
Summary statement.-- The influence exerted on the 
test performance of the 148 participating principals by 
six criteria was examined. The six criteria were: 
(1) years of experience as a principal; (2) college prep-
aration; (3) population of schools administered; (4) sex; 
(5) type of principalship; and (6) population of com-
munity of employment. The differences of the performances 
of various groups within these criteria. were analyzed 
for statistical significance. Only on the criteria of 
sex was there found any statistically significant dif-
ferences. On the basis of these analyses, it was 
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determined that the performance of the men principals 
exceeded the performance of the women principals at the 
five per cent level of confidence, 
2DU 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the knowl-
edge and understanding of elementary school principals in 
Massachusetts regarding the legal principles underlying 
the responsibilities of their position. To accomplish 
this purpose, research was made into case and statutory 
law. From the principles ascertained through this re-
search, a series of questions and answers was constructed 
and submitted to a jury of experts for validation. The 
questions approved by the jury formed the basis for a 
test of certain legal principles of public school admin-
istration, applicable in Massachusetts. This test was 
administered to 148 elementary school principals in 
Eastern Massachusetts, participating voluntarily in nine 
meetings held in host communities. The results from the 
administration of this test were analyzed in terms of 
total group performance and in terms of sub-groups 
established on the basis of six criteria for determination 
of the influence exerted by these factors. 
l. Conclusions 
Total group performance.-- The principals included 
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in this study demonstrated a glaring lack of knowledge of 
the legal aspects of public school administration. The 
responses to the true-false statements, in terms of rights 
minus wrongs, were correct in less than 30 per cent of the 
cases. That the participating principals themselves were 
aware of this lack of knowledge was indicated by their 
selection of the Don't Know resoonse in 15 oer cent of t~e ;;;...;;..~~- . . 
cases. A further indication of weakness was the obvious 
fact that many of the correct responses on the true-false 
statements were founded on no specific knowledge. Some 
of the correct true-false statements were unsubstantiated 
by any supporting statements, and many others were allegedly 
substantiated by the use of incorrect supporting statements. 
The weakness demonstrated by the principals in this 
area of knowledge was amplified by the derivation of a 
corrected score, which took into account both performance 
on the true-false statements and the supporting statements. 
A mean of 16, in view of a maximum possible score of 98, 
left little doubt that the general picture of an area of 
weakness was correct. The presence of several minus scores 
suggested a complete lack of such knowledge in certain 
instances. 
The low degree of knowledge ws.s general, appl;;ing as 
well to principals in large communities as to principals 
in small communities, to principals with considerable 
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experience as to principals with little experience, to 
principals with graduate training as to principels with 
no graduate training, to principals of large schools 
as to principals of small schools, to principals in each 
of the geographic areas surveyed. 
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This low degree of knowledge applied both to the basic 
general principles underlying the legal structure of the 
public school system and to the specific statutory and common 
law concepts. Little knowledge of case law was to be expected 
in view of its relative inaccessibility to the elementary 
school principal. However, the fact that the demonstrated 
weakness applied as well to statutory law was not to be 
expected in that copies of the Massachusetts statutes relating 
to education were readily available and in that tbe statutory 
material was, for the most part, of specific nature. This 
unfamiliarity with many of the specific statutory require-
ments relating to the practical aspects of public school 
administration led to the inference that certain statutory 
requirements have not been met. 
In view of the knowledge that the test items dealt 
with basic legal concepts of public education of relevance 
to the elementary school principalship and of immediate 
concern to the elementary school principal in the per-
formance of his duties of school administration, the 
reported test performance demonstrated conclusively that 
the area of the legal aspects of public school administration 
was one of definite weakness for elementary school principals. 
This weakness, in light of the fact that nearly 80 per cent 
of the participating principals had achieved a master's degree 
or higher, indicated that the colleges and universities have 
not accorded the field of school law a real place in the 
preparation of prospective school administrators. The fact 
that public education was created by law and must operate 
within certain legal limitations seemed to have been taken 
into little account in the development of educational programs 
for school administrators. 
Effect of certain influences.-- The principals were 
classified into sub-groups to determine if certain influ-
ences exerted any significant effect on test performance. 
The following findings resulted from analyses of variance 
applied to the data for these sub-groups: 
1. The number of years in the principalship exerted 
no statistically significant influence on test 
performance. 
2. The college preparation of the principals exerted 
no statistically si-gnificant influence on test 
performance. 
3. The size of the school administered by the prin-
cipals exerted no statistically significant influ-
ence on test performance. 
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4. Men principals performed better than women prin-
cipals. This superiority was statistically 
significant at the five per cent level of 
confidence. 
5. The type of principalship exerted no statistice.lly 
significant influence on test performance. 
6. The population of the community of employment 
exerted no statistically significant influence on 
test performance. 
2. Implications 
The following implications were derived from this 
study: 
1. Specific training in certain legal principles of 
public education, with special reference to the 
state of employment, should be required for 
students preparing for elementary school admin-
istration. 
2. The certification requirements for elementary 
school principals should include certain train-
ing or proficiencies in the field of school law. 
3. A publication providing basic knowledge of common 
law and statutory law, of special relevance to 
the principalship in Massachusetts, should be 
developed by the State Department of Education 
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or the Massachusetts Elementary School Principals 
Association for distribution to all elementary 
school principals in the state, 
4. The Massachusetts Elementary School Princioals' 
Association should work toward legislative action, 
which would create the principalship as a separate 
classification of professional employee of the 
school committee and define the status and 
responsibilities of the position. This would 
replace the present classification as a teacher. 
5. There is an immediate need for the development of 
a current publication of the rules and regulations 
of every school committee in the state, where such 
publication is not now in existence, 
6. All copies of the school co~~ittee rules and 
regulations should include a section in which 
the authorities, responsibilities, and duties 
of the principal are clearly defined. 
7. The Massachusetts Elementary School Principals' 
Association should develop a typical set of broad 
statements and definitions of the authorities 
and responsibilities of the elementary school 
principal to be recommended as a basic outline, 
which could be augmented by the specific rules 
and regulations necessary for the individual 
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connnunities. 
3. Limitations 
This study was subject to the following limitations, 
presented now as guides to modification of future research 
in this area: 
1. The size of the sampling was necessarily limited. 
Participation in the meetings was voluntary on 
the part of the principals. Meetings were held 
in communities which could be visited by the 
investigator on school days. 
2. Physical conditions of the testing, beyond the 
control of the investigator, varied from COJ11.muni ty 
to community in terms of the time of day, the 
locale of the meeting place, and the type of 
furniture. The attitude of the host superin-
tendents or principals also was reflected in the 
attitude of the participants. 
3. Because participation in the meetint;s we,s essen-
tially voluntary, the participants were not nec-
essarily representative of the principals in the 
comraunities included in the groups. 
4. Testing was carried on over a five week period. 
During this period, discussions of test items 
could have been carried on between principals 
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who had taken the test and principals who v;ere 
yet to take the test. However, there did not 
appear to be any observable differences between 
the performances of the first groups takins the 
test and subsequent groups. 
5. No evaluation was made of the performance of 
those principPls who had completed a course 
in school law as compared with principals who 
had not completed such a study. 
6. The classification of the principals into more 
than two groups for the purpose of determininc; 
the influence exerted by certain factors on test 
performance resulted in relatively small groups 
for statistical analysis of the data. Similar 
test performances by a larger group would 
probably have resulted in additional factors 
showing a statistically significant influence 
on test performance. 
4. Need for Further Research 
The review of research and the findings of tc1.is study 
sugsested the following future research: 
1. An extension of this study to a larger and 
different sampling of Massachusetts elementary 
school principals. 
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2. Resee.rch into the degree of knowledge of the 
legal principles of public educat~on on the part 
of teachers, secondary school principals, super-
intendents, and school board members. 
3. Research into the amount and type of litiGation 
in which school teachers and principals in 
Massachusetts have been involved. 
4. Research into the types, number, and rulings of 
school cases in courts below the Masssehusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court. 
5. Historical research into the development of and 
the relationships among the State Board of 
Education, the Commissioner of Education, the 
State Department of Education, and the local 
board of school control. 
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APPENDIX A 
CORRESPONDENCE AND RETURNS REGARDING SCHOOL COMMITTEE 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
THE lliiU.IAM MITCHELL SCHOOL 
NEEDHAM, MASSACHUSETTS 
July 25 1 1957 
As a dQctoral student at Boston University, I am making a 
study of the legal aspects of public school administration, 
particularly those areas affecting the elementary school prin-
cipal at work, As a first step, I wish to make an analysis of 
the school committee rules and regulations of the cities and 
towns of Massachusetts, 
I would appreciate very much your sending to me a copy of 
the rules and regulations of the school committee in your com-
munity or communities and such other directives that may pre-
scribe the duties and the areas of responsibility of the ele-
mentary school principals, A sta~1ed 1 addressed envelope is 
enclosed for your convenience, 
Thank you for your co-operation in this matter, 
Sincerely yours, 
Herbert Rouisse 
Principal 
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THE WILLIAM MITCHELL SCHOOL 
NEEDHAM, MASSACHUSETI'S 
October 21, 1957 
In July, as part of my doctoral study at Boston University, I sent 
to your office a request for a copy of the rules and regulations adopt-
ed by your school committee for the administration of your school system. 
I realize that the request may have been made at an inopportune time. 
I hope that this second request may be better timed to receive a favor-
able answer from you. I have received responses from some sixty per 
cent of the systems and- I feel ths t the large proportion of responses 
within reach might give a truly representative picture of the state in 
this matter. 
Would you please take just one minute to forward a copy of the 
rules and regulations from your community or communities? If you have 
none to forward, would you please check the appropriate statement at 
the bottom of this letter and return it to me in the enclosed self-
addressed envelope? If you are a union superintendent, would you 
please indicate the status for each of your communities? 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Thank you very much for your help. 
Sincerely yours, 
Herbert Rouisse 
Principal 
We have no such copy of rules and regulations published in our 
community. 
The rules and regulations are in the process of revision. 
I am enclosing a copy of the current rules and regulations. 
We have none at present. We are in the process of development. 
We have a set of rules and regulations, but there are no copies 
available to forward. 
CJ 
a 
D 
0 
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EIGHTY-NINE CITIES AND TOWNS SUBMITTING 
RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR ANALYSIS 
Acton 
Agawam 
Amherst 
Andover 
Arlington 
Ashfield 
Athol 
Attleborough 
Avon 
Bedford 
Bellingham 
Braintree 
Brockton 
Brookline 
Buckland 
Canton 
Chelsea 
Clinton 
Cohasset 
Colrain 
Dunstable 
Duxbury 
Easthampton 
Easton 
Erving 
Everett 
Fall River 
Franklin 
Greenfield 
Groton 
Haverhill 
Ipswich 
Kingston 
Leominster 
Leverett 
Lexington 
Longmeadow 
Lynn 
Malden 
Manchester 
Marlborough 
Maynard 
Medford 
Melrose 
Mendon 
Merrimack 
Methuen 
Milton 
Montague 
Nantucket 
Needham 
New Bedford 
Newton 
New Salem 
North Adams 
Northbridge 
Palmer 
Pelham 
Pepperell 
Pittsfield 
Plymouth 
Quincy 
Salem 
Salisbury 
Shelburne 
Shutesbury 
Somerville 
Southbridge 
South Hadley 
Spencer 
Springfield 
Stockbridge 
Swampscott 
Taunton 
Topsfield 
Tyngsborough 
Wakefield 
Walpole 
Waltham 
Warren 
Watertown 
Wendell 
Weymouth 
Westfield 
Westwood 
Wilbraham 
Williamsburg 
Winchester 
Wrentham 
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SIXTY CITIES AND TOWNS HAVING NO COPY OF PUBLISHED RULES 
AND REGULATIONS AVAILABLE FOR MAILING 
Ashby 
Ashland 
Belmont 
Bernardston 
Beverly 
Boston 
Chicopee 
Chilmark 
Edgartown 
East Bridgewater 
East Longmeadow 
Falmouth 
Fitchburg 
Framingham 
Gardner 
Gay Head 
Gill 
Gloucester 
Hadley 
Hamilton 
Hingham 
Holden 
Holyoke 
Lawrence 
Leicester 
Leyden 
Lunenburg 
Mansfield 
Marblehead 
Medfield 
Middleborough 
Millis 
Natick 
Norfolk 
Northampton 
North Andover 
North Attleborough 
Northfield 
North Reading 
Oak Bluffs 
Oakham 
Paxton 
Peabody 
Plainville 
Reading 
Revere 
Rutland 
Scituate 
Stoneham 
Tisbury 
Townsend 
Warwick 
West Springfield 
West Tisbury 
Whitman 
Williamstown 
Wilmington 
Winchendon 
Woburn 
Worcester 
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ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY TOWNS REPORTING NO PUBLISHED 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Abington 
Acushnet 
Alford 
Ashburnham 
Auburn 
Ayer 
Barnstable 
Barre 
Becket 
Belchertown 
Berkley 
Berlin 
Billerica 
Blackstone 
Blanford 
Bolton 
Bourne 
Boxborough 
Boylston 
Bridgewater 
Brimfield 
Brookfield 
Burlington 
Carlisle 
Carver 
Charlemont 
Charlton 
Chatham 
Chelmsford 
Cheshire 
Chester 
Chesterfield 
Clarksburg 
Concord 
Conway 
Cummington 
Dalton 
Danvers 
Dartmouth 
Dedham 
Deerfield 
Dighton 
Dracut 
Dudley 
East Brookfield 
Eastham 
Egremont 
Essex 
Fairhaven 
Florida 
Foxborough 
Freetown 
Goshen 
Gosnold 
Granby 
Granville 
Great Barrington 
Groveland 
Halifax 
Hancock 
Hanover 
Hanson 
Hardwick 
Harvard 
Harwich 
Hatfield 
Hawley 
Heath 
Hinsdale 
Holland 
Holliston 
Hopedale 
Hopkinton 
Hubbardston 
Hull 
Huntington 
Lakeville 
Lancaster 
Lanes borough 
Lee 
Lenox 
Lincoln 
Littleton 
Ludlow 
Lynnfield 
Marion 
Marshfield 
Mashpee 
Mattapoisett 
Middlefield 
Middleton 
Milford 
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ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY TOWNS REPORTING NO PUBLISHED 
RULES AND REGULATIONS (CONT.) 
Millbury 
Millville 
Monroe 
Monson 
Monterey 
Montgomery 
New Ashford 
New Braintree 
Newbury 
New Marlborough 
Northborough 
North Brookfield 
Norton 
Norwell 
Orange 
Orleans 
Otis 
Oxford 
Pembroke 
Peru 
Petersham 
Phillipston 
Plainfield 
Plympton 
Princeton 
Randolph 
Raynham 
Rochester 
Rockland 
Rockport 
Rowe 
Royalston 
Russell 
sandersfield 
Sandwich 
Saugus 
Savoy 
Seekonk 
Sharon 
Sheffield 
Shirley 
Shrewsbury 
Somerset 
Southampton 
Southborough 
Southwick 
Sterling 
Stoughton 
Stow 
Sturbridge 
Sudbury 
Sunderland 
Swansea 
Templeton 
Tewksbury 
Tolland 
Tyringham 
Wales 
Wareham 
Washington 
Wayland 
Webster 
Wellesley 
Wenham 
Westborough 
West Boylston 
West Bridgewater 
West Brookfield 
Westford 
Westhampton 
Westminister 
West Newbury 
Weston 
Westport 
Whately 
Windsor 
Winthrop 
Worthington 
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APPENDIX B 
JURY CORRESPONDENCE AND MATERIALS 
Dr. William O'Keefe 
Boston College Law School 
Boston, Mass. 
Dear Dr. O'Keefe, 
COPY 
William Mitchell School 
Needham, Mass. 
March 1, 1958 
I am preparing a doctoral dissertation at Boston 
University in the field of school law. The problem is a 
determination of the extent to which Massachusetts 
elementary school principals have knowledge of certain 
legal aspects of public education. From a study of the 
literature of the field and many cases, I have developed 
questions for use as the basis of the evaluation instr~ 
ment. To validate these questions and especially the 
stated answers and supporting reasons, I wish to submit 
them to a jury of experts in the field, 
Thus would you, an expert in this field in the 
Commonwealth, extend me the privilege of your service in 
this capacity? This request, approved by my chief advisor, 
Dr. Harold Gear, is being made to the following experts in 
the field: 
Dr. Robert Anderson, Assistant Dean, Boston 
University Law School 
Mr. Raymond Fitzgerald, Deputy Commissioner of 
Education 
Mr. Wayne Holmes, Professor of School Law, 
Westfield Teachers College 
Dr. William O'Keefe, Professor of Law, Boston 
College 
Dr. Albert Purvis, Dean, School of Education, 
University of Massachusetts 
Your services would consist of the reading of a series 
of questions and stated answers and indicating simply your 
approval or disapproval of the question and its correspond-
ing answer. Your assistance will be a great service for 
me, and I hope eventually, a service for Massachusetts 
principals. 
Will you please signify your acceptance of my 
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COPY (Cont.) 
invitation on the enclosed card? Upon receipt of your 
acceptance, I will forward the materials to you or make 
an appointment to bring the materials and discuss them 
with you as you indicate on the enclosed reply card. 
Thank you for your consideration. 
Very truly yours, 
Herbert A. Rouisse 
Principal 
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COPY 
REPLY CARD FOR ENCLOSURE IN REQUEST LETTER TO JURY 
Herbert Rouisse, Principal 
William Mitchell School 
Needham, Mass. 
Dear Mr. Rouisse, 
1. I accept your invitation to serve as a member 
of your jury. 
2. Please forward the necessary materials by mail. 
3. Please make an appointment to bring the materials 
to me. 
4. I cannot serve as a member of your jury. 
(signed) 
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Dr. William O'Keefe 
Boston College Law School 
Boston, Mass. 
Dear Dr. O'Keefe, 
COPY 
William Mitchell School 
Needham, Mass. 
March 15, 1958 
Thank you very much for consenting to serve as a 
member of the jury for my dissertation. Enclosed you 
will find a list of forty-three questions. My answer to 
each question with supporting reasons follows each ques-
tion. All questions refer to public school situations 
in Massachusetts. · 
Will you indicate your complete approval of a ques-
tion and its corresponding answer by placing an A imme-
diately to the left of the number of the question. If 
you challenge the correctness of the answer, doubt the 
applicability of the stated legal principles in Massa-
chusetts. or cannot accept the question as being clear, 
place an N immediately to the left of the number of 
the question. I would appreciate any comments on or 
criticisms of the material, Please feel free to write 
in any remarks. 
If you should so desire, I would be most happy to 
meet with you at your convenience to discuss the materials. 
An early response would be greatly appreciated. 
Thank you again for your valuable assistance. 
Very truly yours, 
Herbert A. Rouisse 
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1. A woman attending a social in a school building hired for 
that purpose was injured in a fall caused by the icy conditions 
or the steps in a poorly lighted entrywayG In case or suit by 
the woman, the school departnent would be liable for dnnages. 
PALSE In Massachusetts, the school coMMittee is not liable 
in tort. Except in those states where there are statutes 
specifically autho:rizinR suits againat the school districts 
for torts, the common law rule of non-liability is well-
established. Warburton v. Quincy, 309 Mass. 111, sweeney 
v. Boston, 309 11ass. 106. 
2. A teacher, enployed on a year's contract. was disnlssed 1n 
the niddle or the school year when it became known in the 
town that the teaoher had been indicted tor adultery in the 
locality in which he had served the previous year. The case 
was eventually dropped without a decision being reached. The 
teacher sued the school oomnittee tor recovery ot his salary 
tor the renaindel' ot the school year from the til>le or his 
discha~ge on the ground that he had been disMissed without 
cause • The court would awal'd the teacher hie salary tor the 
remainde~ ot the cont~act pe~iod. 
FALSE A teache~ is supposed to be an exenplar of youth. 
Good reputation is essential to the greatest usefulness or 
a teacher. The fact of an actual ind1ctnent could well 
cast substantial doubt in the ninde of the students and 
the co~un1ty to the etteot of reducing the efficiency ot a 
teacher and thus stands as a reasonable ground to~ disnissal. 
Freeman v. Bourne, 170 Mass. 289, 49 N.E. 435. Gover v. 
Stovall, 237 xy, 17?.6 35 s. w. (?.d) 24. 
). A fourth grade boy, &fter reaching his home in the afte~noon, 
threw atones at other pupils on thei~ way from school. He 
waa punished by the school principal the next day for this 
action. The parent took 1saue with the principal on the 
ground that tho school authorities had no control over a 
pupil once he had reached home. The principal acted within 
hie legal rights. 
TRUE Exan1nat1on of the authorities reveals that the true 
:c;sr or the teacher's J.Oip,ht and jurisdiction to punish for 
offenses not committed on school property but after the 
return to the parental abode, to be not the time and the 
place of the offense, but its effect upon the Morale and 
efficiency or the school, whether it is in fnct detrinental 
to ita good order and the welfare and advancenent of the 
pupils therein. If the conduct punished for is detriMental 
to the beat interesta of the schools, 1t is pun1shableo 
0 1 Rourke v. Walker, 125 A. 25. (Conn.). 
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4• In the absence of a school conmitteo ~ule forbidding the 
practice, a classroOM teacher has the legal right to 
adninister corporal punishAent to a pupil to~ violation 
ot school rules. 
TRUE The lW.ssnchuaotta statutes Make no F!ention of corporal 
punishMent. Thus the oonnon law principle would apply. As 
stated in Corpus Juris, " •••• a school teacher. in so far as 
it MaY be necessary to the Maintenance of the discipline and 
efficiency or the school •••• may inflict reasonable corporal 
punish~nt upon a pugil for insubordination. disobedience. 
or other F!lsconduct. 
5. A tenure teacher was disnissed by the co~ittee following 
all the necessary steps, but in the face of a recoMMenda-
tion by the superintendent that the teacher not be disnissed. 
The dianissBl was legal. 
TRUE The statute states only that the superintendent muat 
give his reco~endation. but not that the school comn1ttee 
must act in accordance with the ~ecomnendation. Sheldon 
v. Hopedale, 276 f~ss. 230, 177 N.E. 94. 
6. The school comMittee excluded a pupil from school for his 
l'efueal, at his parent• s insistence, to pay for a set or 
books danaged through his carelessness. The eonn1ttee 
acted within its rights. 
F'AT.SE To puniah a child tor carelessness ill to punish it 
when there is no intent to do wrong or violate rules. 
No rule is reasonable which requires of pupils what they 
cannot do. State v. Vanderbilt, 18 N.E. 266. (Ind.); 
Perkins v. West Des l1o1nes Independent School District& 
S6 Iowa 76. 9 N.w. 356. 
7• Instruction 1n the effects of alcoholic drinks on the 
hUMan systen is required to be given in all regular public 
schools. 
TRUE c. L. Ch. 71, s. l expressly states that "In connection 
~ physiology and hygiene instruction as to bhe effects 
or alcoholic drinks •••• sha~l be given to all pupils in 
all schools under public control •••• ", 
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B. A principal is legally classified as a toacher. 
TRUE According to the Masaachuaetta atatutese there nre but 
~classes or professional eMployees or the school committee, 
teachers and superintendents. Sect. 42A at Ch. 71, in 
establishing tenure protection tor principals, merely 
establishes procedural conditions for disMissal and does not 
establish a now class or professional eMployee. The leading 
Massachusetts case on the point and an often-cited case 
nationally, Boody v. Barnstable. 276 Mass. 134, 177 NoEo 78, 
defines a principal as "a teacher with special duties or 
direction and llUUlagel'lent." 
9. A school oo~ittee voted to furnish transportation out or 
tax f'u.nda onl.r to public school pupils. withholding that 
transportation from parochial school pupils. The vote was 
in line with the wishes or a large Majority of the townsa 
population. Such a vote could be enforced. 
PA~~E G. L. Ch. 76. s. 1 give• to pupils attending parochial 
and private schools the a~ rights to transportation as those 
enjored bf pupils or public ochools. Quinn v. Plynouth. 125 
N. E. (2d) 410 {Mase.) 
10. The state legislature, it it should deem it desirable• could 
enact a statute through which tree textbooks would be furnished 
to parochial school pupils out or public tax funds. 
TRUE The Suprene Court or ~he United States has validated a 
iiirute of Louisiana which provided free texts to pupils of 
parochial schools from tax fundso Cocoran v. Board of Educa-
tion, 281 u. s. 370. 
11. The school committee passed a rule forbidding the wearing or 
netal clips on the heels of shoee by pupilso A boy, at the 
insistence of his father, continued to wear them to school• 
for which he ilas expelled. The rather broup)lt the matter 
to court on the ground that what a child should wear to school 
was a prerogative or the parent. The court would sustain the 
school committee. 
TRUE A rule forbidding the wearing of M8tal heel plates is a 
riiionable rule and enforceable by school authorities. 
StroMberg v. Prench, 60 N.D. ·750, 236 N.w. 477. 
12. A school coMMittee passed a rule that no child would be 
adMitted to Grade One after the first four weeks of the 
aehool eel'l8stex•. A father t:ried to entar hill six year 
old daur,hter in Grade One six weak.'! after the etart of 
the school year. The girl was within the age liMits eat 
for Grade One and was older than some of the pupils in 
the class. The girl was refused adMission and the 
father sought to have the court coMpel her adMission. 
The court would sustain the school coMMittee. 
TRUE It is within the authority of the school committee 
~ke reasonable rulea governing the adMission or pupils. 
The SUpreMe Judicial Court of Massachusetts has held that 
a rule prohibiting the adMission or a child to fi~st grade 
after four weeks from the beginning of the semester was 
reasonable and enforceable~ Alvord v. Chester, 180 Mass. 20. 
l)o As part Of the physical education cu:r:rieUllm, instruction was 
given in social and square dancing. Two pupils at the 
direction of their father :refused to take part, the ob,1ections 
of the father being on religious and moral grounds. The courts 
would sustain the school authorities in their coMpelling the 
children to participate in this part of the physical educa-
tion curriculUM. 
FALSE The state or any of its agencies have no :ri~ht to 
deprive parents of thai~ natural and constitutional right 
to r,ove:rn the noral and ethical conduct of their children. 
Hardwick v. F:ruitridr;e School District, .54 Cal. App., 
20.5 Pac. 49. 
14. An upper grade teacher had a pupil, with the aid of a key, 
correct the papers of fellow pupils. A girl in the class 
becane diat~aup,ht when her papers were incorrectly p,:raded 
by the pupil. At the refusal of the teacher to change this 
practice and or the school committee to direct the teacher 
to grade the pupil's work himself, the father refused to 
send the child to school. A court would hold the girl and 
the father guilty of violating the conpulsory attendance 
law 1n such circUMstances. 
TRUE The deteZOMination of the procedure and managenent and 
alrection of pupils and atudiea rests in the wise discretion 
and sound judgment of the teachers and Bchool connittee. So 
held in a case of siMilar nature by the SupreMe Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts, Wulff v. Wakefield 0 221 Masc. 427, 
109 N.E. 356o 
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15o A tenure principal caMpaigned for a candidate for election 
to the school colll!'littee to the ex·i;ent of helping to circulate 
.fliers, sign a petition, and making a mild supporting Bpeech. 
None of this was done on school time or interfered with the 
principal's work. Upon the election of the opposing candidate. 
the principal was disMissed on the grounds of that political 
activity. The court would sustain the committee in the 
discharge. 
FALSE A teacher does not lose his political rights when he 
becomes a teacher. Where the political activity waa carried 
on outside of school and school hours and was cOMpletely 
separated from his work, such political activity does not 
constitute legal grounds for disMissal. Gardner v. North 
Little Rock Special School District, 166 Ark., 466, 257 S.lv. 73. 
16. The school committee of a small town voted to close the 
schools tor the final two months or the school ~ear with the 
onset of an epideMic of Asiatic Flu of severe intensity. 
A first year teacher, under contract for the school year~ 
was relieved of her duties for that time with no pay. The 
court would order the school connittee to pay the teacher 
tor that period. 
TRUE Nothing will excuse the perfornance of a contract 
except an act of God 0 or of a public eneMy, or the 
interdiction of the law operating as the sole and direct 
cause of the failure. In the absence of special provisions 
to the contrary written into the contract. the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts has ruled that a teacher eo 
deprived of his teaching duties was entitled to recover his 
salary. Libby v. Douglas, 175 MaBs. 128, 55 N.E. 808. 
17. A teacher was given a contract by the Superintendent of 
Schools with the knowledge of but without for~l action by 
the school connittee. After serving for three months and 
receiving pa1, the teacher was disMissed by the school 
co~ittee for reason of general dissatisfaction with his 
work. althou~h:, there was no hearing nor were any specific 
causes ~or disnissal given. The court would order the 
school co~lttee to pay the teacher for the reMainder of the 
year. 
FALSE The authority to elect teachers rests aolely with the 
school coi'II'tittee. The superintendent does not have and cannot 
be given the power to contract with a teachero A teacher's 
contract !a such circunstancss is invalid and there can be no 
recovery. Pulvino v. Yar~outh0 286 Mass. 21, 189 NoEo 599. 
18~ The state legislature aupe~viaes all education within 
the state~ If• in the opinion of the ler,1slat~e, nore 
effective supervision coUld be given by ~equ1'1'ing all 
pup1b attending school in cOMpliance "tr1th the coMpulsory 
school law to attend public schoolsa the lep,lslat~e has 
the authol'ity to pass and enforce such le!~islation. 
PA~SP. The state has the authol'lty to conpel that all 
eh1fdren be educated, but it cannot conpel that such 
education be in public schools solelyo Such a statute 
passed by the Oregon leglslat~e was invalidated by the 
united ~tates Pupreme courto Pierce v. society of the 
Sisters, 268 u.s. 510o 
19. A pupil who refuses to be vaccinated on grounds of 
t'el1(1ious scruples against the.practice l!W.y enter aehool 
without a vaccination at the written request of his 
parents on those religious grounds. 
PALSE It has been held in Massachusetts that religious 
~crup~es notwithstanding, a child ~st be vaccinated to 
enter the public schools. G. Lo Ch. 76, s. 15. 
Co~nwealth v. Greene, 268 Mass. 583, Commonwealth Vo 
Chllds, 299 Mass. 367. 
20. A pupil May be exeNpted from examinations for vision 
and hearing in the public schools as required by the 
statutes by written request of his parents on relir,ious 
p;rounds. 
TRUF. Ch. 71, ~. 57 specifically authorizes the 
exeMption of a puoil frOM physical exaninationa in 
school on the written request of the parents for 
reli~ious reasons on the condition that laws relating 
to coMMunicable diseases shall not be violated. 
21. Textbooks nay be adopted for use in a school systeN 
through their selection by a committee of teachers and 
principals, after a careful consideration of texts in 
the field and their relationship with the course of 
study. 
FA~~E Oh. 71, s. 50 states that a change in textbooks 
ah811 be made by a vote of two thirds of the whole 
school comnittee. This 1s a discretionary power of 
the co~ttee which May not be delep,ated. 
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22. Near the end ol' a calendar year- the~ school ooMnittee 
voted to transfer unexpended funds in the operations 
account in the budget to the salaries acc<Junt which had 
been depleted by unusually largo expenditures for 
substitute teachers and replacenont teachers. The 
finance coMMittee and the selectnen asked the court to 
prohibit sueh transfer of funds. Tho court would 
proh!bit such a transfer of funds. 
PALSE No statute stipulates that the school cOMMittee 
MUst Make and contain itself to a segrep,ated budget. So 
long as the school cOMMittee stays within the total 
an.ount of the budget it May transf'er funds f:rom one 
account to another. Leonard v. Sprinp,f'teld, 241 
Mass. 325. 135 N.E. 459o 
23. A school comn1ttee, by a Majority vot~ • elected the 
bl'other-1n-law of a school col'll'litteeMat• to a pl'1ncipnl-
ship. The case was taken to coUl't by a rejected 
candidate on the gl'ound that there was some evidence of 
bad faith on the pal't or the conmittee nnd that the vote 
Of the COMMittee Was against the ~ecomrnendation Of the 
superintendent. The court would sustain the action of 
the coM'!l.itteeo 
TRUE There ia no anti-nepotian law in Massachusetts. 
which would invalidate tho election on the baais of the 
~elat1onahip of the candidate to a school coMMittee 
~mbe~o As to the question of bad faith, the Massachusetts 
Suprene Judicial Court indicated in the Kelley decision 
that it could not inquire into a question of bad faith 
on the part of the comMitteeo Kelley Vo Watertown, 3J0 
Mass. 150; Pavey, v. Medford. 333 Mass. 70. 
24. A tenure teacher was disMissed by a sehool coMMittee 
following the required procedures on the ground that 
he had refused to answer questions as to his connections 
with the Oomnunist Party by pleading the Fifth Anend-
~nto The disMissed teache~ petitioned the court to 
order his re-instateMent on the ground that it was 
illegal to disMiss a teacher for availinp, hiMself or a 
constitutional right. The court would sustain the action 
ot the school co~ittee. 
TRUE The Boston School CoMMittee disMissed a tenure 
teacher for his refusal to answer questions regarding 
his associations with the CanMunist Pal'ty. The court 
held the disMissal was leg&l because the refusal to 
answer questiona would undermine the public confidence 
in h1M and react unfavorably upon the school syste~" 
Faxon v. Boston, 331 Mass. 541. 
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2So A tenure teacher was given notice of his inter~ad 
di&Rissal. All requi~ed procedures were followed. 
The statenent of chargee maintained generally that 
the teacher was incOMpetent. At the hearing, the 
only witnesses heard were those testifying to the 
cOMpetency of the teacher. No other teatlnony or 
evidence was offeredq At a later meeting of the 
co~ttee, the comn1ttee voted to dl~iss the teacher. 
The court would sustain the action ot the coMMittee. 
FALSE Ch. 71. s. 42. in establishing the procedure 
for the d1sn1ssal of a tenure teacher, states "•••• 
nor unless the charge or chargee shall have been 
substantiated;". The court has held such substantiation 
lllllet. bemade b1 the presentation of witnesses or evidence 
and i'e lll&Zldato:ry apon the cor.ll'littee. Ch-aves v. 
Wellea~ey, 299 Mass. 80, 12 N.E. (2d) 176. 
26. The public schools are easent1all,- a part of local 
Municipal government. The city government can exercise 
control over the schools in all matters not specifically 
prescribed to the school comnittee by the statutes. 
PALSE The school comMittee acting in its corporate 
capacity ia a state agency and no part of local 
governnent. In the Leonard case, the court stated that 
the only control over the actions of tho school 
coMMittee by the local authorities would be the closing 
ot schools after the ~1n1mun nUMber of days required 
by statute were reachedo In the Moree case. it wae 
stated. that the decision of the school coMMittee was 
" •••• the decision or the cOMMOnwealth and is to control 
••·•"• Leonard v. Springfield, 241 Mass. 325, 135 N.E. 
459. Morae v. Ashley, 193 Mass. 294. 
27. With the exception or the appropriation for transportation 
the city governnent nuat raise the ~ount of noney as 
atlpulated by the aohool comMittee in ita estimate or 
expendit~ee, when properly prepared and voted within 
their authority, including funda to pay for a raise 
voted to all school personnel by the school committee. 
TRUE Ch. 71, s. 34 makes 1t M&ndatozoy upon the town or C1t1 to appropriate the anount required by the school 
coMMittee. This has been held applicable to all 
necessary eXpanses of the operation of the schools, 
except for transportation which ma1 be controlled by 
the oity. Ring v. Wob~nl 311 Masso 679; Hayes vQ 
Brockton 313 Mass. 641. 4~ N.E. (2d) 643. 
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28. fl. school corn11ttee in a snall town voted to close a 
school in one section of the town end transport those 
pupils to another school feeling that the numbers of 
pupils did not warrant keeping the school open. A 
referendUM submitted to the voters showing a strong 
wish to have said school re-opened to avoid transporting 
the children and to keap the children in their own 
section of town would be binding upon the echool 
comnittee. 
FALSE The action or the school committee within its 
authority is final and not subject to review by 
town or city authorities. In a ainilar case, the 
court sustained tho right of the committee to nake 
all decisions regarding the assignment of pupils to 
schools. within the district. Morse v. Ashley, 193 
Mass. 29!~. 
29. At a hearing on the intended dismissal of a tenure 
principal two of the three school connitteo men testi-
fied agaiiU!t the principal. After their testiMony they 
voted to dismiss the principal. Such testiMony against 
the tenure principal would invalidate the vote of these 
two coMmitteeman. 
FAL~E A school committeeMan may testify as a witness 
in a disl'lissal hearing and resume hie seat as a 
comMitteeman to participate in the vote. To rule 
otherwise would be to eliMinate the testir1ony of the 
very persons who mip,ht best be in a position to know 
the facts in the situation. Moran v. Littleton, 317 
f1ass. 591. 
30. A principal, on tenure as a principal, whose school is 
replaced by a new, larger school, has a prior clail'l to 
the principalship of the new school. 
FALSE The clear duty of the school conmittee is to 
select for a new position in the system the person t-rhom 
they judge best fitted for it. The principalship of the 
new school is not the principalahip the principal had 
previously held. Thus the tenure principal is not 
entitled to be appointed to the new position to any 
greater degree than any qualified person. .Jantzen v. 
Chell'lsf'oi'd$ 332 Haas. 175o 
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31. The state law eays, "Each teacher shall cauae the pupils 
under his charge to sal11te the flag and recit~ in u:ni.son 
•••• the 'Pledge of Allegiance•." Thus a teacher can 
COI'lpel a pupil of Jehovah Witness background t;o coMply 
with that statute. 
FALSE Prio:r to 191~3, f!lany court decisions held that a 
puptl could be coMpelled to participate in the salute 
to the flag and the "oath of Allegiance". However. in 
that year. the United States supreMe court held that a 
law COI'lpelling the flag salute was in violation of the 
First Anendnent g11arantee of reli~ious freedono 
Nicholls v. L)rnn. 297 Mass. 65, 7 N. E. ( 2u) 577. 
West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 u.s. 624, 63 s. ct. 1178. 
32. A nan served two years as a taache:r and then two years 
as principal 1n the sane building. on April lst of his 
Po11rth year in the building, the school co~lttee, by a 
three to two vote, voted to return the man to the claas-
roOI'l• wlthollt prior notice, a statenent of charges, or a 
hearing. The man was legally removed from the principal-
ship. 
TRUE According to Ch. 71, s. 42A, a person attain6 
tenure as a principal by serving More than three years 
in that position. The Man had tenure as a teacher, but 
his return to a teaching position was merely a re-
assignment of duties, which did not require the steps 
necessary for the denotion of a tenure principal. Kelley 
v. Watertown, 330 Mass. 150. 
33. A teacher was elected by the school coMMittee to serve 
as a regular part-tiMe teacher. She served in this 
capacity for several Months, after which tiMe she tras 
elected to a full-tine position in which she served for 
the renainder of that year and the two succeedinr, years. 
Up.:m her election in the sprinp, of the third year, the 
teacher attains tenure status. 
T'lUE The law :•ecoe;nizes no such classitication as a 
part-tiMe teacher. A teacher having served three ye11rs 
at the election of the school coMMittee and having bean 
elected to serve a fourth year has fulfilled the atatutory 
requirenents for tenure, althou~h part of the service 
waa as a regular part-tine teacher. Fr;re v. Lelceate1•, 
300 Haas. 537, 16 N.E. (2d) 41. 
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34. An upper grade boy was expelled by the school oomnittee 
on the grounds of continual acta of playfulness and 
mischief. The parent challenged the expulsion on the 
ground that the boy had not been guilty of any gross 
acts or l'liscondueto The court would sustain the 
colllllittee. 
~ The school col'll'l1ttee bas the authority, to be 
exercised in good ta1th, to expel a pupil from the 
public schools When hie behavior interferes with the 
discipline and nanageMent or the schools. Continual 
acts of n1schief and playfulness, although not mutinous 
or gross, which interfere with that discipline and 
manageMent are sufficient grounds for exclusion. 
Bodkins v. aockport, 105 Mass. 475. 
3$. A principal suspended a pupil for an alleged act or 
nia-conduct and refused to re-adAit him until the pupil 
should acknowledge the.l'l1sconduct and apologize tor it. 
The rather asked tor a hearing before the comnittee, 
but the coMMittee sustained the principal in his actions 
and refused to grant a hearing until the pupil should 
acknowledge his misconduct and apologize. Subsequent 
investigation revealed that the boy had been guilty or 
the alleged Misconduct. The pupil was legally excluded 
r:rolll school. 
PALSE According to Ch. 76, s. 17, a child May not be 
exclUded ~0111 the public schools without a hearing 
before the committee. The court ruled that even where 
the child was guilty of the misconduct. the exclusion 
without a hearing waa illegal. Bishop v. Howley, 165 
Mass. 460, 43 N.F.. 191. 
36. In the absence ot a school committee :rule on the 
Matter, a teacher 1a obligated to see that the Bible 
is read daily in class. 
T~UE Ch. 71, s. 31 states specifically that "A portion 
or the Bible shall be read daily •••• '1 • 
37. Only the school committee has the power to appoint a 
teacher or a principal. A superintendent cannot be 
delegated the power to appoint teachers at his 
discretion during the sW1111ler nonths. 
TRUE Ch. 71, s. 38. states specifically that the 
school committee shall elect and contract with teachers. 
This 1s a Mandatory discretionary power which cannot be 
delegated. Pulv1no v. Yarnouth, 286 Mas~. 21, 189 
N. E. 599. 
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38, An elenentary school pupil was severely burned on 
exoosea hot. stean pipes in a classroom in the process 
of doing phys1cal exe~cises at the direction of a 
teacher, The school district may be held liable for the 
resulting damages. 
FA~~E The connon-law doctrine of non-liability of the 
school dlstrtct for ita own acta or the acts of' its 
el'lployees ia well-established in Massachusetts. 
Molinari v. Boston. 333 Mass 394. 
39. A nenber or the school corom1ttee. participating 1n the 
oorpora1·a action of the school coi'll'littee is a town or 
city oi'ticel', 
FALSF ~~ducation 1s a function or the state. School 
a!Bt~lcta al'e corporations organized as agencies or 
tho state for the purpose ot adMinistering the public 
ac:1ools. School cOI'Il'11ttee nenbero are state officers 
c:1nrged with the responsibility of adMinistering the 
~.aw concerning the public schools within theil' districts. 
AAerican Ju~isprudence. Vol. 47. 
4.C'. A eonnon practice is to notify teachers of the election 
to tenure and then in subsequent years Merely notify the 
teacher of his continuance in position or to eive no 
notification at all. In either circunatanoe. the 
teacher 1a eMployed undel' contract even in the absence 
or a written contract. 
TRUE A tenure teacher, who has been notified of 
election to tenure and who has received subsequently no 
written contract is, in the eyes of the law. serving 
under contract and his salary righte are fixed by 
the rules of the school coMMittee providing for 
nininuro and naxiMUM salaries with annual increases. 
Callahan v. Hoburn, 306 l1ass. 265, 28 N.E, (2d) 9. 
41. At recess tine sone eighth grade boys were riding 
bic~reles in a careless fashion anong ~rounger pupils 
on the playground. The teacher on duty saw this but 
took no action to stop ito A first grade pupil lias 
severely injured by one of the bicycles. The teacher 
would be liable for danap,es 1n case of a s~it. 
FAISE Failure to act where there is a duty to act is 
a case of non-feasance which, in ~mesachuaetts. is not 
actionable in court. The teacher roip,ht well be held 
to account by the school co~ttee, but would not be 
11able.for damages in court. Fulp;oni v, Jchnaton, 302 
Haas. 421 0 19. N.E. (2d) 54?.. 
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42. A rather. displeased with his aonts report card~ refused 
to sign the card. After seve~al roquests and donands were 
ignored, the school co~ttee suspended the child. The 
ratho~ challenged the suopan3ion 1n court on the ground 
that a child could not be punished f'or the violation of 
a school rule by the pa~ent. The court would sustain 
the school coMMittee. 
TRUE A parent is bound by the rules o£ the school as 
is the pupil, if the parent wishes to avail hiMself of 
the benefit of free public education for" his child •. 
The courts have held that a rule requ1~1ng parents to 
sign and return report cards is reasonable, and upon 
failure or the parent to coMply with the rule, the pupil 
r>18.1 be expelbd. Bourne v. State, 52 N.tor. 710 (Neb.). 
43. Two members or i school coMMittee were absent at a 
hearing preceding the intended disnieflal vote on a 
ten~e teacher0 Prio~ to th3 vote, the two absentees 
read a etenor.rnphic transc~ipt or the hearing relating 
to the presentation of evidence and the argUMents o.f 
couneelo The two voted tor disMissal, their" votes 
being necessary to obtain the required two-thirds vote. 
On that contention~ court aet~on would result in t~~ 
reinstateMent of the teacher. 
~ A v~te for d1an1asal is a vote that the evidence 
presented substantiated the charges. such substantiation 
could only be deterN!ned by coMMitteemen pi"eaent at the 
hearing at which t~~ evidence and arguments were 
presented. The reading of a atenoeraphic transcript 
does not qualify a cornnitteenan to vote. 
Perkins v. Quincy, 51 N.E. (2d) 976 (Mass.). 
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APPENDIX C 
TEST OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES 
BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
Please supply the following information. 
meaningful analysis of the data obtained. 
will be held confidential. 
Teaching Principal (50% or more 
-- teaching) 
Supervising Principal 
----Number of Pupils 
----Years experience as principal 
---- Name of Community 
Man Woman (Circle One) 
HERBERT ROUISSE 
It is necessary 
All individual 
2/T ':f':t 
for a 
results 
Degree Status (Check 
Highest) 
None 
----Bachelor's 
----Master's 
--CAGS 
----Doctor's 
Each numbered statement below should be answered by ctrcling the 
correct response to the underlined statement. TRUE, FALSE, DON'T 
KNOW. Below each numbered statement are five lettered statements. 
From one to three of these five lettered statements support the 
correct answer. Circle the letter to the left of each statement 
that supports the answer you have circled. Naturally, if DON'T 
KNOW has been circled, the supporting statements should be omitted. 
All statements refer to a public school situation in Massachusetts. 
There will be a correction for guessing. 
SAMPLE 
32. A woman attending a social in a school building hired for that 
purpose was injured in a fall caused by the icy conditions of the 
steps in a poorly lighted entryway. In case of suit, the school 
committee would be liable for damages. 
TRUE FALSE DON'T KNOW 
A. In Massachusetts, the school committee is not liable in tort. 
B. Warburton v. Quincy found the school committee liable in a 
similar case. 
C. Massachusetts has enacted legislation abrogating the governmen-
tal immunity of school committees. 
D. The common-law rule of non-liability is well established in 
Massachusetts. 
E. Sweeney v. Boston held that the school committee was not liable 
in a similar case. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 1. In the absence of a school committee rule forbidding the prac-
tice, a classroom teacher has the le al ri ht to administer cor oral 
punishmen to a pupil or e. 
TRUE 
A. A Massachusetts statute forbids the use of corporal punishment 
in school. 
B. A Massachusetts statute permits reasonable corporal punishment 
in school. 
c. The Massachusetts statutes are silent on the subject of corporal 
punishment. 
D. A principal, but not a teacher, has the right to administer 
corporal punishment. 
E. The U. S. Supreme Court has upheld corporal punishment by a 
teacher. 
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2. A tenure teacher was dismissed by the school committee, follow-
ing all the necessary steps, but in the face of a recommendation by 
the superintendent that the teacher not be dismissed. The dismissal 
was legal. 
TRUE FALSE DON'T KNOW 
A. A similar case, Sheldon v. Hopedale, held the teacher's dismissal 
to be invalid. 
B. In Gannon v. Russell, the court held that the superintendent was 
not the master of the committee. 
c. The statutes do not require any recommendation from the 
superintendent. 
D. It is within the committee's discretion to decide whether they 
will seek a recommendation from the superintendent. 
E. The statutes require a recommendation by the superintendent on 
such a dismissal. 
3. Instruction in the effects of alcoholic drinks on the human 
system is required to be given in all regular public schools. 
TRUE FALSE DON'T KNOW 
A. The furnishing of such instruction is mandatory upon the 
committee. 
B. Such instruction is required only in secondary schools. 
c. such instruction is within the discretion of the local school 
committee. 
D. A statute requiring such instruction was repealed shortly after 
the end of Prohibition. 
E. Such instruction is required by the statutes. 
4. A school committee voted to furnish transportation out of tax 
funds only to public school pupils, withholding that transportation 
from parochial school pupils. The vote was in line with the wishes 
of a large majority of the town's population. Such a vote could be 
enforced. 
TRUE FALSE DON'T KNOW 
A. Riley v. Hyannis sustained the school committee in such a vote. 
B. The use of tax money to transport parochial school pupils is 
forbidden by the Massachusetts Constitution. 
C. The u. S. Supreme Court has held that transportation of private 
school pupils by use of public funds is legal. 
D. Quinn v. Plymouth held that parochial school pupils were 
entitled to the same transportation rights as public school 
pupils. 
E. The statute specifically guarantees equal transportation 
rights to parochial school pupils. 
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5. The school comm1.ttee passed a rule forbidding the wearing of 
metal clips on the heels of shoes by pupils. A boy, at the 
insistence of his father, continued to wear them to school, for 
which he was expelled. The father brought the matter to court on 
the ground that what a child should wear to school is a prerogative 
of the parent. The court would sustain the school committee. 
TRUE FALSE DON 1T KNOW 
A. A rule of such nature is unreasonable and therefore unenforceable. 
B. Stromberg v. French held that such a rule was within the discre-
tion of the committee and enforceable. 
c. The statutes specifically place the question of school wearing 
apparel within the discretion of the school committee. 
D. In Corrigan v. Fall River, the court held that such a rule was 
within the discretion of the committee and enforceable. 
E. Such a rule would fall within the implied powers of the school 
committee. 
6. A school committee passed a rule that no child would be admitted 
to Grade One after the first four weeks of the school semester. A 
father tried to enter his six year old daughter in Grade One six 
weeks after the start of the school semester. The girl was within 
the age limits set for Grade One and was older than some pupils in 
the class. The girl was refused admission and her fathet' sought 
to have the court compel her admission. The court would sustain 
the school committee. 
TRUE FALSE DON'T KNOW 
A. The compulsory school age, by statute, is six to sixteen. 
B. The right to attend school is a qualified right. 
C. The committee has full discretion as to what children may 
attend public school. 
D. Alvord v. Chester sustained the committee in a similar case. 
E. Simpkins v. Lincoln held for the parent in a similar case. 
7. As part of the physical education curriculum, instruction was 
given in social and square dancing. Two pupils, at the direction 
of their father, refused to take part, the objections of the father 
being on religious and moral grounds. The court would sustain the 
school authorities in their compelling the children to participate 
in this part of the physical education curriculum. 
TRUE FALSE DON'T KNOW 
A. Physical education is not one of the subjects required by 
statute. 
B. An agency of the state has no right to deprive parents of their 
right to govern the moral and ethical conduct of their children. 
c. There has been no case in Massachusetts in which the point has 
been at issue. 
D. A California case, Hardwick v. Fruitridge School District, held 
for the parents in a similar case. 
E. A Utah case, Clausen v. Cedar Hills School District, held for 
the school authorities in a similar case. 
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8. An upper grade teacher had a pupil, with the aid of a key, 
correct the papers of fellow pupils. A girl in the class became 
distraught when her papers were incorrectly graded by the pupil. 
At the refusal of the teacher to change this practice and of the 
school committee to direct the teacher to grade the pupil's work 
himself, the father refused to send the child to school. A court 
would hold the irl and the father uilt of violatin the com ul-
sory a en ance law ances. 
DON'T KNOW 
A. The teacher has the mandatory duty of correcting pupil work 
himself. 
B. Wulff v. Wakefield held that school authorities had acted 
unreasonably in such a case. 
C. The determination of procedures rests with the teachers and the 
committee. 
D. The fact that the pupil doing the correcting erred in that task 
has no bearing on the rights involved. 
E. The failure of the teacher and committee to correct the wrong 
would justify the lack of compliance with the compulsory 
attendance law. 
9. The state legislature supervises all education within the state. 
If, in the opinion of the legislature, more effective supervision 
could be given by requiring all pupils attending school in compliance 
with the compulsory attendance law to attend public schools, the 
legislature has the authority to pass and enforce such legislation. 
TRUE FALSE · DON 1 T KNOW 
A. The U. S. Supreme Court has invalidated such legislation. 
B. Parents have certain rights in the direction of the education 
of their child. 
c. Such a law would violate rights guaranteed by the 14th 
Amendment. 
D. The state has no right to supervise private schools. 
E. Such a statute is in force in certain states. 
10. A child who refuses to be vaccinated on grounds of religious 
scruples against the practice may enter school without a vaccination 
at the written request of his parents on those religious grounds. 
TRUE FALSE DON'T KNOW 
A. In Decatur v. Peabody, such exemption was sustained by the court. 
B. The U. s. Supreme Court has held that vaccination can be 
compelled regardless of religious scruples. 
C. In Commonwealth v. Greene, the court permitted such exemption. 
D. The statute specifically permits such exemption. 
E. The State Department of Education furnishes a form for such 
exemptions. 
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11. A tenure teacher was dismissed by a school committee following 
the required procedures on the ground that he had refused to answer 
questions as to his connections with the Communist Party by pleading 
the Fifth Amendment. The dismissed teacher petitioned the court to 
order his reinstatement on the ground that it was illegal to dismiss 
a teacher for availing himself of a constitutional right. The court 
would sustain the action of the committee. 
TRUE FALSE DON'T KNOW 
A. The dismissal was illegal because the grounds are not listed 
in the statute regarding dismissal of tenure teachers. 
B. A teacher has no constitutional right to plead the Fifth 
Amendment. 
c. A person has no constitutional right to teach. 
D. In Faxon v. Boston, the court held for the teacher in a 
similar case. 
E. A committee may take into account the public feeling toward 
Communism in considering the dismissal of a teacher. 
12. Textbooks may be adopted for school use in a system through 
their selection by a committee of teachers and principals, after a 
careful consideration of the texts in the field and their relation-
ship with the course of study. 
TRUE FALSE DON'T KNOW 
A. The selection of textbooks is within the discretion of the 
superintendent. 
B. The school committee may delegate the selection of texts to 
whatever professional personnel it wishes. 
C. The statute specifies the method by which texts must be adopted. 
D. The statutes are silent on the selection of texts. 
E. None of the above substantiates the correct answer. 
13. The school committee, while lawfully exercising its statutory 
authority, is essentially a part of local municipal government. 
The city government can exercise control over the schools in all 
matters not specifically prescribed to the school committee by the 
statutes. 
TRUE FALSE DON'T KNOW 
A. Public schools are essentially under local control. 
B. The members of the school committee are elected locally. 
C. Heritage v. Dodge held that public schools are essentially a 
local institution. 
D. In Commonwealth v. Randall, the court held, on a question of 
curriculum, that the public schools are essentially a state 
institution. 
E. None of the above answers substantiate the correct answer. 
14. With the exce tion of the a 
the city government must raise he amoun of money as stipulated 
by the school committee in its estimate of expenditures, when 
properly prepared and voted within their authority, including 
funds to pay for a raise voted to all school personnel by the 
committee. 
TRUE FALSE DON'T KNOW 
A. The statute specifically imposes upon the town and cities the 
duties of raising funds for school use as stipulated by the 
school committee. 
B. The finance committee can reduce appropriations involving 
salary raises. 
C. Hayes v. Brockton held that the city must appropriate the 
amount stipulated by the school committee. 
D. The Eastern Mass. Railway Co. case held that the city must 
appropriate for all items stipulated by the school committee 
except for the item on transportation. 
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E. Callahan v. Woburn held that the school committee was subordinate 
to the finance committee and city council in matters of budget. 
15. A tenure teacher was given notice of his intended dismissal. 
All required procedures were followed. The statement of charges 
maintained generally that the teacher was incompetent. At the 
hearing, the only witnesses heard testified to the competency of 
the teacher. No other testimony or evidence was offered. At a 
later meeting, the committee voted to dismiss the teacher. The 
court would sustain the action of the committee. ---
TRUE FALSE DON 1T KNOW 
A. The committee is not bound by strict rules of evidence. 
B. The statute specifically requires that charges be substantiated. 
c. Graves v. Wellesley heard for the committee in a similar case. 
D. At a hearing for the dismissal of a teacher, the committee is 
judge of the credibility of the witnesses. 
E. The burden of proof of the charges lies with the committee. 
the new school. 
TRUE FALSE DON'T KNOW 
A. The duty of the school committee is to select the best qualified 
person for the position. 
B. White v. Stoughton sustained the committee in a similar case. 
c. Jantzen v. Chelmsford sustained the committee in a similar case. 
D. The principalship of the new school is not the principalship 
formerly held by the tenure principal. 
E. None of the above substantiates the right answer. 
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17. The state law says, "Each teacher shall cause the pupils under 
his charge to salute the flag and recite in unison •.•• the 'Pledge 
of Allegiance'." Thus a teacher can compel a pupil of Jehovah 
Witness background to comply with the statute. 
TRUE FALSE DON 1T KNOW 
A. The U. S. Supreme Court has ruled that the saluting and pledg-
ing of allegiance holds no religious significance. 
B. Nicholls v. Lynn held that the flag salute could not be 
compelled. 
c. A teacher has no choice but to enforce the statute without 
exception. 
D. Aiken v. Reading held that such compulsion of the salute and 
pledge was unconstitutional. 
E. None of the above substantiates the correct answer. 
18. A man served two years as a teacher and then two years as a 
principal in the same building. On April 1st of his fourth year 
the building, the school committee, by a three to two vote, voted 
return the man to the classroom without prior notice, a statement 
charges, or a hearing. The man was legally removed from the 
principal ship. 
TRUE FALSE DON'T KNOW 
A. All dismissals voted must be by a two thirds majority. 
B. The man must be notified of the dismissal before April 1st. 
C. The change in positions was merely a reassignment of duties. 
in 
to 
of 
D. The statute states that a person, to attain tenure as a 
principal, must serve in the principalship for over three years. 
E. A demotion is not the same as a dismissal. 
19. An upper grade boy was expelled by the school committee on the 
grounds of continual acts of playfulness and mischief. The parent 
challenged the expulsion on the ground that the boy had not been 
guilty of any gross act of misconduct. The court would sustain the 
committee. 
TRUE FALSE DON'T KNOW 
A. The statute places the authority for expulsion solely with the 
school committee. 
B. Expulsion for misconduct requires the commission of a gross act 
of misconduct. 
C. Expulsion for misconduct lies within the discretion of the 
principal. 
D. Hodgkins v. Rockport held for the parent in a similar case. 
E. Florio v. Spencer held for the committee in a similar case. 
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20, At a hearing on the intended dismissal of a tenure principal, 
two of the three school committeemen testified against the 
principal. After their testimony, they voted to dismiss the 
principal. Such testimony against the principal would invalidate 
the vote of these two committeemen, 
TRUE FALSE DON'T KNOW 
A. Sullivan v, Concord invalidated the committee's action in a 
similar case. 
B. To eliminate the testimony of school committeemen would be to 
silence those in the best position to know the facts. 
C. The committee is not bound by strict rules of evidence. 
D. Moran v. Littleton sustained the committee in a similar case. 
E. In no kind of administrative hearing may a person serve as both 
witness and judge. 
21, A pupil may be exempted from examinations for vision and hearing 
in the ublic schools, as required b statute, b written re uest of 
his parents on re g ous grounds, 
TRUE FALSE DON'T KNOW 
A. The case of Thompkins v. Dover sustained a parent's right to 
such exemption. 
B. The statute specifically authorizes such exemption. 
C. The necessity for efficient vision and hearing in school 
achievement is such that no exemptions can be permitted. 
D. Several court decisions have held that religious grounds cannot 
be maintained in such a situation. 
E. The matter lies within the discretion of the school committee. 
22. A principal suspended a pupil for an alleged act of misconduct 
and refused to readmit him until the pupil should acknowledge the 
misconduct and apologize for it. The father asked for a hearing 
before the committee, but the committee sustained the principal in 
his actions and refused to grant a hearing until the pupil should 
acknowledge his misconduct and apologize. Subsequent investigation 
revealed that the boy had been guilty of the alleged misconduct. The 
pupil was legally excluded from school. 
TRUE FALSE DON'T KNOW 
A. Bishop v, Rowley sustained the committee in a similar case. 
B. Expulsion for misconduct lies within the discretion of the 
principal. 
C. The statute requires a hearing before the committee on the 
question of exclusion for misconduct. 
D. The case would hinge on the fact that the boy was guilty of 
the alleged offense. 
E. Dickinson v. Canton sustained the parent in a similar case. 
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23. In the absence of a school committee rule on the matter, a 
teacher is obligated to see that the Bible is read daily in class, 
TRUE FALSE DON 1T KNOW 
A. The frequency of Bible readings is within the discretion of the 
principal. 
B. The frequency of Bible readings is within the discretion of the 
teacher. 
c. The frequency of Bible readings is within the discretion of the 
superintendent. 
D. The statutes specify the frequency of Bible readings. 
E, None of the above substantiates the correct answer. 
24, At recess time, some eighth grade boys were riding bicycles 
in a careless fashion among younger pupils on the playground. The 
teacher on duty saw this but took no action to stop it. A first 
grade pupil was severely injured by one of the bicycles, The 
teacher would be liable for damages in case of a suit. ---
TRUE FALSE DON 1T KNOW 
A. A teacher in Massachusetts is not liable for damages for failure 
to act. 
B. The school district, and not the teacher, would be liable for 
the pupil's injury. 
c. In Fulgoni v, Johnston, teachers were held not liable for cases 
of nonfeasance. 
D. In a similar case, Carter v. Murphy, the teacher was held liable. 
E. By statute the school committee is liable for the negligence of 
its teachers. 
25. A father, displeased with his son's report card, refused to 
sign the card and return it to school, as required by the school 
rules. After several requests and demands were ignored, the 
school committee suspended the child. The father challenged the 
suspension on the ground that a child could not be punished for a 
violation of a school rule by the parent. The court would sustain 
the committee. 
TRUE FALSE DON'T KNOW 
A. A parent is bound by the rules of the school. 
B. A rule that report cards must be signed by the parents is 
unreasonable. 
c. A committee can deprive a pupil of his right to attend school 
only for the misconduct of the pupil. 
D. In Spiller v. Woburn, the court held for the committee in a 
similar case. 
E. In Bourne v. State, the court held for the committee in a 
similar case. 
APPENDIX D 
TABLES OF VARIANCE ANALYSIS 
Table 1. Analysis of the Variance of the Performance of 
the Principals on the Basis of Years of Expe-
rience in Terms of Total Right Answers 
Source d. f. Sum of Mean FV 
Squares Square 
(1) ( 2) \3) (4) ( 'J J 
Between means •••. 2 25 12.50 1.15 
Within classes ••• 145 1572 10.84 
Total .......... 147 1597 
_y F. 01 -4.78; F.o5=3.06 (Interpolated). 
Table 2. Analysis of the Variance of the Performance of 
the Principals on the Basis of Years of Expe-
rience in Terms of the Corrected Scores 
Source d.f. Sum of Mean FV 
Squares Square 
(1) ( 2) \3) (4) ( 5) 
Between means •.•. 2 692 346.00 1.66 
Within classes ••• 145 30133 207.82 
Total ........•. 147 30825 
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Table 3. Analysis of the Variance of the Performance of 
the Principals on the Basis of College Preparation 
in Terms of Total Right Answers 
Source d .f. Sum of Mean FY 
Squares Square 
l l ) (2) l3) ( '+ ) l5) 
Between means ... 3 41 13.71 1.27 
Within classes •. 144 1556 10.81 
Total ......... 147 1597 
!Y' F.o1=3.9l; F.o5•2.67 (Interpolated). 
Table 4. Analysis of the Variance of the Performance of 
the Principals on the Basis of College Preparation 
in Terms of the Corrected Scores 
Source d.f. Sum of Mean FY 
Squares Square 
ll) (2) l3J (4) l5) 
Between means .•.. 3 434 144.67 0.69 
Within classes ••. 144 30391 211.05 
To ta 1 • ......... 147 30825 
!Y' F.o1•3.9l; F. 05.2.67 (Interpolated). 
Table 5. Analysis of the Variance of the Performance of 
the Principals on the Basis of the Size of School 
Administered in Terms of Total Right Answers 
Source d,f, Sum of Mean FY 
Squares Square 
(1) ( 2) (3) ( 4) \ 5) 
Between means •••• 2 13 6.50 0.60 
Within classes •.. 145 1584 10.92 
Total ......••.• 147 1597 
y F. 01:4.78; F. 05 =3.06 (Interpolated). 
Table 6. Analysis of the Variance of the Performance of 
the Principals on the Basis of the Size of School 
Administered in Terms of the Corrected Scores 
Source d.f. Sum of Mean FY 
Squares Square 
( 1) (2) ( 3) (4) (5} 
Between means •••• 2 9 4.50 0,21 
Within classes ••• 145 30816 212.52 
Total . ......... 147 30825 
_y F, 01 m4,78; F.o5•3.06 (Interpolated). 
'}- •: 
";Ju 
Table 7. Analysis of the Variance of the Performance of 
Men and Women Principals in Terms of Total 
Correct Answers 
Source d.f. Sum of Mean F~ 
Squares Square 
{ 1) { 2) {3) l '+ J l5) 
Between means •.. 1 57 57.00 5.43* 
Within classes •. 146 1540 10.48 
Total .•..•.•.• 147 1597 
~ F.o1=6.81; F_ 05m3.91 (Interpolated). 
* Significant at the five per cent level. 
Table 8. Analysis of the Variance of the Performance of 
Men and Women Principals in Terms of Corrected 
Scores 
Source d.f. Sum of Mean F~ 
Squares Square 
Pl l c: J ljJ l '+ J l ') J 
Between means .... 1 1036 1037.00 5.08* 
Within classes .•• 146 31428 204.03 
Total ......... 147 32464 
~ F.o1=6.81; F.o5=3.91 (Interpolated). 
* Significant at the five per cent level. 
2
_,... 
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Table 9. Analysis of the Variance of the Performance of 
Supervising Principals and Teaching Principals 
in Terms of Total Correct Answers 
Source d .f. Sum of Mean FY 
Squares Square 
(lJ (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Between means •.. l 5 5.00 0.46 
Within classes .•• 146 1592 10.90 
Total .•...•.... 147 1597 
y' F, 01:6.8l; F.o5=3.9l (Interpolated). 
Table 10. Analysis of the Variance of the Performance of 
Supervising Principals and Teaching Principals 
in Terms of the Corrected Scores 
Source d. f. Sum of Mean FY 
Squares Square 
{ l) (2) l3J (4) l5l 
Between means .•.• l 645 645.00 3.11 
Within classes •.. 146 30180 206.71 
Total .......... 147 30825 
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Table 11. Analysis of the Variance of the Performance of 
the Principals on the Basis of Population of 
Community of Employment in Terms of Total 
Right Answers 
Source d.f. Sum of Mean F~ 
Squares Square 
( 1) ( 2 J (3) ( 4) (5T 
Between means .•.• 3 41 13.67 1.27 
Within classes .•• 144 1556 10.81 
Total ........•. 147 1597 
~ F. 01 =3.91; F. 05=2.67 (Interpolated). 
Table 12. Analysis of the Variance of the Performance of 
the Principals on the Basis of Population of 
Community of Employment in Terms of the 
Corrected Scores 
Source d.f. Sum of Mean F~ 
Squares Square 
!.1) ( 2 J (3) ( Ll J 1 ':J J 
Between means ••.• 3 1361 453.67 2.22 
Within classes .•. 144 29464 204.61 
Total ....•••... 147 30825 
~1 F -3.91; F 05=2.67 (Interpolated). :::.; . 01 . 
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